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Abstract 
Employing a single-site exploratory case study research methodology, this study seeks to 
paint a rich and detailed picture of managerial and professional perspectives of the impact 
of clinical governance on the professional autonomy and self-regulation of general 
practitioners (GPs) in a Primary Care Trust (referred to as the Utopian PCT), in the North 
West of England. The study defines clinical governance in the context of general practice; 
identifies the requirements for and barriers to its implementation; explores the role of GP 
Medical Advisers to the PCT and determines whether clinical governance is contributing to 
the deprofessionalisation (Haug 1973; 1975; 1977; 1988), proletarianisation (McKinlay and 
Arches 1985; McKinlay and Stoeckle 1988; McKinlay and Stoeckle 2002; Coburn 1992; 
Coburn et al 1997) or restratification of general practice (Fried son 1975; 1983; 1984; 1985; 
1986). 
There are a small number of existing studies examining the impact of clinical governance 
on the professional autonomy and self-regulation ofGPs (SheafTet a12002; 2003; 2004; 
Locock et at 2004). This study focuses on the whole process of clinical governance whilst 
others focus on the implementation of National Service Frameworks. This is the only study 
employing a single-site exploratory case study methodology seeking to 'particularise' 
rather than to 'generalise' and to paint a rich and detailed picture of the 'human-side' of the 
Utopian peT and the associated general practices. Whilst never intending to be 
generalisable, the results of the study add to the growing body of evidence that the 
restratification of general practice has begun in England through GP Professional 
Representatives (referred to as GP Medical Advisers at Utopian PCT), employed in 
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hybrid advisory/supervisory roles within PCTs. My study also supports Sheaff et aI's 
(2004) findings, suggesting that in the case of general practice, restratification does not 
divide the profession into separate occupational groups (Fried son 1984). Instead, 
knowledge management, supervision and general practice are different aspects of the same 
role (Sheaff et a12004; Courpasson 2000). The study demonstrates that despite the 
structural constraints imposed by clinical governance on general practice GPs are by no 
means helpless victims of government policy. Where possible they use clinical governance 
to their own advantage and to the advantage of their patients. They unenthusiastically 
implement those aspects of clinical governance they dislike but cannot avoid. The GPs 
participating in the study objected to what they perceived to be the managerial interference 
embodied in clinical governance and continued to adhere to a professional rather than a 
'neo-bureaucratic' culture. The study suggests that in the future the new General Medical 
Services Contract (2004) will be influential in reinforcing the implementation of clinical 
governance in general practice. 
This study identifies areas for future investigation including the comparison of the GP 
Medical Adviser's role in Primary Care Trusts with that of Clinical Directors in Hospital 
Trusts; the longer-term impact of the new GMS Contract (2004) on the implementation of 
clinical governance; the changing role of the Practice Manager resulting from the 
implementation of clinical governance and the new GMS Contract (2004); the 
contradictions apparent in subsuming risk management into the wider clinical governance 
agenda; the longer term impact of the use of National Service Frameworks (NSFs) and 
National Institute of Excellence (NICE) guidance and the associated training ofGPs, on 
the clinical performance ofGPs and finally, the impact of 'direct employment with a PCT 
for GPs on their professional autonomy and self-regulation. 
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Chapter One 
Introduction 
'J hal'e no doubt that we shall hal1e at least as many physicians in 2020 as we 
have now .... but will those physicians be professionals in the way we 
understand the term at present? Will they have the same values or will 
medicine have become a business, its practitioners tradesmen, and healthCilre 
just another sen,ice industry? ••.• Yet, it is upon them (the medical profession) 
that the future of medicine rests. If their sense of calling is not destroyed, they 
will be doing their best for sick people in the dark hours when the hostile 
critics of the profession are chattering away at their dinner parties or safely 
tucked up in bed' (Tallis 2004:241, 3) 
The Department of Health (l998b:33) defines clinical governance as, 
'A framework through which organisations are accountable for continuously 
improving the quality of their services and safeguarding high standards of care 
by creating an environment in which excellence in clinical care will flourish'. 
Since the introduction of the NHS in England in 1948, successive governments, in their 
attempts to deliver efficient and high quality health care services to the whole population 
have challenged the professional autonomy and self-regulation of the medical 
profession. This has become more overt since the implementation of the Griffiths 
Report proposals in 1983, which was a signal for the continued application of 
managerial techniques derived from the private sector. The internal market followed in 
1991, and the implementation of the Labour Government's 'third way' since 1997 has 
continued this trend (Harrison and Ahmed 2000; Flynn 2002; Harrison and Smith 2003; 
Harrison and McDonald 2003). 
Clinical governance has emerged against a backdrop of highly publicised medical 
failures or malpractice including, the Bristol Heart Surgery Inquiry, the unauthorised 
use of children'S organs at Alder Hey hospital, mistaken diagnosis in breast cancer 
screening services at Canterbury Hospital and the murder of numerous patients by GP 
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Harold Shipman. Clinical governance incorporates the setting of national standards of 
care through 'National Service Frameworks' (NSFs) via the National Institute for 
Clinical Excellence (NICE); continuous quality improvements, based on clinical 
standards and evidence-based practice; risk management, and the monitoring of 
progress, through the Commission for Healthcare Audit and Inspection (CHAI), a 
survey ofpatient and user experience, and a system of modernised professional self-
regulation, involving GP performance appraisal, continuous professional development 
(CPD) and the five yearly revalidation of medical practitioners (DofH 1998b; 1999). 
There is an ongoing debate about the impact of clinical governance on the professional 
autonomy and self-regulation of the medical profession including general practitioners. 
The debate centres around whether clinical governance is contributing to a decline in 
professional autonomy ofGPs, conceptualised by two overlapping theories of 
deprofessionalisation (Haug 1973; 1975; 1977; 1988) and proletarianisation (McKinlay 
and Arches 1985; McKinlay and Stoeckle 1988; McKinlay and Stoeckle 2002; Coburn 
1992; Coburn et al 1997) or whether it is leading to a redistribution of power within the 
profession, referred to as restratification (Friedson 1975; 1983; 1984; 1985; 1986). It is 
to this body of knowledge that I am seeking to contribute with my thesis. 
1.1 Aim and Objectives of the Research 
The aim of this study is to examine the impact of clinical governance on the 
professional autonomy and self-regulation of general practitioners (GPs) in a Primary 
Care Trust (PCT) in the Northwest of England from the perspectives of Primary Care 
Trust directors and managers, and medical healthcare professionals working in general 
practice. 
The objectives of this research are: 
• To explore clinical governance in the context of general practice and to identify 
the requirements for and the barriers to its implementation 
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• To examine the role ofGP Medical Representatives on the Primary Care Trust 
(PCT) Board and Professional Executive Committee (PEC) in the 
implementation of clinical governance in general practice. 
• To analyse the impact of clinical governance on the professional autonomy and 
self-regulation of GPs to determine whether this is contributing to the 
deprofessionalisation, proletarianisation or restratification of general practice. 
1.2 Background to the Research. 
My interest in quality assurance developed whilst I was studying for my MBA degree 
during the late 1980s. For my action research based dissertation I was asked by my 
employer to design a quality assurance system During this process I located the 
literature on New Public Management and became interested in the issues surrounding 
the transferability of private sector management techniques to public sector services. 
After graduating I was employed by a former Polytechnic as a Senior Lecturer in a 
Business School, and over the years started to experience first hand the impact of 
increasingly managerialist approaches in higher education on my own work as a 
lecturer, feeling considerably constrained by this. 
After the election of the Labour government in 1997 and the introduction of clinical 
governance as a quality assurance system in the 'New NHS' (DoH 1998), and at the 
same time, whilst supervising the MBA dissertation of a senior manager in a newly 
formed Primary Care Group (PC G), I recognised parallel issues in relation to challenges 
to professional autonomy in the health and higher education services. General 
practitioners were continually cited by my MBA student as individuals who were 
blocking the progress of the implementation of clinical governance in primary care. I 
wondered if GPs might be starting to feel as I had been over the previous few years. 
After doing some initial reading I realised that whilst there was a wealth of publications 
about quality assurance issues in secondary care, there was considerably less in relation 
to primary care and general practice in particular. At the same time I started to read the 
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literature on the sociology of the professions, which identified the medical profession as 
one of the 'true' professions with a monopoly of specialist knowledge giving control 
over the content of work, leading to professional autonomy and self-regulation. 
(1ohnsonI972; Friedson 1983). It appeared to me that clinical governance presented a 
direct challenge to the professional autonomy of the medical profession, and in the 
context of my own particular interest, general medical practitioners (GPs). 
Having secured access to a Primary Care Trust (PCT) in the Northwest of England as a 
research site (from here on referred to as the Utopian PCT) through my MBA student, I 
planned to examine the impact of clinical governance on the professional autonomy of 
GPs, this forming the central inquiry of my research study. I already had a brief insight 
into a PCT manager's perception as a result of supervising my student's dissertation I 
decided to explore this further, and to contrast this with the professional perspective of 
GPs themselves and other healthcare professionals working with them in general 
practice. I started to form my research questions, 
• How do PCT managers and GPs in the Utopian area define clinical governance 
in the context of general practice? 
• What do PCT managers and GPs perceive to be the requirements for and the 
barriers to the effective implementation of clinical governance in general 
practice? 
• What are the perceptions ofPCT managers and GPs of the impact of clinical 
governance on GP's professional autonomy? 
I understood from my initial literature review that the impact of successive government 
policies on the autonomy of the medical profession is an established field of inquiry 
(Salter 2002; Flynn 2002; Harrison and Ahmed 2000; Harrison and Smith 2003). 
Interpretations vary according to the author's theoretical approach. Neo-Marxist 
analysts like 10hnson (1972); Haug (1973; 1975; 1988); Mckinlay and Arches (1985); 
Mckinlay and Stoeckle (1988) and Coburn (1992) suggest that the medical profession is 
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slowly succumbing to 'deprofessionalisation' and 'proletarianisation' as in the case of 
other workers in advanced capitalist societies. 
Friedson (1984; 1986) rooted in a Neo-Weberian tradition, takes issue with these 
'professional decline' theorists, arguing that rather than the medical profession losing 
overall control of its work it has experienced a restratification within the profession. 
'Rank and file' professionals may lose control to knowledge management and 
supervisory elites emerging within the profession, but the profession does not lose 
control overall. This raises the question, 
• Has general practice experienced a professional decline as a result of the 
implementation of clinical governance, or is it experiencing a restratification? 
This question was posed by Mahmood (2001) who argued that GPs occupying 
managerial positions on PCGrr Boards and senior committees could be interpreted as a 
form of rest ratification in general practice. No firm conclusion was however reached. In 
2002, Harrison and Dowswell examined how government policy along with its 
governance arrangements impacted on the professional autonomy of forty-nine GPs in 
Northern England, it was concluded that the use of GPs on PCGrr Boards does 
represent a form of restratification. Sheaff et al (2002; 2003) after examining the role of 
GP Clinical Governance Leads in implementing clinical governance in general practice 
also reported that restratification of general practice is starting to occur in England. 
Other studies however, suggest that there is inconclusive evidence of restratification in 
general practice (Lockwood et al2004; Armstrong 2003). 
The debate about whether or not restratification is occurring in general practice in 
England appears set to continue for a long time. Having identified this, I determined to 
contribute to this ongoing debate. 
• What is the role of GP representatives on the PCT Board and Professional 
Executive Committees? 
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• Are these GPs principally medical representatives (Friedson 1986) or do they 
become primarily PCT managers, co-opted to pursue a governmental and 
managerial agenda ? 
From these six research questions I was able to define precisely the aim and objectives 
of my research study as outlined at the start of this chapter. 
1.3 Outline of the Thesis. 
Chapter One - Introductory chapter. 
Chapter Two - New Public Management, the National Health Service (NHS) and 
General Practice. 
This chapter is the first of two chapters providing contextual material in support of my 
study. The chapter discusses the emergence of New Public Management (NPM) in the 
National Health Service (NHS) with a focus on general practice. It details the events 
surrounding the emergence of the NHS and outlines the approaches of successive 
governments to the management of the service. The purpose of the chapter in the 
context of the aim and objectives of my research is to explore the shift from traditional 
bureaucratic management of public services in general and the NHS in particular. 
Clinical governance with its roots in Total Quality Management (TQM) has been 
described as the latest manifestation ofNPM in the National Health Service (Flynn 
2002). This chapter focuses on the impact ofNPM on the professional autonomy and 
self regulation of the medical profession with an emphasis on general practitioners, 
whilst the following chapter provides a detailed account of clinical governance. 
Chapter Three - Clinical Governance. 
This chapter is the second of two contextual chapters. It explores in detail the concept of 
clinical governance, reviews existing medical attitudes to clinical governance, considers 
the potential impact of clinical governance on the autonomy and self-regulation of the 
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medical profession and examines the new General Medical Services (GMS) contract as 
a mechanism for reinforcing the implementation of clinical governance in general 
practice. Along with chapter two, the aim of this chapter is to provide contextual 
information and to support the analysis and discussion of the results of my study which 
are presented in chapters six and seven of this thesis. 
Chapter Four- The Professions and Professional Autonomy. 
Chapter four presents the literature review underpinning my study. The chapter firstly 
explores the literature relating to the nature and development of the professions as a 
distinct occupational group and identifies professional autonomy and self-regulation as 
the defining characteristic of a profession. The chapter continues with a review of the 
theories of deprofessionalisation and proletarianisation as explanations ofthe impact of 
recent healthcare policy on the medical profession. These theories suggest that the result 
has been a decline in professional autonomy. The alternative explanation of 
restratification is then reviewed, which argues that the medical profession has not 
experienced a decline in professional autonomy but merely a redistribution of power 
and autonomy within the profession. The final section of the literature review presents 
an account of the relatively few existing studies of the impact of clinical governance on 
the professional autonomy and self-regulation of general practitioners in England and 
demonstrates how my study seeks to add to this body of knowledge. 
Chapter Five - Methodology. 
Chapter five outlines and justifies the methodological framework of my thesis and 
presents the research design. 
Chapter Six - Results. 
Chapter six presents the results of my study and takes the form of a comparative 
presentation of the managerial and professional perspectives of the concept of clinical 
governance in general practice, the requirements for and the barriers to its effective 
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implementation, the role of GP Medical Advisers to the PCT in relation to the 
implementation of clinical governance in general practice and the impact of clinical 
governance on the professional autonomy ofGPs. 
Chapter Seven - Discussion: Clinical Governance in General Practice 
Chapter seven discusses the results of my study in the context of the existing literature 
on the impact of clinical governance on the professional autonomy and self-regulation 
of GPs reviewed in chapter four. The discussion also draws on the contextual material 
on NPM and clinical governance outlined in chapters two and three of the thesis. 
Chapter Eight - Conclusions. 
The fmal chapter presents the conclusions flowing from the discussion presented in 
chapter seven of my thesis. The chapter outlines the contribution of my study to the 
existing body of knowledge, identifies the limitations of the study, defmes areas for 
future research, and concludes with an outline of the personal development I have 
experienced as a result of undertaking the research. 
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Chapter Two 
New Public Management, ti,e National 
Health Service and General Practice 
'Better management provides a /abel under which pril'ate-sector disciplines can be 
introduced to the public sen'ices, political control can be strengthened, budgets 
trimmed, professional autonomy reduced, public service unions weakened and a 
quasi competitive framework erected to flush out the natural 'inefficiencies' of 
bureaucracy'. (Pollitt 1990:49) 
2.1 Introduction. 
This chapter is the first of two chapters providing the contextual backdrop to my study. 
The purpose ofthe chapter in the context of the aim and objectives of my research is to 
explore the shift from the traditional bureaucratic management of public services in 
general, and the NHS in particular, to 'New Public Management' (NPM). Clinical 
governance with its roots in Total Quality Management (TQM) has been described as 
the latest manifestation ofNPM in the National Health Service (Flynn 2002). This 
chapter explores the concept ofNPM, outlines the events leading to the establishment of 
the NHS, and traces the various approaches to the management of health care services 
including the application ofNPM techniques in more recent decades. Throughout the 
chapter the focus is on the impact of health care management on the autonomy and self-
regulation of the medical profession, particularly general practitioners (GPs). The 
second contextual chapter provides a detailed account of the concept of clinical 
governance. 
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2.2 New Public Management and 'Managerialism'. 
New Public Management (NPM) according to Pollitt (1990) quoted above, is a 'label' 
representing the transfer of private sector management practices to public services. Its 
aim is to improve the quality and efficiency of services and to curb the power of 
professional groups delivering them Dunleavy and Hood (1994:9) suggests that (NPM) 
is, 
'a handy shorthand, a summary description of a way of reorganising public 
sector bodies to bring their reporting, and accounting approaches closer to (a 
particular perception 00 business methods. ' 
NPM has no conceptual foundation of its own but stems from 'public choice theol)" 
and 'managerialism' (Barselay 1992). Growing out of 'new right' ideology 
(McLaughlin et al 2002) NPM is an international trend in public administration 
designed to slow down the expansion of public spending and to encourage private-
sector provision of services previously provided only by the public sector (Hood 1991; 
1995a; 1995b; Newman and Clark 1994). 
The Public Management Committee of the OECD defined NPM as, 
'A new paradigm for public management. ..... aimed at fostering a performance-oriented 
culture in a less centralised public sector.' (OECD, Public Management Service 1995, 
quoted in Mathiasen 1999). 
The characteristics ofNPM have been defmed by various commentators and include a 
focus on output measurement in terms of efficiency, effectiveness and quality of 
service; the replacement of centralised structures with decentralised 'management 
environments' where decisions on resource allocation and service are made closer to the 
point of delivery, and which seek feedback from clients and other stakeholders; a search 
for alternative more cost effective sources of service provision to direct public 
provision and regulation; and a focus on the flexible response to external changes at the 
least cost. (Aucoin 1990; Osborne and Gaebler 1993; Mathiasen 1999; Holmes and 
Shand 1995; Dunleavy and Hood 1994). 
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Drawing on the work of other authors, Hood (1991) identified seven doctrines ofNPM 
including 'hands-on' entrepreneurial management as opposed to traditional bureaucratic 
public administration (Clarke and Newman 1993); the use of explicit standards and 
measures of performance (Osborne et alI995); an emphasis on managerial output 
controls (Boyne 1999); the disaggregation and decentralisation of public services 
(Pollitt 1990); the promotion of competition in the provision of public services (Walshe 
1995); the use of private sector styles of management (Wilcox and Harrow 1992); and 
the disciplined allocation and use of resources (Metcalfe and Richards 1990) 
Barzelay (1992) observes that NPM does not have a conceptual foundation and a set of 
internally consistent propositions. Various disciplines are useful however, in 
understanding and analysing NPM. Microeconomics provides the tools for policy 
analysis and is used as the basis for determining 'rational' management practices. 'Law 
and regulation' provides the framework for managerial action. The most significant 
contribution to understanding NPM is perceived to be 'organisation theory' which 
suggests how the culture of bureaucracy shapes the behaviour of individuals and groups, 
which in tum influences the way public sector organisations function Barzelay 
(1992: 132) identifies the management practices adopted within the framework ofNPM 
as, 
' .... exercising leadership, creating an uplifting mission and organisation culture, 
strategic planning, managing without direct authority, pathfinding, problem 
setting, identifying customers, groping along, reflection-in-action, coaching, 
structuring incentives, championing products, instilling a commitment to quality, 
creating a climate for innovation, building teams, redesigning work, investing in 
people, negotiating mandates, and managing by walking around. ' 
Whilst few would argue with the sentiment of improving the quality and efficiency of 
public services, the suitability ofthis approach to the management of public sector 
organisations has been questioned. Aucoin (1990) suggests there is theoretical 
contradiction in the concept ofNPM leading to cross-pressure and confusion for 
managers and contradiction in organisational designs with competing rationales. Rhodes 
(1994) observes that NPM is responsible for the erosion of the British State through 
privatisation, the loss offunctions by local and central government to alternative 
delivery systems, the loss of functions by British government to the European Union 
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and reducing the discretion of public servants and the professions. These are believed to 
lead to a 'hollowing out of the state'. 
Hood (1991) suggests that NPM is like the 'Emperor's new clothes'. New 
managerialism has changed nothing apart from the language used in management 
circles, the basic problems associated with public services remain. Secondly, Hood 
(1991) argues that NPM has not achieved its main aim which was to lower the unit cost 
of services, instead it has damaged public services and has resulted in the 
'aggrandisement of management', and has produced a 'performance indicator industry'. 
Hood (1991) argues that the practices of , top-slicing' and creative accounting have 
destabilised the necessary bureaucracy of public services and has redirected resources 
away from the 'frontline' of service delivery. It suggests that the main beneficiaries of 
NPM are an elite group of 'new managers' whose careers have been built on its 
implementation 
Not least of all the criticisms is that public organisations are different forms of 
organisation with different objectives and purposes than private sector profit orientated 
business organisations (Newman and Clark 1994). Success for private sector 
organisations depends on the ability of managers to maximise financial performance, 
they must be profitable and economically efficient to survive in the market place. 
Ultimately, private sector organisations are accountable to shareholders. On the other 
hand, public organisations are created by government for political purposes including 
the provision of public services. They are accountable to political representatives, the 
law, and ultimately, the general public for achieving their objectives. Measuring their 
success is more ambiguous than it is for private sector profit making business and 
cannot be reduced to 'bottom-line' profit or loss (Farnham and Horton 1996). 
Dunsire (1973) observes that public organisations have to achieve a balance between 
resource efficiency and goal effectiveness. Policy tests imply a qualitative judgement 
about goals and their priority and it is politicians who decide on both the goals and the 
resources to be allocated to achieve them There is no objective way of determining the 
right policies or the right amount of resources it is a political choice, in the private 
sector this is achieved by supply and demand and the price mechanism Traditionally 
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public sector management systems have emerged out of administrative systems, whilst 
in the private sector the reverse is the case. These observations and criticisms raise the 
fundamental question, is NPM an appropriate vehicle for achieving the purpose and 
objectives of public services? 
2.3 Managers, Professionals and Managerialism. 
Farnham and Horton (1996) observe that 'managerialism' is an ideology which is 
directive and potentially authoritarian. It is not based on a philosophy of management 
by consent. It is an 'elitist' view of management emphasising the managers 'right to 
manage' in a sector where professional groups have traditionally dominated in the 
management of services. Newman and Clark (1994) observe that the ethic of public 
service depends on bureaucratic procedures and unquestioned professional expertise 
which are undermined by the new approaches to management. 
Ackroyd, Hughes and Soothill (1989) observed that professionals resist the 
implementation of bureaucratic control strategies, preferring a 'custodial' or 
professionally determined line management. Mintzberg (1983) described the structure in 
which professional workers have traditionally dominated public services as a 
'professional bureaucracy'. Work is complex and requires the application of expert 
specialist knowledge, skills and tacit judgement on a daily basis. Professionals have 
considerable control over their work and operate independently from their colleagues 
without direct managerial supervision The 'professional bureaucracy' emphasises 
professional authority with standards for work set externally by independent 
professional bodies rather than internally by managers. This is set in sharp contrast to 
Mintzberg's (1983) 'machine bureaucracy', where work is more routine, procedures 
more fonnalised, where there are rules, regulations, formalised channels of 
communication, centralised decision making power and close supervision of work by 
managers. 
NPM criticises the 'professional bureaucracy' on a number of counts. Public choice 
theorists are concerned about the monopoly power held be professional groups within 
the 'professional bureaucracy'. This is perceived to distort the market and to result in 
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'producer capture' where services promote the interests of professionals rather than 
service users. (Alaszewski 1995). Managerialist critics on the other hand highlight the 
failure of the 'professional bureaucracy' to deliver efficient services. Collegial forms of 
organisation are perceived as, 
' ..... impediments to the development of rationalised managerial control.' 
(Ackroyd 1995:6) 
Kitchener et al (2000) observe that 'professional bureaucracies' are also criticised for 
their focus on operational management rather than strategic management, and for their 
perceived failure to respond to change in the external organisational environment. 
Professional front-line staff are believed to exercise too much discretion without a 
necessary concern for budgeting constraints and other organisational priorities. 
NPM with its emphasis on strategic management, human resource management, 
performance management, leadership and cultural control mechanisms directly 
challenges the approach of 'professional bureaucracies' to supervision. It also uses 
'hybrid practitioner managers' to monitor and control professional work. (Exworthyand 
Halford 2002; Ferlie et al1996; Kitchener et al1999; Kitchener et al 2000). NPM 
presents a more bureaucratic form of contro~ similar to Mintzberg's (1983) 'machine 
bureaucracy' described above, placing greater emphasis on standardised practices and 
establishing clear measurable performance targets for individual professionals (Pollitt 
1993; Hoggett 1996). 
Exworthy and Halford (2002) suggest that it is to be expected that the result of the 
application ofNPM techniques would be conflict between professionals and managers 
over power, status, authority and over how services should be run, although there is now 
evidence of greater co-operation and collaboration between these traditional antagonists. 
Three key lines of argument are present in the literature in relation to this. Firstly, that 
the professions are becoming 'deprofessionalised' as they lose their cultural authority in 
terms of prestige and trust (Haug 1973; 1975; Starr 1982). Secondly, the professions are 
becoming 'proletarianised' as they lose their independence and become increasingly 
subject to the rules of management (Mckinlay and Arches 1985 and Mckinlay and 
Stoeckle 1988). Finally, that the professions fragment internally as a result of greater 
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specialisation within professions, especially the separation of administrative 
professionals and 'rank and file' practitioners, and the bureaucratisation of professional 
bodies in an attempt to strengthen the credibility of professional self-regulation. The 
professions experience a form of internal 'restratification' (Fried son 1985; 1986). This 
debate is central to my thesis and is returned to as the main focus of the literature review 
in chapter four. 
2.4 The National Health Service (NHS) and New Public 
Management. 
The National Health Service (NHS) was established in 1948 to provide healthcare 
according to clinical need free at the point of use. It was to be funded by central 
government out of general taxation Since that time this has resulted in a political 
tension between the desire to provide a high quality service and the need to constrain 
public expenditure. This is exacerbated by an unwillingness of governments to raise 
taxes, growing public expectations, scientific and technological advancements in 
medicine, and a rising proportion of elderly people in the population using medical 
services. In common with the experience of other OECD countries and other UK public 
services this has resulted in the application ofNPM techniques in the NHS. In turn this 
has resulted in a tension between NHS managers and the medical profession exercising 
their professional autonomy. (Corby 1999) 
2.4.1 Background to Establishment 
Ham (l999a) provides a detailed account of the lead up to the establishment of the 
NBS. Throughout this process a clear commitment to the continued professional 
autonomy of doctors was demonstrated by the government. The 1911 National 
Insurance Act had been a key part of the then Liberal government's programme of 
social reform This provided groups of working people earning under £160 per year 
with free care from general practitioners (GPs). There were also sickness payments and 
unemployment pay made available. There had however been great opposition from the 
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medical profession, concerned about the potential this presented for the state to control 
its work. GPs only co-operated after an agreement was reached, that their payments 
would be based on a capitation system rather than a salary, thereby protecting GP 
independence. GPs were also offered a choice about whether or not to work for the 
NHS. Generous levels of payments were agreed for GPs and high-level earners in the 
population were excluded from the scheme, securing potential additional income for 
them The main criticism of the scheme was that only insured people were covered and 
not their families and hospital care was not included. 
Ham (1999a) reports that responsibility for the provision ofheaIthcare services had 
increasingly been taken on by the state. The Dawson Committee set up by the Ministry 
of Health recommended the provision of a comprehensive system of primary care and 
hospital services. Reports from the Royal Commission on National Health Insurance in 
1926, The Sankey Commission on Voluntary Hospitals in 1937 and the British Medical 
Association in 1930 and 1938 all criticised the existing services and made various 
suggestions for change. These included the greater need for the coordination of 
hospitals and the need for health insurance to cover additional groups of the population. 
The Royal Commission's report suggested that health service funding might be derived 
from general taxation instead of insurance. The BMA suggested that health insurance 
should be extended to cover the whole of the population and that insurance should also 
cover hospital services. The Beveridge Report on Social Insurance and Allied Services 
in 1942 proposed reform and extension of the social security system along with 
proposals for a National Health Service (NHS). In 1944 a white paper was published 
proposing a NHS. Harrison ( in Exworthy and Halford 2002) observes that commitment 
to professional autonomy for the medical profession was a key feature of the white 
paper which stated, 
'Whatever the organisation, the doctors taking part must remain free to direct 
their clinical knowledge and personal skill for the benefit of their patients in the 
way they feel to be best.' (Ministry of Health 1944:26, quoted in Exworthy and 
Halford 2002:51» 
The National Health Services Act was passed in 1946 and the National Health Service 
was established in 1948. 
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In the negotiations leading to the establishment of the NHS the medical profession 
worked hard to achieve its own objectives and achieved many concessions. Retention of 
independent contractor status for general practitioners (GPs), the option of private 
practice and access to pay beds in NHS hospitals for hospital consultants; distinction 
awards with related increases in salary for consultants and a leading role in the 
administration of the service. During the process of negotiation, Bevan divided the 
medical profession, winning the support of hospital consultants, who became employees 
ofthe service in return for high fmancial incentives. GPs were isolated but successful in 
maintaining their independent contractor status (Dopson 1997; Harrison in Exworthy 
and Halford 2002). 
2.4.2 The NHS 1948-1979. 
Harrison et al (1992) observed that in 1948 the NHS comprised a tripartite structure 
including general practitioners, dentists, pharmacists and opticians, who were self-
employed practitioners contracting their services to the NHS; hospital services; and 
local government responsible for ambulances, health visiting and child welfare and 
preventative services. 
The country was divided into 19 then 20 regions controlled by Regional Hospital 
Boards (RHB) responsible to the Health Minister. Reporting to the Health Minister were 
groups of hospitals managed by a Hospital Management Committee (HMC) of part time 
appointees many of whom were doctors (Harrison 1988). Doctors were not employed 
by HMCs, but by RHBs, thereby protecting their professional autonomy and freedom of 
speech from managerial challenge, and were the most powerful group from the outset. 
The contract included the right for consultants to engage in private practice and gave 
them a right of appeal to the Secretary of State against dismissal (Harrison et alI992). 
General practitioner, dental, and ophthalmic services were administered by Executive 
Councils (EC) appointed by Local Authorities (LA) and the Ministry of Health, and 
were also funded directly by the Ministry. Ham (1999a), highlighted that in no sense 
were ECs management bodies, but merely administered the contracts of family 
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practitioners, maintained lists of local practitioners and dealt with complaints by 
patients. In this way the professional autonomy of GPs as independent contractors was 
also protected. (Ham 1999a; Harrison et aI 1992) 
Lewis (1998) observes that in 1965 GPs demanded a new contract with the NHS, 
complaining about poor pay in relation to hospital consultants. They wanted the state to 
intervene to limit their hours of work and the services they offered by making some of 
them chargeable, and to provide more fringe benefits. They also highlighted that their 
existing contract provided no incentive to improve practice premises or to engage in 
continuing education. At the same time GPs firmly defended their status as independent 
contractors, on the grounds that they needed to safeguard their relationship with patients 
by limiting state interference. The state granted the GPs demands when they threatened 
to resign 'en masse' from the NHS. 
Ham (1 999a) reported that the next significant development in general practice occurred 
in the late 1960s with the growth in health centres and group practices and the 
emergence of the primary health care team. Another important development was the 
distribution ofGPs between different parts of the country overseen by the Medical 
Practices Committee (MPC), set up under the 1946 National Health Service Act. The 
Committee had no power however, to insist that GPs work in specific locations. In 
1966, Area Allowances were introduced as a financial incentive to attract doctors to less 
well provided areas. There were however still problems of quality and coverage of 
general practitioner services. 
The NHS was restructured in 1974 removing the Local Government element of the 
NHS, and creating 14 'Regions' in England, divided into 90 'Areas'. Around half the 
'Areas' were divided into two or more 'Districts' based on the location of a district 
general hospital. Regional Health Authorities (RHA) and Area Health Authorities 
(AHA) were set up as statutory corporate bodies, whilst district level was purely 
administrative. (Corby 1999). 
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At each level there were multidisciplinary management teams who were to make 
decisions by consensus, doctors, each with a power of veto held half of the membership 
in these teams (Harrison 1982; 1988). General practitioners maintained their 
independent contractor status, but were brought under family practitioner committees 
(FPC) accountable to the AHA. Community Health Councils were established in each 
district to represent the views of the local population. (Corby 1999). 
Dopson (1997) suggests that this reorganisation had four aims, to unify health services 
under one authority, to provide better co-ordination between health authorities and 
related local government services, to improve the management of the NHS and to 
provide central control of expenditure to ensure 'value for money'. 
Ham (1 999a: 21) reports that, 
'Management Arrangements for the Reorganised NHS' (the Grey Book), set out 
the functions of each of the tiers in the new structure, and the medical profession 
was given a key role in the management system There was to be 'maximum 
delegation downwards, matched by accountability upwards'. 
Dopson (1997), drawing on the work of Draper, Grenholm and Best (1976) questioned 
how the new mechanistic command and control structure could accommodate the 
complex pressures on the provision of health care, and that the reorganisation 
represented a move away from the principles on which the NHS was founded towards a 
more authoritarian, top-do\\'n bureaucracy. 
Harrison (in Exworthy and Halford 2002) observed that the commitment to the 
professional autonomy of the medical profession in the 1974 reorganisation was still 
present. The Labour government stated that, 
'The service should provide full clinical freedom to the doctors working in it. ' 
(DHSS 1970:29, quoted in Harrison 1999). 
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Whilst the Conservative government specified that, 
'Professional workers will retain their full clinical freedom .... .to do as they 
think best for their patients'. (DHSS 1972a:vii, quoted in Harrison 1999) 
And then in a further document, 
'Management plays only a subsidiary part ... .it can help or hinder the people 
who play the primary part.' (DHSS 1972b:9, quoted in Harrison 1999) 
Arrangements for employing and organising medical staff remained free from 
subordination to management at local level. Hospital consultant's contracts continued to 
be held at a strategic rather than operational leveL and they still had the right to 
engage in private practice and to appeal directly to the Secretary of State against 
dismissal. General practitioners remained self-employed contractors, and largely 
isolated from the rest of the NHS, their contracts being held by separate public bodies 
and only vaguely specifying their terms (Harrison and Smith 2003). 
Harrison (1988) concludes NH services were created as an aggregate of individual 
clinical decisions. Managers were reluctant to question medical decisions in relation to 
the pattern of services or to propose changes to them 
'Managers neither were, nor were supposed to be influential with respect to 
doctors .... Managers in general worked to solve problems and to maintain their 
organisations rather than to secure major change.' (Harrison 1988:51). 
1.4.3 The NHS 1979-1997. 
A Conservative Government was elected in 1979 and challenged the existing Keynesian 
approach to the welfare state. It pursued a programme of privatisation of state o\\ned 
enterprises, reductions in some taxes and introduced controls over public spending. It 
was perceived that public services, including the NHS, should be made more efficient 
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and that the best way to achieve this was to emphasise managerial priorities (Ham 
1999a). 
A reorganisation took place in 1982 when the 'Area' level was eliminated from the 
structure. 'Regions' were retained, and 190 District Health Authorities and 8 Special 
Health Authorities were created. In 1981 the Family Practitioner Committees were 
given the status of employing authorities in their own right. In 1983 performance 
indicators were introduced which facilitated the comparison of health authorities on the 
basis of value for money. 'Manpower' targets were also set for all staff. Health 
Authorities had to participate in competitive tendering for laundry, domestic and 
catering services (Corby 1999). 
2.4.4 The Griffith.~ Report 
The most significant policy during this period was the introduction of general 
management resulting from the Griffiths Report published in 1983. In effect the 
Griffiths Report signalled the overt application of private-sector management 
techniques in the NHS. Roy Griffiths was deputy chairman and managing director of 
the supermarket chain, Sainsburys. Griffiths was asked to advise on the effective use of 
resources in the NHS. The five areas of alleged weakness identified by Griffiths and his 
team were a lack of strategic central direction, a lack of individual managerial 
responsibility, a failure to use objectives as a guide to managerial action, a neglect of 
performance and a neglect of the consumer (Hunter et al 1988; Dopson 1997) 
The report recommended that general managers should be appointed at all levels in the 
NHS to provide leadership, motivation and continual improvement. The general 
manager was to become the final decision maker for decisions previously made 
by consensus teams to avoid the delay created in the past by failure of the teams to 
reach an agreement. Hospital doctors were to accept the management responsibility that 
went with their clinical freedom and professional autonomy, and to participate fully in 
decisions about priorities. Centrally, the NHS was to be strengthened by the 
establishment of a Health Services Supervisory Board and an NHS Management Board 
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with the chairperson being appointed from outside the NHS (Dopson 1997; Ham 
1999a). 
Harrison and Ahmed (2000: 132) observe that the replacement of consensus 
management with general management represented a major defeat for the medical 
profession. They quote the BMA writing to the Secretary of State, 
, It could be interpreted from the report (Griffiths) that a somewhat autocratic 
'executive' manager would be appointed with significant delegated powers, who 
would - in the interests of ' good management' - be able to make major 
decisions against the advice of the profession .... it should be clearly understood 
that the profession would neither accept nor co-operate with any such 
arrangement- particularly where the interests of patients are concerned.' (BMJ 
288, 14 January 1984: 165). 
Despite this, the recommendations of the Griffiths report were implemented. As well as 
the setting up of the Boards, and the appointment of general managers, budgeting 
systems, performance indicators, and structures relating to the management of clinical 
workloads were introduced. A number of the management posts were taken up part-
time, by doctors (Dopson 1997; Packwood et al1991; 1992). 
Harrison et aI (1992) suggest that a review of empirical work from 1984-1990 suggests 
that whilst medical professional domination had been challenged by Griffiths there was 
little loss of professional autonomy as a result. Packwood et aI (1991; 1992) observed 
another effect of the Griffiths reforms, managers became more externally focused 
responding more to the government's agenda than to the professional agenda Harrison 
et al (1992) conclude that by 1985 there was no longer any medical pressure to return to 
consensus management. General managers in the NHS had achieved legitimacy and 
substantial influence. 
2.4.5 The Internal Market. 
Against the backdrop of an increasing public funding crisis, the Griffiths report had laid 
the foundation for the introduction of the internal market in 1991. This was underpinned 
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by the rationale that private sector markets would lead to greater efficiency. Ham 
(1999a) argues that this was made easily possible because of the previous appointment 
oflarge numbers of Chief Executives in the NHS who were receptive to NPM policies, 
and the greater involvement of the medical profession in management. All Trusts were 
to have a medical director, and many had internal organisation structures built around 
'clinical directorates' headed by consultants working closely with senior managers. 
Harrison and Pollitt (1994) state that this was an attempt to use doctors to 'manage' 
other doctors and to encourage them to think more in managerial terms, by placing 
budgetary constraints on them 
Many authors (Fitzgerald 1994; Llewellyn 2002) highlight the doctor/manager role as 
significant in the manager/professional relationship in the NHS. Llewellyn 2002 :594) 
argues that medical directors occupy a boundary role, and exhibit 'Janusian' thinking, 
'they constructively join two sets of traditionally opposed ideas.' (2002:596). Clinical 
directors act as a channel of information to other medical professionals and have some 
control over how management ideas and priorities are communicated to them 
Llewellyn (2002) also observes that managers do not have access to or are able to 
control ideas of medical professionals, 
'Clinical directors straddle the whole organisation, whilst managers cannot 
comment on clinical matters or professional conduct' (2002:596). 
Harrison (in Exworthy and Halford 2002) observes that the use of doctors as managers 
along with access to aggregate medical audit data made it easier for managers to 
challenge doctors over their use of resources and service priorities. Ham (1 999a) 
suggests doctors are made more accountable for their performance by involving 
managers more in the management of clinical activity. Managers were also to take part 
in the appointment, and drawing up of job descriptions and the reward management for 
consultants. Disciplinary procedures were to be implemented for hospital doctors. 
Resource management was extended and there was to be greater use of clinical audit in 
hospitals. Doctor's contracts were now to be held locally by the Trust bringing 
consultants more within a traditional bureaucratic hierarchy and curtailing any public 
criticism they might make about the NHS. The right to appeal to the Secretary of State 
in relation to dismissal was also eventually lost. 
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The White Paper, 'Working for Patients' was published in 1989. This laid out the basis 
on which health services would be delivered. The market was based on a split between 
heaIthcare purchasing and providing organisations. Provision of services was the 
function of Trusts, independent of health authority control, in a contractual relationship 
for patients, with either the health authority or general practitioner fundholders(GPFH). 
In addition management arrangements were to be further strengthened at central and 
local levels. In the New Department of Health, the Supervisory and NHS Management 
Boards were to be replaced with a Policy Board and NHS Management Executive. 
Locally, managers were to sit as members of local authorities along with a small 
number of none executive directors appointed for their personal contribution not 
because they were drawn from designated organisations (Harrison and Ahmed 2000). 
In the case of primary care, Family Health Practitioner Committees were to be replaced 
by Family Health Services Authorities. These were also to appoint general managers to 
sit as members of the authorities along with four members drawn from the health 
profession, five non-executive directors and a chairperson. Non-executive members of 
all these structures were to be paid in order to attract talented individuals to theses roles. 
(HamI999a). Warwicker (1998) suggests that these changes transformed the FHSA 
from an administrative body to a managerial authority to which for the first time in their 
history, GPs would become accountable. 
Harrison and Pollitt (1994) report that GP Fundholding was introduced on a voluntary 
basis. By 1996 over 30% of general practices in England were involved. GP 
Fundholders were allocated a budget to purchase secondary care services from NHS 
Trusts of their choice or from the private sector. Under-spending could be retained for 
reinvestment in the practice. Harrison and Ahmed (2000) refer to the empirical work of 
Harrison and Choudhry (1996) which indicates that GP fundholders had been willing to 
move some specialist clinics into primary care, and that GP fundholding financial 
leverage had led to changed relationships with hospitals and hospital consultants. GP 
threats to re-allocate referrals had led to prompter pathology results, prompter patient 
discharge reporting, and the reduction of waiting lists. None of this had been the case 
for non-fundholding GPs. Glendinning (1999) argued that involving GPs in cost 
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containment strategies is particularly significant since they control access to and 
therefore in effect determine the levels of demand for expensive secondary care. 
Glendinning (1999) reports that fundholding had provided the financial flexibility to 
allow GPs to develop the range of services offered by their practices. By the mid 1990s 
it had been extended to produce Multifunds and Total Purchasing Pilots. Multifunds 
allowed the collaboration of smaller practices enabling them to share management costs. 
Total Purchasing Pilots enabled GPs to manage budgets for the full range of community 
and hospital services, thus expanding services into new areas. 
North and Peckham (2001) suggest that GP fundholding significantly changed the 
relative power base of GPs and hospital consultants. Fundholding meant that hospital 
clinicians could be accountable for their performance by their peers, but within a 
managerial rather than a professional context. On the other hand, fundholders were 
required to control their purchasing of hospital and community health services, 
prescribing and practice costs within a fixed budget, with the incentive of being allowed 
to retain savings from cost efficiencies for re-investment in the practice. 
Harrison (1999) reports that, as in the case of the Griffiths reforms, the government 
faced opposition from the BMA in relation to the proposed new internal market. 
'(The BMA) ...... does not believe that the changes proposed would achieve (the 
government's stated) aims. Indeed it is convinced that many of the proposals 
would cause serious damage to NHS patient care, lead to a fragmented service 
and destroy the comprehensive nature of the existing services. The government's 
main proposals would appear to contain and reduce the level of public 
expenditure devoted to health care. The proposals would undoubtedly increase 
substantially the administrative and accountancy costs of the service, and they 
ignore the rising costs of providing services for the elderly and of medical 
advances. In the absence of any additional funding the proposals would 
inevitably reduce the standards ofNHS patient care (BMA 1989:2, quoted in 
Harrison 1999). 
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The government, as had been the case with the BMA's objections to the Griffiths 
proposals, pressed on with implementation. The BMA ended its campaign against the 
proposals in June 1992. Harrison and Pollitt (1994) and Harrison (1999) observe that 
the possibility (if not the event) of 'provider competition' within the internal market 
served to some extent to unify the professional managerial relationship within hospitals. 
The necessity to calculate the cost of services and general cost pressures made the 
activity of medical professionals more transparent. The mutual interests of 
organisational survival and gro\\1h ensured a degree of co-operation between the two 
groups. 
In the case of primary care, the White Paper, 'Promoting Better Health' published in 
1987 proposed a new contract for GPs and dentists. The contract for GPs was published 
at the same time as 'Working for Patients' and came into operation in 1990. The 
contract required health checks for new patients, three yearly checks for patients not 
otherwise seen by GPs, and annual checks of patients aged 75 and over. Targets were 
set for cervical cancer screening and vaccination immunisation, the provision of health 
promotion and chronic disease management clinics were encouraged along with the 
possibility of GPs engaging in the provision of minor surgery, GPs were also expected 
to become involved in child surveillance. There were extra payments offered for GPs 
agreeing to work in deprived areas, and additional money for the employment of 
practice statT and to improve practice premises. Practices were requested to produce 
annual reports of their activities and a practice leaflet for patients. Procedures for 
patients changing doctors were simplified. Income from capitation payments was 
increased from 46% to 60% to encourage GPs to provide the services demanded by 
patients. (Ham 1999a) 
Warn'icker (1998) observes that there were several modifications made by central 
government on the contractual obligations of GPs. In 1993 the health promotion clinics 
were discontinued on the basis that they had created a 'clinics industry', resulting in 
disproportionate payments going to some practices with little evidence of improvement 
in performance measures. Clinic fees were replaced \\ith banding which in exchange for 
an annual fee required GPs to provide an annual programme ofheaIth promotion. A 
second modification was the removal of the obligation to carry out three yearly checks. 
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GPs had put increasing pressure on the government stating that these checks were 
expensive and not effective. In 1996 there was a third shift in government policy, the 
banding scheme was removed, GPs only being required at the start of each year to 
submit a description of their proposed health promotion activities to a Health Promotion 
Committee which would recommend to the Health Authority to approve the activities 
for payment. These changes represent a shift from GP obligation to provide services, to 
giving them more discretion, and from having to provide extensive data on the health of 
patients to only an indication of activities and minimal data on patients. 
Warn·icker (1998) states that the 1990 GP contract failed to 'manage' GPs. There was a 
lack of scientific evidence and rationality behind the required health promotion 
activities. The FHSA had not 'managed' and 'monitored' GPs to ensure they met their 
contractual obligations. GP professional autonomy and their independent contractor 
status did not fit well with the government's 'managerialist' model. Warwicker (1998) 
concluded that the contract failed because of incoherence of government policy. On the 
one hand there was a commitment to reduce public expenditure on primary care by 
imposing NPM strategies on GPs to subordinate them and make them more 
accountable. On the other hand, its commitment to market forces, minimal Government-
intervention and entrepreneurship, had transformed GPs into entrepreneurial small 
business managers and they behaved accordingly. 
The contract was also criticised for its failure to directly address inequalities in general 
practice and the integration of GP services with other community based health services. 
The contract contained minimum performance indicators and quality assurance 
mechanisms (Glendinning 1999). Nevertheless, Rivett (1998), suggests that the contract 
was an attempt to exert managerial accountability over the levels and quality of services 
offered by GPs, and introduced an element of performance related pay using specified 
screening and health promotion activities as performance indicators. The contract 
represented an attempt to 'manage' areas of clinical activity, challenging the 
professional autonomy ofGPs. 
Lewis (1998) notes some interesting contrasts between the circumstances of the 1965 
and 1990 GP contracts. In 1%5 GP morale was low, but they emerged successfully 
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from negotiations with their demands for higher pay and better working conditions met, 
and their professional autonomy endorsed by the government. In 1990, morale was high 
but the government succeeded in imposing a new contract on GPs increasing their 
accountability. In 1965 GPs saw their independent contractor status as a means of 
protecting their professional autonomy, but in 1990, it was the means by which the 
government secured more specific terms of service from GPs. 
Harrison (1999) reports that during 1996 there were a series of Green Papers published 
(DoH 1996a; 1996b and 1996c) documenting a series of problems with the NHS. The 
1990 GP contract had not assured quality and was difficult to enforce. The internal 
market had created inequalities of levels and quality of service provision 
geographically. Funding mechanisms were inflexible and unresponsive to variations in 
local healthcare needs. In particular the separation of the general medical services 
budget and the community health services budgets were problematic for purchasing or 
providing integrated services which crossed the GP/NHS Trust divide. The NHS 
(Primary Care) Bill received royal assent just before the May 1997 general election. The 
Act introduced an option for the introduction of salaried GPs to assist in attracting GPs 
to areas where services were poor. It was anticipated that salaried GPs would facilitate 
greater flexibility in the roles and responsibilities of different medical professionals. If 
GPs were salaried and had a common and equal status to nurses and other healthcare 
professionals as employees of a provider organisation it could be easier to substitute 
nurse run services for general medical services currently provided by GPs. 
The Act also allowed for the pooling of the GMS and HCHS budgets providing greater 
flexibility to meet local needs. Three types of projects to implement these were 
operational from April 1998. Individual 'salaried GPs' employed by the Local Health 
Authority with a contract to provide a specified range of services. 'Personal Medical 
Services '(PMS), which was a contract between a practice and the Health Authority to 
improve the range and quality of services. 'PMS plus' projects, which were personal 
medical services and an extended range of medical services. Cash-
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limited GMS and HCHS budgets were linked in a single contract to provide an 
additional range of services than GPs would provide under their individual GMS 
contracts. (Glendinning 1999). 
Glendinning (1999) concludes that the 1997 Act marks a transition from general 
practice to primary health services. It provided the organisational and fmancial 
framework to facilitate coherent primary health services. It is recognised however, that 
the professional autonomy of GPs is challenged by providing the opportunity to build 
both clinical activities and performance targets into individual employment contracts or 
organisational service contracts. It also provides Health Authorities with managerial 
levers in the form of financial incentives and sanctions to control the range and quality 
of primary health services including those provided by GPs. 
2 • ./.6 The MIS/rom 1997 'The Third Way' 
In 1997 The Labour Government was elected and set about developing its OMI policies 
for the modernisation of the NHS. This was labelled 'the third way' because it was to be 
different to both the centralised planning implemented by previous Labour governments 
and the internal market implemented by the previous Conservative government. Less 
emphasis was to be placed on competition and more on partnership. There was a 
commitment to maintaining the separation of purchasers and providers with a focus on 
holding providers to account for their performance rather than as a means of promoting 
competition. 
It was proposed to abolish GP fundholding because of its expense and inequity, and to 
replace it with GP commissioning. Annual contracts were to be replaced with longer 
term health care agreements. Variations in performance were to be reduced by new 
national service frameworks (NSFs) and a system of clinical governance. GPs and other 
primary heaIthcare staff were to be free to make resourcing decisions at the local level 
to improve services for patients. There were to be a wide range of incentives to increase 
efficiency and raise standards, and sanctions for poor performance. These proposals 
represented a ten year plan to modernise the NHS. The government committed to 
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continue to fund the NHS through taxation and to increase spending on the NHS in real 
terms every year. (Ham 1999a) 
GPs were required to work within the framework of a Primary Care Group/ Trust 
(PCGIT) which was charged with co-ordinating local heaIthcare organisations, 
including general practice, in the provision of local primary health care services. 36000 
GPs were organised into 481 PCGs in England, responsible for the commissioning of 
services and for working with Social Services to produce the Health Authorities Health 
Improvement Plan. Each PCG covered a local population of around 100,000 patients, 
and was accountable to the Health Authority (Horton and Farnham 1999). 
McIntosh (2000) reports that initially GPs threatened to not co-operate with PCGlTs, 
refusing to accept Boards of Directors similar to Health Authorities and Trusts, with lay 
members and chairs appointed by the government. Negotiations between the BMA and 
the Secretary of State followed, leading to concessions on the composition of the peG 
Boards. GPs were allowed to make local decisions as to whether they wished to be in 
the majority on the Boards. They were also allowed to choose whether a GP would be 
the chair of the Board. In most cases they chose this to be the case. MCIntosh (2000) 
suggests that this was a major extension of professional power, and an opportunity to 
reclaim power from NHS managers. PCG Boards thus comprised four to seven GPs and 
one or two nurses selected by their colleagues, one social services representative, a non-
executive director and a lay member appointed by the Health Authority. Other primary 
care professionals could also be co-opted onto the Board as non-voting members. 
McIntosh (1999: 11) highlighted that the National Association of Primary Care Survey 
demonstrated that GPs felt threatened and unsupported by PCGs, and previous 
fundholders believed their independence had been reduced. 
SheafT et aI (2003) note that as GPs continued to be protective of their independent 
status, and avoided the prospect ofsalaried employment, there was no possibility of 
these organisations being anything other than local professional networks. PCGlTs 
lacked the governance structure of conventional bureaucracies. General practices 
remained organisationally independent of the PCGIT working under contract to the 
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Department of Health, and reimbursed by the PCGrr for most of their spending on staff 
and buildings 
It was intended that peGs would eventually be transformed into peTs. The first 
seventeen peTs were operational in April 2000, followed by a second group by October 
of the same year. All peGs were to become peTs by April 2002, although the initial 
transitions were to be voluntary (North et a11999). PCTs are statutory bodies 
controlling around 80% of expenditure on local hospital and community health services. 
PCT are required to control access to and develop secondary services, community 
nursing and care of the elderly. PCTs can invest in premises, buy or construct 
community hospitals, purchase facilities and employ doctors directly. There is a Trust 
Board and a Professional Executive Committee (PEC). The Board's role includes 
determining the pay of executive members, preparing proposals for expenditure on 
general medical services (GMS), and is responsible for the overall performance of the 
Trust. There is a chair and five lay members appointed by the Health Secretary, and 
three professional members. This structure is different to the structure ofthe former 
peGs. It attempts to balance the influence of managers and clinicians supervised by lay 
members. The PCT Chief Executive is appointed by the Board. The Chair of the Board 
is a lay person, whilst the chair of the Executive Committee is usually a GP. The PEC 
is responsible for setting priorities, investment plans, reviewing services and 
implementing decisions (McIntosh 1999). 
Whilst transition from peG to PCT status was at first voluntary, it was unlikely that this 
would be agreed without the support of the relevant GPs. The BMA suggested that GP 
support should be confirmed by a ballot. A minimum of80% GPs should have voted, 
with two thirds supporting a transition before it should go ahead. The Royal College of 
GPs (ReGP) stressed PCG's interests should be justified by tangible benefits that would 
come from PCT status. There would be greater responsibilities for corporate and clinical 
governance increasing the pressure on PCT managers to ensure that individual practices 
and other tearns within the PCT stayed within budget and were accountable for the 
standards of services provided. In reality, GPs have been unable to prevent transition 
(Beecham 1999). Furthermore, Glendinning (1999) observes that GPs will be unable to 
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hide behind a distant Health Authority for their prescribing and referral decisions and 
that they will be centrally involved in priority setting and resource allocation decisions. 
Mahmood (2001) argues that peTs are in effect an extension of management control 
over GPs because their status in a peT is different to what it had been in a peG, the 
medical majority on the Board having been removed. Fewer doctors on the Board 
reduce their ability to influence peT decisions. This may not be an issue if there is 
agreement over objectives and how to achieve these. 
The key observation of 'the third way's' impact on medical professional autonomy 
relate to the implementation of clinical governance and are discussed in the next 
chapter. Harrison (in Exworthy and Halford 2002) however, generally observes that 
'third way' reforms will lead to a redistribution of autonomy within the medical 
profession with the advent of a primary care led NHS. Although it is possible to 
overstate the professional independence ofGPs working in the NHS, because their 
terms and conditions of work are heavily regulated by the government, there is a belief 
that the shift in power to them represents a move away from the international trend of 
the 'corporatisation' and 'bureaucratisation' of medicine. In April 2004 a further new 
General Medical Services (GMS) contract was implemented. This is also discussed in 
the next chapter. 
The discussion in this chapter demonstrates that the relationship between medical 
professionals and NHS managers has been a dynamic one during successive 
reorganisations of the NHS. Overall, Kitchener et aI (2000) evaluating the consequences 
of the application ofNPM in the NHS suggest that the service has become more 
financially driven, transparent and accountable. There is a greater emphasis on assessing 
the cost of services and rationing of services on this basis. Performance management 
systems and clinical audit have increased the ability of managers to monitor and control 
the work of 'front-line' professional workers. The medical profession has suffered 
significant defeats, particularly in relation to the Griffiths proposals and the introduction 
of the internal market. 
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Kitchener et al (2000) observe however, that in spite of the defeats professional workers 
have continued to exercise a high degree of tacit control over service delivery. 
Bureaucratic rules and regulations are not always implemented, performance 
management data is not always collected, and where it is, it is not always used 
systematically in the continuous improvement of services. Referring to the work of 
Ackroyd et aI (1989), Kitchener (2000) suggests that 'custodial' (professionally 
determined) approached to service provision still retain a key influence in the NHS. 
2.5 Conclusion. 
This chapter has defined and explored the concept of New Public Management which is 
rooted in a combination of ' public choice theory' and 'new managerialism'. NPM does 
not have a conceptual foundation of its own but micro economics, law and organisation 
theory are useful disciplines for explaining the practices ofNPM. The focus ofNPM is 
to slow do\\n the expansion of public spending and to encourage private sector 
investment in services previously provided only by the public sector. NPM uses private 
sector management philosophy and practices in an attempt to improve the quality and 
efficiency of public services, and to curb the power of professional workers within the 
services. NPM has been heavily criticised by many, particularly in relation to its 
relevance to the management of public sector organisations which have different 
purposes, goals and criteria for and measures of success than private sector business. 
The strategies, structures and culture ofNPM present a clear challenge to 'professional 
bureaucracy' which has been the traditional means by which the professions have 
dominated public sector services. 
The chapter has traced the emergence of the English NHS and the various approaches to 
the management of the service have been reviewed, including the application ofNPM in 
the last three decades. Throughout, the focus has been on general practice and the 
impact ofNPM on the autonomy of the medical profession. There is evidence to suggest 
that NPM practices have steadily eroded the autonomy of the medical profession (Haug 
1973; 1975; 1993; Mckinlay and Arches 1985; Mckinlay and Stoeckle 1988). The 
employment of doctors in managerial type roles, suggests that there may have been a 
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restratifucation of professional autonomy within the medical profession rather than an 
overall decline in its power (Friedson 1985; 1896). 
Clinical governance with its roots in TQM has been described as the most recent 
manifestation ofNPM in the National Health Service (Flynn 2002). The next chapter 
provides a detailed account of clinical governance to support the analysis and discussion 
of the results of my research presented in chapters six and seven of this thesis. 
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Chapter Three 
Clinical Governance 
'The introduction of clinical governance in the National Health Sen'ice in England 
represents a fundamental shift in the relationship between the state alld the medical 
profession ••••. !t is also a response by the state to the increasing problems with the 
regulation of expertise ill all era ofheightelled COIISUNU!r awarelless of risk. '(Flylln 
2002:155) 
3.1 Introduction. 
This chapter is the second of two chapters providing the contextual backdrop to my 
study. It explores the concept of clinical governance, reviews existing medical attitudes 
to clinical governance, considers the potential impact of clinical governance on the 
autonomy and self-regulation of the medical profession and examines the new General 
Medical Services (GMS) contract as a means of reinforcing the implementation of 
clinical governance in general practice. 
Clinical governance has been described as the latest phase of managerialism in the 
National Health Service, and represents a potentially significant increase in managerial 
control of the medical profession (Flynn 2002). It is not an entirely new concept but 
combines a range of existing processes of health care management. These include multi-
professional clinical audit, evidence-based practice, clinical supervision, management 
learning from complaints and adverse incidents, continuing professional development, 
patient/user feedback systems, clinical performance management and the collection and 
analysis of data for monitoring clinical care. In addition, clinical governance requires a 
complete change in organisation culture, systems and stafIbehaviour (Swage 2000). 
Clinical governance has emerged against a backdrop of highly publicised medical 
failures or malpractice including, the Bristol Heart Surgery Inquiry, the unauthorised 
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use of children's organs at Alder Hey hospital, mistaken diagnosis in breast cancer 
screening services at Canterbury Hospital and the murder of numerous patients by GP 
Harold Shipman. Clinical governance represents the state's response to public concerns 
and is a clear attempt to regulate the work of the medical profession presenting a direct 
challenge to medical professional autonomy (Flynn 2002) 
Clinical governance incorporates the setting of national standards of care through 
'National Service Frameworks' (NSFs) via a new organisation, the National Institute for 
Clinical Excellence (NICE); continuous quality improvements based on clinical 
standards and evidence-based practice; monitoring of progress through another new 
organisation, the Commission for Healthcare, Audit and Inspection (CHAI); a new 
survey of patient and user experience; and a system of modernised professional self-
regulation, involving performance appraisal, life-long learning and the periodic 
revalidation of medical practitioners. This has been supported in primary care by the 
implementation of a new contract for general practitioners implemented in April 2004. 
These reforms have been referred to as 'neo-bureaucracy (Harrison 1999); as a form of 
'soft governance' (Courpasson 2000) of the medical profession (Dent 2005); and as the 
most recent manifestation of New Public Management in the NHS (Flynn 2002). 
3.2 What is Clinical Governance? 
The Department ofHeaIth (1998b:33) presented clinical governance as a process that 
provides NHS organisations and individual health professionals with a framework 
within which to build a single coherent local programme for quality improvement. It is 
formally defined as, 
'A framework through which organisations are accountable for continuously 
improving the quality of their services and safeguarding high standards of care 
by creating an environment in which excellence in clinical care will flourish'. 
36 
Janet Hewitt 
2006 
Penny (2000) observed that the term 'clinical governance' was first used by the World 
Health Organisation in 1983 to summarise high quality care on four dimensions, 
professional performance, resource allocation, risk management and patient satisfaction. 
Chandra Vanu Som (2004) explores a range of definitions of clinical governance and 
concludes that common to them all is the concept of an integrated approach to care, 
incorporating the patient experience and the co-ordination of diagnosis and treatment in 
the context of the overall environment. Drawing on the work of Martin (1994), it is 
suggested that 'integration' extends to organisational integration; and the co-ordination, 
co-operation and communication between units of the organisation involved in 
delivering quality care. Thus, clinical governance is designed to integrate and 
consolidate previously fragmented approaches to quality improvement in NHS 
organisations. 
Chandra Vanu Som (2004) takes the main principles of clinical governance and 
develops a defmition which takes into account health care organisational inputs, 
structures, processes and outcomes. The main principles of clinical governance are 
identified as clear lines of responsibility and accountability for the overall quality of 
clinical care; a comprehensive programme of quality improvement systems including 
clinical audit, application of evidence-based practice, implementing clinical standards 
and guidelines, workforce planning and development; education and training plans; risk 
management policies, and procedures for all professional groups to identify and address 
poor performance. Clinical governance is thus defined as, 
'A governance system of health care organisations that promotes an integrated 
approach towards management of inputs, structures, and processes to improve 
the outcome of health care service delivery where health staff work in an 
environment of greater accountability for clinical quality' (Chandra Vanu Som 
2004:89). 
Flynn (2002) suggests that official NHS defmitions of clinical governance are 
ambiguous and varied, but stress the necessity for improvements in quality and stronger 
mechanisms for professional self-regulation (DofH 1998: para 3.2). Flynn (2002: 157) 
argues that clinical governance is, 
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, ..... a new model for marrying clinical judgement with national standards, in 
contrast both with previous central control of clinical judgement and patient 
needs of the late 1970s, and the laissez-faire system of competiton of the early 
1990s.' 
Hurst (2003) observes that clinical governance is based on a simple spiral model 
comprising the setting of quality standards, delivering quality standards, and the 
monitoring quality standards. The following three subsections explore these elements in 
more detail. 
3.2.1 Setting Quality Standards. 
'A First Class Service' (DoH 1998b: 13) stated that high quality services for all, which 
would overcome previously unacceptable variations in the quality of care available to 
different NHS patients in different parts of the country, would be achieved through the 
development of national guidance based on reliable evidence of clinical and cost 
effectiveness. There were to be clear national standards set, defining what patients could 
expect to receive from the NHS. National Service Frameworks (NSFs) and clinical 
guidance would be developed through a new organisation, the National Institute for 
Clinical Excellence (NICE). 
The National Institute for Clinical Excellence (NICE) was established in April 1999 
with the status of a Special Health Authority (Harrison and Lim 2000). The remit of 
NICE was to promote clinical and cost effectiveness through guidance and audit. It 
would provide advice on best practice, on the use of existing treatment options and 
appraise new health interventions. This would result in the production of 'clinical 
guidelines' for the management of specific medical conditions, or recommendations to 
the Department of Health, that particular treatments should not be introduced without 
further trials. These clinical guidelines would feed into general practice and NHS 
computer information systems (DoH 1998b: 14-17). Whilst the application ofNSFs and 
NICE guidance are optional for the medical profession, in the BMA News Review, 
(March 1999: 16), the Chair of NICE advised clinicians to record the reasons for any 
non-compliance with guidelines in patient case notes. 
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National Service Frameworks (NSFs) would define pathways through primary, 
secondary and tertiary care which a particular type of patient might be expected to 
follow. Freedman (2002) observed that the aim ofNSFs is to set out common standards 
across the UK and represents a positive attempt to implement continuous improvement 
of clinical care, reduce variations in clinical practice, improve patient access to services 
and to improve clinical outcomes. 
'A First Class Service' (DoH 1998b:46-47) refers to 'modernised professional self-
regulation' and encourages professional and statutory bodies to continue to set and 
monitor standards. Bodies that set guidelines include the General Medical Council, the 
General Dental CounciL the Council for Professions Supplementary to Medicine and 
the UK Central Council. Klein (1998) observed that in the policy documents, there is a 
flavour that these guidelines are out of date and no longer reassuring to the public 
following the high profile media coverage of adverse professional practice. The (1998b) 
document made it clear that NICE would be working closely with these organisations in 
the future, along with the Audit Commission, the Health Service Commissioner, the 
Professional Royal Colleges, the Health and Safety Executive and Social Service 
organisations in setting and monitoring standards. 
3.2.2 Delivering Quality Standards. 
This part of the quality model is about ensuring that practitioners apply the national and 
local standards set, in their daily work. To reinforce the delivery of quality standards, 'A 
First Class Service' (DoH 1998b:32-49) highlighted clinical supervision, performance 
appraisal, continuous professional development and life-long learning, evidence-based 
practice, risk management and workforce planning. 
Clinical Supervision and Performance AppraisaL 
Van Zwanenberg and Harrison (2000:21) defmed clinical supervision as: 
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, .... A formal process of professional support and learning that enables 
individual practitioners to develop knowledge and competence, assume 
responsibility for their own practice, and enhance consumer protection and 
safety in complex clinical situations.' 
Van Zwanenberg and Harrison (2000) recorded the benefits of supervision as improved 
service quality for patients and stress relief for practitioners working in tense situations. 
It is noted however by Whitfield (2000), that implementation of clinical supervision is 
'patchy,' particularly, among professionals working in isolation, for example, general 
practitioners. It is further reported that whilst nurses appeared to accept clinical 
supervision, medical practitioners were more sceptical, and, at the time, gave the 
General Medical Council a vote of 'no confidence', partly due to its plans for medical 
performance appraisal and revalidation. 
'A First Class Service' (DoH 1998b: 36-37) indicated that practitioners would be 
expected to engage in systematic continuous professional development and life-long 
learning. 'Modernised' self-regulation would involve performance appraisal for medical 
professionals, including for the first time, general practitioners. 
In (2003), Middlemass and Siriwardena reported that all general practitioners would be 
expected to have an appraisal, and to be professionally 'revalidated' every five years. 
This process would require general practitioners to provide evidence of their 
professional performance and continuous professional development. This evidence 
should reflect the basics of professional practice as set out in the General Medical 
Council's 'Good Medical Practice' performance standards. In other words, revalidation 
would be necessary for doctors to remain licensed to practise. 
Continuous Professional Development and Life-Long Learning. 
'A First Class Service' (1998b:41-45) outlined the main purpose and approach to 
continuous professional development and life-long learning in the context of clinical 
governance. It was stated that, 
40 
Janet Hewitt 
2006 
'the government would work with the professions to reach a shared 
understanding of the principles that should underpin effective continuous 
professional development, and the respective roles of the state, the professions 
and individual practitioners in supporting this activity' (1998:41). 
Continuous professional development programmes should meet both the learning needs 
of individual professionals and service development needs of the NHS (1998b:42). 
Lifelong learning would be required to keep up to date with new technologies and new 
approaches to patient care to meet increasing public expectations of the NHS. The role 
of professional bodies in supporting continuous professional development was 
highlighted as influencing the standards of clinical practice, promoting professional 
self-regulation, supporting audit of practice and relating it to learning needs and 
promoting the value oflifelong learning to professionals. It was noted (1998b:43) that 
continuous professional development would be best managed locally in order to meet 
local service needs and those of individual practitioners. Professional and service needs 
were to be identified in a personal development plan, developed by individual 
professionals in discussion with colleagues (1998b:44). 
Walshe et al (2000) identified a strong link between continuous professional 
development, life long learning, clinical governance and quality. The benefits of 
continuous professional development were found to be a raised awareness of 
contemporary medical issues, improved standards of care, and the meeting of the 
learning needs of practitioners. It was concluded that this was a positive contribution to 
well-developed services and the promotion of self-regulation 
Van Zwanenberg and Grant (2004) recently reported that, although doctors should 
continue to learn more about clinical medicine, they increasingly need to develop areas 
that are not clinical in nature. The examples cited are, information technology and 
management, audit and research skills and educational skills. It is noted that general 
practitioners increasingly share areas of their continuous professional development with 
other members of the primary healthcare team. Government guidelines offer a 
framework of continuous professional development that can be applied to all members 
of the primary care team and to the practice as a whole (DoH 1998b). It is 
recommended that each member of the primary care team should prepare a personal 
Janet Hewitt 
2006 
development plan. This should record what the continuous professional development is 
to be, how it will be reinforced and disseminated locally to show how it is improving 
effectiveness. Individual performance development plans should then form part of a 
practice professional development plan, which should address the learning needs of the 
whole practice, and which should link to national objectives and the practice strategic 
plan. 
Evidence-Based Practice (EBP). 
Implementing the evidence base provided by NICE in everyday practice is considered a 
key to the delivery of the Government's clinical governance agenda (DoH 1998b: 36). 
Fitzgerald et al quoted in Mark and Dopson (1999: 189) suggests that evidence-based 
medicine, 
' .... involves the diffusion of evidence, particularly new or updated evidence, 
into clinical practice ...... .it includes complex processes of understanding, 
deciding, evaluating, communicating and agreeing ...... .it involves change and 
change processes. ' 
Wallace and Stoten (1999) reviewed evidence-based practice in a clinical governance 
context and concluded that it contributes positively to improved patient care, and 
provides tangible evidence about cost-effective new treatments. The challenges 
identified by the study were that since no new resources are available 'in the light' of 
evidence-based practice it increases the competition for existing resources. There was 
still found to be considerable professional resistance to implementing evidence-based 
practice, and information management and technology did not always support it. 
3.2.3 Monitoring Quality Standards. 
The final stages in the Department of Health's (1998b:51-68) quality model are the 
monitoring of quality standards. The government outlines three ways of addressing this, 
firstly, by establishing the statutory body, the Commission for Health Improvement 
(CHI, now CHAI) to provide independent examination of local attempts to improve 
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quality and to address poor performance. Secondly, by using performance indicators to 
assess the standards of care delivered by the NHS. Finally, by introducing a 'National 
Survey of Patient and User Experience', to provide comparable information on patient 
and user experiences. 
CHAJ. (preJ1;ously CHI) 
The Commission for Health Improvement (CHI), [now the Commission for Healthcare 
Audit and Inspection (CHAI)], was first established in September 1999 as a statutory 
body 'at arms length from the government' (D ofH1998b:51). Its mission is to provide 
national leadership of clinical governance and to support organisations in its 
implementation CHAI makes regular visits to NHS Trusts and Primary Care Trusts 
(peTs) every 3 to 4 years to ensure that local clinical governance arrangements are in 
place and working effectively, and that NICE guidance and NSFs are being 
implemented. In addition its remit is to identify good practice and to undertake e).1emal 
incident enquiries where necessary. CHAI works closely with statutory bodies in cases 
of under-performing clinicians, making public its recommendations where appropriate 
(DoH 1998b:51-62). 
The National Performance Assessment Frameworks (NP AF) outline performance 
indicators against which CHAI, strategic health authorities and local commissioners are 
able to assess the performance of Trusts and PCTs, to ensure they are delivering 
effective local health services (DoH 1998:63 and DoH 1999: 11). Performance 
indicators are set in relation to health improvement, fair access to services, effective 
delivery of appropriate healthcare, efficiency, patient / carer experience and health 
outcomes. (DoH 1998b:63). These are based on statistics collected from across the UK 
and league tables are produced on a regular basis, which are available to the public. 
(Walshe et al2000:121). 
More recently the Department of Health has published performance indicators for 
primary care organisations, and the first star ratings for PCTs based on these indicators, 
were produced in 2003. (\\\\ \\'chinh~lIhL~1g1f-,11i!:lg~irJdl'~2btD]I). 
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The National Sun'ey of Patient and User Experience and Complaints 
Procedure. 
In addition to external accreditation, monitoring of quality of services takes place 
through the National Survey of Patient and User Experiences. This is designed to collect 
information about demography, illness and social issues, experiences of primary care 
and transition where necessary to secondary care (DoH 1999: 12). 
Bullough and Etchells (2004), report that good complaints procedures provide free 
information about PCTs and individual practices. These often forestall more serious 
disputes. These cost time and money and are very stressful for everyone involved. 
Every PCT and individual practices must now have a complaints manager and a 
complaints code of practice. It is noted that even non-clinical complaints can reveal 
serious difficulties within a practice which may then be addressed before there are more 
serious consequences. 
Poor Performance. 
Irvine (1999: 1174-7) the (then) president of the General Medical Council, outlined the 
duties of a doctor, which are in effect 'values' that doctors should demonstrate in their 
daily work. These include concern, courtesy, and respect for patients, providing 
understandable information, keeping professional knowledge and skills up to date, 
recognising the limits of professional competence, being honest and trustworthy, acting 
quickly to protect patients if it is believed that an individual (self or others) is unfit to 
practise and avoiding abusing the position of doctor. 
Bullough and Etchells (2004) identify the main causes of poor performance. These are 
mostly in relation to doctors failing to keep up to date. It is noted that often doctors 
themselves are unaware of this problem Ifothers do not notice, or feel unable to 
comment, this often results in no remedial action being taken. Single-handed general 
practitioners working alone are perceived to be particularly vulnerable. Other factors 
such as physical and mental health, alcohol and drug abuse, poor working conditions 
and work overload are also identified. Bullough and Etchells (2004), note that although 
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Local Medical Councils (LMCs) have set up support mechanisms for general 
practitioners, traditionally, these have not been much used. However it is reported that 
newer doctors are more likely to use services such as confidential counselling, and are 
more aware of a new 'professionalism' that is developing within general practice. 
Components of this are identified as clear professional values; explicit standards; 
collective, as well as individual responsibility for standards of practice; local medical 
regulations based on team-working; systematic evidence of keeping up to date and of 
adequate performance; and effective systems of dealing with poor performing doctors. It 
is noted however, that there are a small number of doctors who are simply 'bad', for 
example, Harold Shipman, who may in clinical governance terms have appeared to be a 
'hard working' 'committed' general practitioner! 
In 2002 responsibility for poor performance was taken over by PCGs and peTs. 
Taylor (2004) identifies the remedial measures that may now be employed in primary 
care as follows. PCT teams would be required to visit a general practitioner to discuss 
the perceived problems. Where health is deemed to be an issue, occupational health 
assessments are undertaken. In making an assessment teams may use methods to 
'measure' performance and may possibly observe a OPs practice performance. The 
Royal College of Practitioners have developed a 'toolkit' for dealing with poor 
practitioner performance (~~)ll~E[',P.()r.gc1!h) to assist primary care teams in this process. 
Problems considered to be less serious are dealt with at local (PCT) level, with 
educational solutions. More complex situations may require an independent local 
educational assessment in more depth. This service is provided by postgraduate 
deaneries. 
Taylor (2004) reports that the National Clinical Assessment Authority (NCAA) should 
become involved when more serious performance issues are identified, or where a 
doctor refuses an assessment. NCAA advisers are experienced clinicians or health 
service managers who support the PCT by providing advice and ensuring that local 
assessments take place. The PCT remains responsible however, for implementing the 
recommendations of an assessment. The Health and Social Care Act 2001 introduced 
the power for PCTs to suspend general practitioners pending investigation This was 
previously not possible because of the independent contactor status ofOPs. For the first 
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time this Act also requires PCTs to develop a list of locums and non-principal GPs in 
their geographic area, to assist with investigations. 
Taylor (2004) reports that in the case of 'acute' problems of poor medical performance, 
where patients are considered to be potentially at risk, these are to be immediately 
referred to the General Medical Council (GMC). After initial screening by the GMC, if 
the problem is indeed defmed as one of poor performance, the doctor will be offered an 
assessment. If the doctor refuses assessment, he/she will be required to attend a hearing. 
If an assessment it accepted, following this, remedial action may be recommended. 
Typically this will be some form of training or occasionally complete re-training 
(~D~JL.£Ill~-J!h. . .QJg). If the initial GMC screening identifies serious problems which are 
not based purely on poor performance, a formal hearing will be required. 
The Council for Health Care Regulatory Excellence (previously Council for the 
Regulation of Healthcare Professionals), was set up in April 2003 by the NHS Reform 
and Health Care Professions Act 2002, with a mission to protect the public interest, 
promote best practice and achieve excellence in relation to regulating healthcare 
professionals. The Council is funded through the department of Health and is 
responsible to Parliament. The work of the Council covers nine regulatory bodies 
currently responsible for healthcare professionals throughout the UK including the 
General Medical Council. The Council monitors how regulators carry out their 
functions, compare the performance of different regulators and recommend changes in 
the way regulators carry out their work. This is achieved through regular performance 
reviews. (\\\\ \L~hr.Qorg.nh) 
3.2.4 Culture, Leadership and Teams. 
'A First Class Service' (1998b:71) stated that to achieve sustainable quality 
improvement in the NHS, 'a fundamental shift in culture' would be required. Health 
organisations would have to be 'engaged from top to bottom in developing and 
delivering the quality agenda' 
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Scally and Donaldson (1998) suggested that the reforms in the 1980s including the 
introduction of medical audit, general management, clinical guidelines, performance 
indicators, the Patient's Charter and evidence-based medicine were fragmented attempts 
to improve the consistency and quality of health care services. On the other hand, the 
post 1997 reforms, including the implementation of PCGrrs and clinical governance are 
a more coherent approach, involving the whole workforce. Clinical governance has 
become a statutory duty on Chief Executive Officers of Trusts to assure quality and 
continuous improvement. Donaldson (2000) observes that this is the most ambitious 
quality improvement agenda ever to have been implemented in the NHS and will 
require the transformation of the NHS organisation culture. 
Scally and Donaldson (1998), report that effective clinical governance requires multi-
professional team working, strong leadership and an open and participative ('no blame') 
organisation culture, where ideas and good practice are shared. Roland et al (2001) 
described the required culture as more open, with accurate reporting and sharing of data, 
less emphasis on provider confidentiality, and an end to the protection of professional 
prerogatives. It is argued that a key requirement is for doctors to change their attitudes 
and behaviour, accepting change which involves better quality team working and 
leadership, the practice of evidence-based medicine, and the introduction of revalidation 
of doctors with associated appraisal and continuous professional development. 
3.3 Attitudes to Clinical Governance. 
There have been a number of studies tracking progress in the implementation of clinical 
governance, and identifying the positive benefits gained and the barriers encountered in 
this process. (McColl and Roland 2000; Baker and Roland 2002; 
Campbell and Sweeney 2002; Marshall et a12002; Sweeney et al2002; Onion 2000; 
Roland 2003) 
A national survey of the opinions of over 23,000 GPs in England was conducted in 
2001 by the British Medical Association (BMA). It found that only 18.5% ofGPs 
disagreed with the concept of clinical governance, and only 29.2% disagreed with 
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professional revalidation (Baker and Roland 2(02). Further studies indicate the positive 
benefits gained from clinical governance. Sweeney et aI (2002) report perceptions of 
improved patient and staff safety and improved working conditions including more 
interesting and challenging work. There is reduced isolation of practitioners and 
'tribalism', and better team working. This was found to be particularly significant for 
single-handed GPs. Finally, stronger and wider links with other public services were 
perceived to be beneficial. 
Middlemass and Siriwardena (2003) investigated the knowledge, attitudes and beliefs of 
OPs in Lincolnshire towards appraisal and revalidation. It was concluded that OPs were 
positive about appraisal, provided that it was done by professional peers, that there was 
local ownership of the process, and that the purpose was 'educational' leading to agreed 
development plans. Concerns related to the time and resources necessary to make 
appraisal worthwhile and the lack of clarity between appraisal and revalidation. 
There were also barriers to effective clinical governance in general practice identified 
by these studies. These barriers include concerns about the pace of change and the large 
volume of work associated with this; perceptions of a 'blame culture' existing in many 
primary care organisations, undermining the openness required for shared learning to 
take place; too few staff and other dedicated resources for clinical governance and a 
continued 'disengagement' of some practices with the concept of clinical governance. A 
wide diversity in the levels of care and in the available resources and information 
technology skills in general practice were also identified as hindering a corporate 
approach to the implementation of clinical governance (Campbell and Sweeney 2002; 
Marshall et aI 2002 ). 
McColl and Roland (2000) identified the challenges presented by poor standardisation 
of data recording and retrieval, and the need to develop systems for the comparison of 
data. The variability in information technology skills of managers and clinicians in 
general practice was also identified as a challenge. These barriers were re-affirmed by 
Sweeney et aI (2002), who in addition reported the difficulties experienced by OP 
representatives on peTs committees, taking the lead in the implementation of clinical 
governance in general practice (OP leads). These individuals expressed concern about 
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the ambiguity and uncertainty of their role, and the adverse emotional impact of this. 
There were difficulties experienced in undertaking a leadership role in a structure 
without formal line management authority. GP leads reported feelings of powerlessness 
and lack of control over their workloads, given the shortage of resources dedicated to 
the implementation of clinical governance. Clinical Governance Leads reported that 
they had adopted 'softer' facilitative approaches to the general practices in their 
geographic areas, wanting to be viewed as a resource and advocate for practices rather 
than an enemy and desiring to represent the views of the practices at the PCTs. 
There were criticisms of the central organisations associated with clinical governance. 
Onion (2000) recognised that NICE would accurately assess evidence and publish clear 
summaries for clinicians and commissioners of services. Onion (2000) suggests 
however, that NICE guidance is not 'absolute' and cannot therefore identify bad 
practice with 'certainty'! Onion (2000) asks, will NICE in effect be a national rationing 
council? Will NICE mean the end to clinical freedom? 
Rowland (2003) questioned CHAI's 'conflicting' roles of support of health care 
organisations on the one hand, and reviewer and investigator of poor performance on 
the other. The 'real' independence ofCHAI was questioned. On the one hand it operates 
'at arm's length from the government: (DoH 1998:51) on the other hand, CHAl is 
directed by the Secretary of State for Health to undertake specific investigations of 
alleged poor performance. Roland (2003) concludes that the main purpose ofCHAl was 
always inspection, not the softer more supportive developmental role. 
3.4 The New GP Contract and Clinical Governance. 
In April 2004 a new contract of service was implemented for general practitioners in 
England.The clear aim of the contract is to encourage and directly reward the delivery 
of high quality care. (Buckman and Snell 2002; Gulland 2003; Stokes et al 2005). 
The contract provides the option for GPs to opt out of the provision of certain services 
for patients, including out-of-hours care. Patients will now be registered with the 
practice rather than with specific GPs. GPs salaries have the potential to be increased 
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through the delivery ofa 'Quality Outcomes Framework', and by the provision of new 
specialist 'enhanced services'. Participation in the quality outcomes framework is 
voluntary and the pace of progress towards implementation is to be defined by the 
practice itself. The costs of delivering the improved standards of quality are to be met 
by government funding. 
There are three elements to the QOF clinical, organisational and the patient experience. 
Clinical quality is largely about chronic disease management, and is measured in two 
ways. Larger fields of work, for example, ischaemic heart and other vascular diseases 
and diabetes, are scored along a sliding scale with practices moving up a range of 
criteria with rising standards. Simpler areas of work, for example hypothyroidism, 
epilepsy, chronic obstructive airways disease, severe and enduring mental illness and 
asthma, are scored by a simpler tiered method. Organisational quality is also tiered so 
that the practices can work to improve services at their own pace. The patient 
experience is to be monitored via questionnaires enabling GPs to respond progressively 
to the patient's needs. The implementation of the new contract is to be monitored using 
a 'high trust' model with a minimum of bureaucracy. (Buckman and Snell 2002) 
Essential elements for practices to make the new contract work are identified by 
Buckman and Snell (2002) as having auditable records and registers, accurate call and 
recall systems, and responsive primary care teams willing to co-operate together. 
Practices will in effect move up a continuum from having accurate disease registers, 
developing internal audit systems, agreeing and confirming acceptance of the criteria 
and standards in each of the disease areas to be managed, and systematic 
implementation of process measures to achieve the change. There will have to be 
frequent disease reviews accepted by both GPs and patients. This should lead to the 
achievement of the outcome-based targets. Buckman and Snell (2002) go on to 
highlight that to make the process work it will be necessary to delegate tasks to the most 
appropriate member of the primary care team to achieve maximum efficiency and cost 
effectiveness. This may require GPs to be willing to accept a different skill mix in the 
primary care team to make the best use of available resources. Multi-disciplinary teams 
and new work patterns will need to be accepted by all practice staff. It will also be 
necessary to ensure practice managers are competent and well trained to lead the 
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change. Accredited information systems will need to be used, and there should be 
agreed codes allocated to specific medical conditions and associated treatment (read 
codes) within practices and the PCT. Clinical audit and risk management will be 
prerequisites to underpin the whole process. PCTs will need to provide appropriate 
support and training for practices in implementing the new contract. 
The main challenges associated with implementing the new contract that have so far 
identified are firstly, obtaining the support of GPs, particularly in relation to the 
delegation of tasks that they may still wish to maintain responsibility for; taking on a 
public health role alongside individual patient management; accepting that patients as 
consumers are at the centre of the new contract; and finally, persuading practice staff to 
accept the new culture and patterns of working, and ensuring that routine workloads are 
managed appropriately. (Buckman and Snell 2002). 
It is too soon to conclude as to the full impact of the new GP contract and there is little 
critical analysis in healthcare management literature yet. Comparing the details of the 
new GMS contract with the clinical governance framework however, it seems fair to say 
that it has been designed to positively reinforce the implementation of clinical 
governance in general practice where the independent contractor status of GPs may 
have been a significant barrier. 
3.5 Clinical Governance, Professional Autonomy and Self-
Regulation 
'The new NHS Modem Dependable' (1 997: Para 7.15) indicated that the government 
would continue to look to individual health professionals to be responsible for the 
quality of their own clinical practice, 
'Professional self-regulation must remain an essential element in the delivery of 
quality patient services.' 
Professional bodies were encouraged to continue to develop national standards in line 
with changing service needs and increased public expectations, 
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, ..... The Government will continue to work with the professions. the NHS and 
patient representative groups to strengthen the existing systems of professional 
self-regulation by ensuring they are open. responsive and publicly accountable. • 
Friedson (1970b) in his study of the medical profession. asserted that professions could 
be differentiated from other occupational groups by their autonomy and ability to 
exercise legitimate control over their work. In the case of medical practitioners this was 
justified in relation to their specialist knowledge and skills, which were perceived to be 
impossible for outsiders to understand or evaluate. Their adherence to strong value 
systems enabled them to be trusted to act responsibly without supervision. Professional 
ethics would, in effect, control their performance. Where individuals under-performed 
or behaved unethically, professional bodies would be expected to recognise, report and 
regulate this. Sutherland and Dawson (1998) noted that the General Medical Council 
(GMC). Royal Colleges. postgraduate deans. teachers and colleagues comprise the 
framework regulating the medical profession They further reported that historically 
there has been a general acceptance of the legitimacy of clinical autonomy. As outlined 
in the previous chapter, part of the agreement with the medical profession at the 
inception of the NHS was as much clinical freedom as resources would allow, in 
exchange for their acceptance that they would deliver a service that covered the whole 
nation. Quality in healthcare has therefore been dependent on professional autonomy as 
a control mechanism for doctors. These points were introduced in chapter two of my 
thesis and are developed more fully in chapter foUf. 
Alaszewski (2002) however, emphasised examples of poor medical performance and 
mal-practice. where professional self-regulation has failed to prevent injury or death to 
patients. The Bristol Inquiry is identified as a 'watershed' case because it signifies that 
the government is no longer willing to 'unconditionally' trust the medical profession to 
regulate itself and to provide consistent standards of care. The result of this being the 
introduction of clinical governance. a system designed to both regulate performance and 
to improve quality. 
In 'Clinical Governance and Self-Regulation' (Royal College of Physicians 1999: 15), 
the Royal College of Physicians outlines its position in relation to clinical governance. 
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'The long established mechanisms for regulating the medical profession are no 
longer enough. The public, the profession and the government all expect a much 
greater degree of accountability, with less variation in standards of practice and 
behaviour. It is up to us to demonstrate as clearly as possible, through clinical 
governance and self-regulation, good and effective practice. ' 
The document then goes on to indicate how quality of practice should be improved and 
how this might be demonstrated to the public. Clinical governance, including 
performance appraisals and continuous professional development for medical 
professionals, clinical audit, personal development plans and peer led service reviews 
are thus clearly endorsed by the Royal College of Physicians. 
In summary, quality and clinical effectiveness are now to be, in effect, enforced. 
through the tools of evidence-based practice via the implementation of NICE guidance 
and National Service Frameworks. Clinical performance is then to be monitored 
through performance indicators, bench marking and league tables, and periodically 
inspected by CHAI. Alongside this, practitioners are subjected to performance appraisal 
and required to undertake continuous professional development in order to continue to 
be licensed to practice. Harrison (1999) argues this is a form of 'neo-bureaucracy. ' 
Exploring the politics of medicine, Salter (2002) suggests that the control of knowledge 
(the essence of professional autonomy), is exercised through the three regulation 
functions of standards setting, monitoring and evaluation and intervention. If this is the 
case, then what is clear is that clinical governance will increasingly have far reaching 
implications for the professional autonomy of the medical profession. Sutherland and 
Dawson (1998) in their study of the roles of doctors and managers in the new NHS, 
conclude that clinical governance gives managers legitimacy as 'monitors' of the 
quality of clinical services. It is suggested that this is a direct challenge to traditional 
medical professional autonomy. 
3.6 Conclusion. 
This chapter has defmed and explored the concept of clinical governance. Clinical 
governance is defined as the latest phase of managerial ism in the NHS (Flynn 2002), 
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representing a form of'neo-bureaucracy' (Harrison 1999) and exercising 'soft 
governance' (Courpasson 2000; Dent 2005) over the medical profession. 
Clinical governance represents a shift in the relationship between the state and the 
medical profession (Flynn 2002). Clinical governance seeks to replace 'professional 
autonomy' with 'responsible autonomy' (Dent 2005), and to incorporate professional 
self-regulatory mechanisms within centrally directed managerial organisation structures 
(Sheaff et al 2003). There is evidence to support Flynn's (2002) suggestion, that clinical 
governance is a recent manifestation of New Public Management in the NHS. 
The literature review supporting my study is presented in the ne:d chapter. The aim of 
my study is to examine the impact of clinical governance on the professional autonomy 
and self-regulation of GPs in a PCT in the Northwest of England from the perspectives 
ofPCT directors and managers and medical heaIthcare professionals working in general 
practice. Chapters two and three of this thesis have provided a detailed account of 
clinical governance as an element of the 'New Public Management' of the NHS. The 
following chapter reviews the literature on the professions as a distinct occupational 
group and examines the existing literature base seeking to explain the impact of recent 
healthcare policy on the autonomy and self-regulation of the medical profession The 
literature review highlights the key debate concerning whether the medical profession is 
experiencing deprofessionalisation (Haug 1973; 1975; 1977; 1988) and 
proletarianisation (McKinlay and Arches 1985; McKinlay and Stoeckle 1988; 
McKinlay and Stoeckle 2002; Coburn 1992; Coburn et al1997) or alternatively, an 
internal restratification (Fried son 1975; 1983; 1984; 1985; 1986). It is to this debate that 
my study makes a contribution This is presented in the discussion and conclusion of my 
thesis in chapters seven and eight. 
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Chapter Four 
The Professions, Professional Autonomy 
and Clinical Governance. 
'At the heart of a profession is a justifiable autonomy expressed in self-
regulation ..•••. this is the compliment that society pays to the professions it trusts and 
values. It is this that is under threat ••••• if this goes, much else will go with it and the 
worldfor sick people will be a much colder and less safe place' (Tallis 1988:141) 
4.1 Introduction. 
This chapter presents the literature review underpinning my study. It explores 
functionalist and processual approaches to the sociology of the professions and focuses 
on the development of the professions as a distinct occupational group. The chapter 
demonstrates that the key defming characteristics of a profession are its professional 
autonomy and self-regulation. 
The chapter continues with a review of the Neo-Marxist theories of 
'deprofessionalisation' (Haug 1973; 1975; 1977; 1988) 'and 'proletarianisation' 
(McKinlay and Arches 1985; McKinlay and Stoeckle 1988; McKinlay and Stoeckle 
2002; Coburn 1992; Coburn et aI 1997) as explanations of the impact of recent 
healthcare policy on the medical profession The Neo-Weberian concept of 
'restratification' (Fried son 1975; 1983; 1984; 1985; 1986) is also outlined as an 
alternative way of understanding recent events in the management of health care. 
The final section of the literature review presents an account of the relatively few 
existing studies forming the ongoing debate about the impact of clinical governance on 
the professional autonomy and self-regulation of GPs. The debate centres around 
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whether clinical governance is contributing to a decline in the professional autonomy of 
GPs leading to their deprofessionalisation (Haug 1973~ 1975~ 1977; 1988) and 
proletarianisation (McKinlay and Arches 1985; McKinlay and Stoeckle 1988~ 
McKinlay and Stoeckle 2002; Coburn 1992; Coburn et aI 1997), or whether it is instead 
leading to a redistribution of power within the profession (Friedson 1975; 1983; 1984; 
1985; 1986). The conclusion of the chapter identifies how my study aims to contribute 
to this body of knowledge. The detailed account of the contribution of my study is 
presented in the conclusion of my thesis in chapter eight. 
4.2 The Professions and Professional Dominance. 
4.2.1 Functionalist and Processual Perspectives - An Overview. 
The literature on the professions is vast and varied and spans more than a century. In 
1983, HaIl wrote of the near disappearance of sociological interest in the professions in 
American literature. At the same time however, Halliday (1983), in Europe, was writing 
that the sociology of the professions was 'alive and well' though undergoing significant 
change, with the emergence of the power paradigm Macdonald and Ritzer (1988) 
suggested that studies ofthe professions in both USA and UK have not been isolated 
from each other and that there had been considerable cross fertilisation between the two 
countries. American studies have tended to be descriptive, focusing on specific 
occupations, often in isolation from relationships to other social structures and 
institutions. On the other hand British studies have been concerned with the 
relationships between the professions and other occupations, government and the class 
system British studies have also tended to be more theoretically based on the sociology 
ofDurkheim, Weber and Marx. 
In a later attempt to review the literature on the professions, Ritzer, this time writing 
with Walczak (2001), reported that sociologists have conceptualised professions and the 
process of professional is at ion in various ways including functionalist and trait models, 
with their roots in Durkheim's sociology of consensus and order, and processuaI 
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models, including power and action approaches, taking their theoretical lead from the 
work of Marx and Weber. 
The early functionalist models, attempted to identify the key traits and characteristics of 
the professions, differentiating them from other occupations, and focusing on their 
perceived 'function' of maintaining social order (DurkheimI964). 
The processual approach may be divided between the power approach and action 
approaches. The power approach considers how professions acquire the power base 
which differentiates them from other occupations, and having acquired it, how the 
situation may be exploited to further enhance that power base. This influential body of 
literature deals with inter- and intraprofessional conflicts, professions and their 
relationship with government, and professions and social stratification. More recently, it 
has also been concerned with loss or potential loss of professional power via 
'deprofessionalisation' and 'proletarianisation' resulting from bureaucratisation and 
corporatisation. (Johnson 1972; 1995; Haug 1973 and 1975; Boreham 1983; McKinlay 
and Arches 1985; Coburn 1992). 
Action approaches emphasise the ability of professionals to influence and shape the 
organisations and environments in which they operate. Rather than viewing changing 
patterns of professional control as outcomes of organisational and structural changes, 
they are seen as outcomes of continuing struggles by occupational groups for legitimacy 
and institutional recognition. (Friedson 1970a; 1970b; 1984; Larson 1977; Starr 1982; 
Harrison 1994). 
A profession was defined by Ritzer and Walczak as, 
, An occupation that has had the power to have undergone a development 
process enabling it to acquire or convince significant others .... that it has 
acquired a constellation of characteristics we have come to accept as denoting 
a profession.' (1986:6) 
Friedson (1983) suggested that any definition of profession should reflect that it is a 
changing concept with roots in industrial nations strongly influenced by Anglo-
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American institutions. In his o\\n analysis of the medical profession, Friedson 
(1970b:xvii) dermes a profession as, 
' ... An occupation which has assumed a dominant position in a division of 
labour, so that it gains control over the determination of the substance of its 
O\\TI work. Unlike most occupations it is autonomous and self-directing' 
(1983:22) 
Friedson (1983:23-26) presents a useful summary of the history of the professions. He 
observes that the medieval universities of Europe produced three 'learned professions', 
medicine, law and the clergy. 10hnson (1972) referred to these as the 'true' professions, 
against which other occupations seeking professional status compared themselves in 
terms of defining characteristics or traits. These characteristics were defined by 
functionalist theorists as altruism, autonomy and self-regulation, authority over clients, 
general systematic knowledge, distinctive occupational culture and community and 
legal recognition (Parsons 1954; Goode 1957 and Greenwood 1957). Friedson, (1970a; 
1970b) stresses the autonomy of the professions and the resulting necessity for self-
regulation as the key characteristics of , true' professions. 
Friedson (1983) observes that as the occupational structure of capitalism developed 
during the nineteenth century in UK and USA, newly formed middle class occupations 
seeking a secure and privileged place in these economies sought professional status, 
competing with each other in the process. To achieve this status they had to organise 
their O\\TI training and 'credentialing' institutions. Gaining recognition as a profession 
was important because its traditionally defined characteristics oflack of self-interest, 
dedication and learning, legitimated efforts to gain protection from competition in the 
labour market. 
The process of gaining professional status is referred to as 'professionalisation.' 
Wilensky (1964) suggested that indicators of professionalisation portray a historical 
sequence of events through which all professionalising occupations must pass in a series 
of stages to an end state of 'professionalism' In the USA these were defined as the 
emergence of a full time occupation, the establishment of a training school, the 
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establishment of a professional association, political agitation to protect the profession 
by law and the adoption of a formal code of ethics and conduct. 
Rueschemeyer (1983) observed that, particularly since the 1960s more critical attitudes 
towards the professions and their position in society have developed. The emerging 
'power' and 'action' paradigms emphasised professional self-interest rather than selfless 
altruism In particular the professions are perceived to achieve high status in society, 
privileged terms and conditions of work, guarantees of high material rewards and the 
highly valued professional autonomy and self-regulation. The power approach focuses 
on the political and social processes by which the professions secure and reproduce their 
privileged position in society. The action approach suggests that professional status is 
actively pursued, and is the result of individual and collective action, rather than the 
result of macro-structural influences. (Larson 1977). 
The medical profession has achieved, 
'unparalleled professional power, prestige and income' (Ritzer and Walczak 
(1986:5). 
It has gained a monopoly of esoteric knowledge and has as a result considerable 
autonomy to defme the content of its own work and the right to control its o\\n work. 
(Friedson 1970a). At the same time there has been considerable debate over the position 
of doctors within changing healthcare systems, particularly in Britain, Australia, 
Canada, Scandanavia and America (McKinlay and Stoeckle 1988). 
4.2.2 Functionalist and Trait Approaches. 
The functionalist and trait approaches to the sociology of the professions are concerned 
with defining the characteristics of a profession and identifying the role they fulfil in 
society. 
Marshall (1963), stressed the 'altruism' of the professions, and Parsons (1954), defmed 
their collective orientation. Etzioni (1969), classified occupations into 'professions' and 
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'semi-professions'. Millerson (I 964), listed twenty-three elements of the 'true' 
professions, based on twenty-one defmitions from earlier works. Goode (I957) defined 
the characteristics of 'ideal-type' professions against which occupational groups could 
assess themselves in their claims for professional status. Two of these characteristics 
were viewed as essential, these were, prolonged specialist training in a body of abstract 
knowledge, and a service orientation From these, ten other characteristics were derived, 
five of which underpin the concept of professional autonomy. Professional autonomy is 
here defined as a profession's right to determine its own standards of education and 
training, legal recognition by licence, licensing and admission boards controlled by 
members of the profession, and legislation concerning the profession shaped by the 
profession itself Practitioners are free of 'lay' regulation and control (Fried son 1975). 
This results in an ability to determine the nature and content of work and peer 
evaluation without reference to others outside the profession. (Fried son 1970a; 1970b) 
Hickson and Thomas (I969) extended trait thool)' by going beyond lists of elements of 
professions and attempting to establish a hierarchy of professions in Britain by putting 
measurable indicators of 'professionalism' into a Guttman cumulative scale. They 
suggested that the scale produced a close relationship between the professionalisation 
score and the age of the various associations included in their study. They concluded 
that the process of professionalisation is a vel)' long one. 
Barber (1963) stressed the unique behaviour of the professions in relation to other 
occupations. He argued that professional behaviour may be defined in terms of four 
essential attributes. Theses are a high degree of generalised and systematic knowledge; 
orientation to community interest, rather than self-interest; a high degree of self-control 
through codes of ethics, internalised via work socialisation; and fmally, a system of 
rewards, monetary and honorary that symbolise work achievement. 
Hall (1968), attempted to define 'the professional model. ' He saw this as comprising 
structural and attitudinal characteristics. Professional autonomy is isolated as an 
attribute that is both structural and attitudinal. 
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Structural characteristics are for example, efforts of professional associations to 
exclude the unqualified and to facilitate the legal right to practice. Attitudinal 
characteristics are reflected in the manner in which professionals view work, for 
example, use of professional organisation as a major reference point for ideas and 
judgement; a belief in service to the public and dedication to work; a belief in the 
indispensability of the profession~ belief in professional autonomy, that the practitioner 
should be able to make decisions without pressure from outside the profession; and 
fmally, belief that only fellow professionals are able to judge work. 
Professional autonomy is structural because it is part of the work context. If the 
structural pre-requisites for professionalism are met, then the attitude to practice 
becomes the important consideration in measuring professionalisation The combination 
of the structural and attitudinal aspects are seen to be the basics of the professional 
model and according to Hall (1968) are present to a large degree in highly professional 
organisations such as medicine and law. These are present to a lesser degree in less 
professional organisations. 
The trait and functionalist approaches to professionalism and professionalisation have 
been criticised e"lensively. As early as 1957, Greenwood was critical of the procedure 
of listing 'attributes' or the relationship between these, without any explicit theoretical 
framework. In the 1960s and 1970s, critics were pointing out that trait theorists could not 
agree on a definitive list of traits representative of professionalism (Wilensky 1964; 
Johnson 1972; Roth 1974; Elliott 1972; Dingwall and Lewis 1983). 
Becker (1962) suggested that professionalism as a symbol differed markedly from 
professionalism in reality. The ideals of professionalism might become a useful public 
relations mechanism which few would take seriously. 
Wilensky (1964), and Roth (1974), suggested that functionalist and trait approaches 
were largely descriptive ignoring history and process. 
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Johnson (1972) pointed out that trait approaches merely accept a profession's own 
definition of itself. Johnson also stressed that the approach fails to take into account the 
social conditions under which professionalisation takes place, and that it ignored 
the impact of government and academia on the organisation of the occupation and the 
content of its practices. 
Rueschemeyer (1964; 1983) is critical of the functionalist approach to specialist 
knowledge. He argued that this knowledge is assumed to be of equal value to all groups 
in society, which is not necessarily the case. Rueschemeyer (1964) also questioned the 
'bargain' that professionals allegedly strike with society. What happens if they do not 
fulfil that bargain? The functionalist approach implies that there are effective 
mechanisms of self-regulation. Rueschemeyer argued that the power of the professions 
would protect their privilege and autonomy in the event of poor practice. He concluded 
that the privileges ofthe professions are similar to those held by any group high up in 
the social stratification system, and are rooted in the power resources derived from 
positions in the division of labour. 
Torres (1991) argued that the functionalist approach fails to examine power, conflict 
and other social interactions in the process of professional is at ion. Torres (1991) 
suggested that processualliterature on the other hand, concerns itself with 
intraoccupational conflict between sections of an occupation competing for control of 
professional functions; intraoccupational interaction between sections supporting or 
opposing professionalising occupations; and interaction between sections of an 
occupation and the state and occupational policy makers. 
4.2.3 Processual Approaches - Power and Action 
The Processual approach may be divided between the power and action perspectives. 
The Power approach is concerned with explaining how professions acquire and then 
maintain and enhance their power base. Action approaches explore a profession's ability 
to influence and shape the organisations and environments in which it operates. Power 
approaches stress the impact of macro structural and organisational change, whilst 
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Action approaches are concerned with the impact of human agency in shaping and 
influencing outcomes. 
Power Approaches. 
Esland (1980) suggested that the power and influence of the professions lie in their 
professional autonomy, the degree of control over the management and exercise of 
specialist knowledge, and the skills which are based on it. In addition, the level of 
public acceptance and support they can obtain. These are necessary acquisitions for 
professional ising occupations and gaining these are political activities involving an 
ongoing task of public persuasion and competitive relationships with other occupations. 
James and Peloille (1970) argued that when there is a high degree of , indeterminacy' in 
the work of a profession, when tasks are variable and non-rationalised the group is 
likely to achieve professional autonomy and high status and rewards. On the other hand, 
if work has been systernised and subject to laid down rules and procedures, it is possible 
for external forces to control the work process. Social and political factors also create or 
prevent conditions where elite groups can capitalise on the work situation. At crucial 
points in a profession's development, pursuit of best practice might cause a group to 
codify and mechanise their own work, enabling control to be shifted to outside 
managerial elements. 
In attempts to become recognised as a profession, Parry and Perry (1976), emphasised 
the problem of 'exclusiveness' and 'market control'. To exercise control over the 
market anyone with expertise must be included, but this results in lowering the standard 
of higher status members. Parry and Perry (1976) argue that the claim to unique 
competence, legally supported is the key to professionalisation. 
Larkin (1983) and Macdonald (1985) demonstrated that occupations need to 
continually work to identify the territory they wish to monopolise and also to attempt to 
control the work of surrounding groups without diminishing their own power and 
prestige. Secondly, they need to regulate the relations between these groups and the 
distribution of power between specialities. This obviously generates conflict within and 
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between occupations. In his study of four paramedical groups, Larkin (1983) noted that 
the division oflabour assures lower status groups of a market, and association with a 
higher status group provides prestige. He defined an 'arena of 
tension' between groups, the outcome of which is determined by the degree of access of 
each group to exterior power sources. 
Abbott (1988) argued that the key factor of professional life is interprofessional rivalry. 
He argued that it is important to have a 'systemic' rather than an 'individualistic' view 
of professions. It is necessary to look at interdependencies and the overall 'system' of 
groups engaging in the fight for professional status. It is not the work that the profession 
performs but the competition over work that is the basis of the dynamic relationship 
between professions. Abbott (1988) suggested this is explained by the concept of 
'jurisdiction. ' This is the control a profession exercises over a specific area of work, the 
right to perform the work, at the same time excluding others, and to define best practice. 
Jurisdictional claims are made to for example, the law, public opinion, and the state. 
Abbott (1988) argued that jurisdiction could be created, willingly vacated, and also lost 
to a more competent group. Fighting for jurisdiction is the means by which the 
development of professions occurs. Abbott (1988) also argued that knowledge is 
important, it must have high status in society. Work related knowledge is formalised 
into an intellectual system, with its own methodology, philosophy, ethics and theory. 
This knowledge enables a profession to defend its position and claim further 
jurisdiction. It attempts to re-define human problems into professional problems that it 
alone is able to solve using its expertise. The system of professions posed by Abbott 
(1988) provides a framework to explain the range of professional development. 
Professions may attack each other, external forces may open up or close jurisdictions, 
jurisdictions may be willingly vacated or shared. In the latter case, junior members of a 
profession may be supervised by more experienced members of a profession. In this 
way, inter-professional relations can be co-operative as well as competitive. MacDonald 
and Ritzer (1988) identifY other studies of inter and intraprofessional conflict taking 
place within the context of ongoing power struggles. (Holloway et al 1986; Podmore 
1980). 
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Other significant contributions within the power approach concern the relationship 
between the professions and the state. Johnson (1972) in his book 'Professional Power' 
considers types of professional control. He identifies collegiate control in which the 
producer defines the needs of the consumer and the way in which these are provided. 
Secondly, patronage, where the consumer defines his !her needs and how they are to be 
met. Within this type, 'oligarchic', and 'corporate' patronage are distinguished. 
Oligarchic patronage arises in traditional societies where an aristocratic patron is the 
major consumer of various goods and services. Corporate patronage refers to 
professions in industrial societies, where the demand for services comes from large 
corporate organisations. The final type of control is 'meditative', in which a third party 
mediates the relationship between producer and consumer, defining both the needs and 
the manner in which they will be met. Again this may be sub-divided into capitalism, 
where the capitalist intervenes between the producer and consumer in order to 
rationalise production and to regulate markets~ and state mediation, where a powerful 
centralised state intervenes in the relationship between producer and consumer to define 
what the needs are. 
Johnson (1972) highlighted the medical profession in Britain, suggesting that the state 
defined who would receive medical services whilst medical practitioners 
determined the manner in which these needs would be met. Johnson (I 972) argued that 
the impact of control on individual occupations would vary according to the historical 
origins of that occupation. An occupation may bring with it many of the characteristics 
of professionalism, even though this may be in decline and new institutional forms of 
control emerging. Where social conditions are influential in affecting the development 
of an occupation, forms of institutional control will emerge which will vary also 
depending on the potentiality for autonomy displayed by the occupation. 
In 1982, Johnson developed this last point further arguing that the development of the 
professions could be understood in terms of the opposition between professional 
autonomy and state intervention. The development of capitalism in Britain involved an 
interrelated process of state formation and professionalisation The conclusion drawn 
was that, 
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'the relationship of state to profession presents itself as one of constant struggle 
and seeming hostility, while at the same time constituting an interdependent 
structure. The view that professionalisation is not a single process with a given 
end-state also suggests that the relationship with changing state forms is in 
flux ..... , ..... To claim that the modem professions are a product of state 
formation does not entail a view of profession as universally the servants of 
power.' (1982:207-208) 
Fielding and Portwood (1980) also considered the relationship of the professions with 
the state. They present a typology of bureaucratic professions. The dimensions are 
public / private (workplace and practice) and dependence / autonomy in relation to the 
state. They concluded that in most cases a formal working relationship has been 
established between professions and the state and that in the relationship with the state, 
few professions have lost status and autonomy and that the interdependent processes of 
bureaucratisation and professionalisation have benefited both parties. 
Halliday (1985) argued that the degree of influence a profession has on the state 
depends on their standing in four areas, the foundations of their knowledge, the forms of 
authority they can exercise, the institutional centrality of their work, and the 
organisational characteristics of their professional associations, these impact on their 
ability to act collectively in relation to the state. 
A further interest ofprocessual theorists is the relationship between the professions and 
the stratification system Macdonald and Ritzer (1988). Johnson (1980) based his 
analysis on the work of Marx and analysed the place of the professions in relation to 
production and therefore the class structure. Johnson (1980) considers the ways in 
which various professions relate to the dual structures resulting from the antagonistic 
relations of capital and labour, in relation to the appropriation of surplus value, the 
realisation of capital and the reproduction of the relations of production. These were 
seen to generate parallel systems of social control in the maintenance and expansion of 
capital. 
Boreham (1983) analysed knowledge and power in relation to the professions. He 
argued that professionals achieve and sustain their position by identification with 
recognised norms and values of capitalist organisation of the labour process. He also 
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argued that professions align themselves with the values of capitalism and are rewarded 
by incorporation into the 'upper echelons' of society, where their ideology ofa 
'calling', masks the contradictions that develop at the level of production and in the 
organisation of the labour process. 
Action Approaches. 
Everett Hughes (1963) is often referred to retrospectively, as the main point of reference 
for the shift in focus in the late 1960s to an 'Action' perspective, which is concerned 
with the ways in which individuals and groups influence the contexts in which they 
operate. Hughes (1963) reported that he had, 
' ... passed from the false question, 'Is this occupation a profession?' to, 'What 
are the circumstances in which people in an occupation attempt to tum it into a 
profession and themselves into professional people?' (quoted in Macdonald 
1995:6) 
Becker (1962) highlighted the 'symbols' of professionalism, stating that these 
represented the ideal base for the control of the work of members, and for defming 
relationships with clients. He suggested that 'profession' is a label which secures 
political advantage. 
, ....... because the symbol legitimates the autonomy of the worker, occupations 
that are trying to rise in the world very much want to possess it. ...... so we fmd 
many occupations trying hard to become professions and using the symbol of 
the profession in an attempt to increase their autonomy and raise their prestige' 
(1962: 139). 
Hughes (1971 :288) argued that professions claim a legal, moral and intellectual 
mandate. Individually they gain a licence to practice, at the same time, as a group, they 
'presume to tell society what is good and right.' Hughes (I 971) suggested that this 
licence and mandate are the key sources of professional authority. The strength of the 
mandate varies from one profession to another. In the case of medicine, it is supported 
by state legislation, which prevents unqualified individuals from practising. 
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Occupations need to persuade the public and the government that the specialist nature of 
their work means it can only be undertaken by 'qualified' individuals. Once achieved, 
this provides considerable internal control over the organisation of a profession. It 
enables professions through their professional associations, to define the necessary 
qualifications and criteria for entrance to the profession, and codes of practice. 
'Ideologies' are also created emphasising the importance of its specialist knowledge and 
skills along with warnings of likely dangers if practised by unqualified individuals. 
Hughes (1971) also highlighted ideologies of trust as central to the professional 
mandate. Clients are expected to trust the knowledge and skills of the medical 
profession, disclosing all 'necessary' personal information to them At the same time, 
the profession requires protection from any adverse consequences of their practice. The 
profession protects its members by making it difficult for outsiders to pass judgement 
on individual members. Only fellow professionals are 'qualified' to assess the 
performance of professional work and to establish if a mistake has been made. 
The professional mandate is dependent on a negative view of the 'lay' public for its 
justification. Hughes, (1963 in Esland et aI 1975) suggested that this legitimates the 
existence of the profession. The medical profession can prescribe treatment for 
'conditions' defined by itself Also, the professions 'speak' for society in matters in 
which they claim to be expert. 
, .... Physicians consider it their prerogative to define the nature of disease and 
health and to determine how medical services ought to be distributed and paid 
for ........ every profession considers itself to be the proper body to set the term; 
in which some aspect of society ... is to be thought of, and to defme the general 
lines or ~wen the detail of public policy concerning it. '(Hughes 1963 in Esland et 
al 1975:245) 
IIIich (1975) also argued that the medical profession created needs leading the public to 
seek their services. Individuals are persuaded to believe their problems are medical in 
nature and therefore require the services of doctors. 
Building on the work of Hughes (1971) and Friedson (1970a; 1970b), Larson (1977) 
posed the concept of the 'professional project', also referred to as the 'collective 
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mobility project'. This uses Weberian concepts of 'exclusion' and 'social closure' to 
explain how the professions build up a monopoly of knowledge and on this basis also 
build up a monopoly of service deriving from it. In this way, the resulting claims on 
professional status which are pursued, are 'projects' which may succeed or fail. There is 
also an element of Marxian approaches in Larson's work in her analysis of the 
complexities ofhierarchy within professions. An occupation succeeding in achieving 
professional status may not provide a career path for all members. The rise of one group 
within a profession may not be to the advantage of another. Also, employing 
organisations may impose a 'trusted' managerial group on a profession rather than 
drawing senior managers from the profession itself. It is also recognised that division 
may emerge within a profession and there may be des killing at lower levels. 
Friedson (l970a; 1970b), argued that medical knowledge was separate from its 
application. Medical knowledge might be neutral, but in its application, the organised 
medical profession had interests that might not reflect the needs of patients. Medicine 
had become a profession which 'dominated' health care in its own interests. Medicine 
had also produced its own ideology, 
, a self deceiving view of the objectivity and reliability of its knowledge and the 
reliability of its members.' (Friedson 1970b:370). 
Friedson (1970b) noted that professional control has four dimensions to it. Control over 
the content of work, control over other health related professions, control over clients 
and control over terms and conditions of work. Professional autonomy (contro) over the 
content of work) however, is perceived to be the defming characteristic of a profession. 
Friedson (1970b) argued that professional dominance is achieved by persuading the 
public of its validity. Gaining acceptance brings monopoly powers. This is also 
achieved by the sponsorship of a social elite, the state, protecting it from encroachment. 
Dominance is maintained through medical professional associations, and the control of 
new knowledge through medical schools. The medical profession also controls 
heaIthcare through its ability to defme and legitimate 'illness. • 
Coburn (1992), reported that in 1986, Friedson redefmed professions as agents of 
formal knowledge, credentialed on the basis of higher education Professions created 
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exclusive shelters in the labour market for members through the monopolisation of 
education, training and entry requirements. The important characteristics of a profession 
had become the links between professional work, for which there must be a market 
demand, the training provided by the education system, and privileged access to the 
market for members of the profession. All other powers of professions are viewed as 
merely supportive of these links between task, training and market. It is this tight 
control over labour markets that sustain the power and privileges of professionals .. 
In 1986, in his book 'Professional Powers', Friedson demonstrated how professional 
powers grew out of their 'market shelters'. Knowledge monopolies are identified as a 
major source of power because this facilitates control over how work is conducted, 
which is labelled, 'technical autonomy.' This in tum leads to situationally specific 
knowledge monopolies. For example, because of their specialist knowledge, 
professionals normally control case records of clients, this organisationally significant 
information enhances the power of professionals in work situations. Other special 
privileges flowing from the specialist knowledge of professionals are more favourable 
employment rights and terms and conditions of work than enjoyed by other occupations. 
It is technical autonomy which also creates the alleged necessity for self-direction (self-
regulation) of the professions. 
A further source of professional power is identified as 'gatekeeping' activity. This is 
referred to as 'institutional control' over desired resources and involves interpretation 
and judgement of the benefits required by a client. For example, in England, general 
medical practitioners are gatekeepers to secondary care. Professional power is dermed 
as greatest where situations combine a monopoly of situational knowledge and 
gatekeeping in interaction with clients. 
Friedson (1994) argued that professionalism has always been a dynamic concept. 
Chapters two and three of this thesis highlighted the progressive implementation of 
New Public Management techniques in the English NHS. What has been the impact on 
the autonomy and self-regulation of the medical profession? Exworthy and Halford 
(2002) observed that there are three lines of argument in relation to this. Firstly, that 
'deprofessionalisation' is taking place (Haug 1973; 1975); secondly, the 
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'proletarianisation' thesis (Mackin lay and Arches 1985; Mackinlay and Stoeckle 1988); 
and thirdly, that a restratification within the medical profession is occurring (Fried son 
1986; 1994). 
Sections 4.3 and 4.4 of this chapter explore the concepts of deprofessionalisation, 
proletarianisation and restratification as explanations of professional decline. 
4.3 Professional Decline. (Are professions losing their privileged 
position?) 
As early as the 1950s, Mills warned ofa loss of professional prerogatives and 
particularly professional autonomy. According to Mills (1956) modem society was 
becoming progressively bureaucratised, the professions were perceived to be 
increasingly absorbed into administrative systems where knowledge is standardised and 
professionals become managers. 
, Most professionals are now salaried employees; much professional work has 
become divided and standardised and fitted into the new hierarchical 
organisations of educated skill and service; intensive and narrow specialisation 
has replaced self cultivation and wide knowledge; assistants and 
subprofessionals perform routine, although often intricate, tasks, while 
successful professional men become more and more the managerial type. So 
decisive have such shifts been, in some areas, that it is as if rationality itself had 
been expropriated from the individual and been located as a new form of brain 
power in the ingenuous bureaucracy itself.' (Mills 1956: 112 quoted in 
Macdonald 1995) 
More recently in the 1970s, against the backdrop of social and structural changes 
impacting on the status and prerogatives of the professions the overlapping theories of 
deprofessionalisation and proletarianisation, rooted in Marxist analysis have been 
published. 
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4.3.1 Deprofessionalisation. 
Describing the changing role of doctors, Haug (1973; 1975) first posed 
'deprofessionalisation' as an alternative scenario to existing predictions of a generally 
professionalised society (Friedson 1970a 1970b; Bell 1968; Halmos 1970). 
Deprofessionalisation was rooted in perceptions of changing relations between 
professionals and consumers, and was defmed as a loss of unique professional qualities, 
particularly IIK>nopoly over knowledge, public belief in the service ethic, professional 
autonomy and authority over clients. Other proponents of the deprofessionalisation 
thesis have been Oppenheimer (1973); Betz and O'Connell (1983) and Rothman (1984). 
Haug (1973) argued that technological and ideological trends would render professions 
obsolete. Professions would lose control over knowledge as a result of computerisation, 
the emergence of new occupations in the division of labour and increasing public 
sophistication. The result would be challenges to traditional professional autonomy and 
demands for increased accountability. Such deprofessionalisation would strip away 
traditional claims of professional authority and deference. 
To the extent that scientific professional knowledge can be codified, it can be broken 
down and stored in a computer memory and recalled as required. Haug (1973) noted 
that the academic knowledge underpinning professional expertise is largely codifiable 
and amenable to computer input. This may then be extracted by anyone who knows how 
to get it, medically qualified or not. It was further observed that this makes peer review 
of professional performance possible. Increased general educational levels would serve 
to demystify professional expertise. The availability of training in the field of 
computing would facilitate information retrieval. The part of professional knowledge 
gained by experience and therefore not codifiable, could also be gained by lesser 
academically qualified but well trained, (and therefore cheaper to employ) para-
professionals. 
Haug (1973) noted that the public service ethic of professionals would also be 
increasingly challenged. Their eIIK>tional detachment from clients deemed necessary not 
to compromise professional judgement may be viewed as lack of concern for the client. 
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The public would also become increasingly confident about their rights and would wish 
to take an active part in professional decision-making. Pressure groups and self-help 
groups would encourage assertive behaviour on the part of clients. 
Fifteen years later, in 1988, Haug re-visited the concept of deprofessionalisation to 
assess its accuracy in relation to the medical profession. She noted that at that time, the 
medical profession had been only partially successful in preventing the spread of 
medical knowledge to lesser qualified para-professionals. New occupations had 
emerged. The media had popularised much of the increasing bank of medical 
knowledge making it accessible to a more educated public. Computerised diagnosis and 
evaluations of decision trees indicating the relative success of various treatments were 
already available. Haug (1988) observed the increasing unwillingness of patients (in the 
western world) to unquestioningly accept medical authority, and the tendency to require 
medics to talk in plain understandable language and not use terminology to obscure and 
mystify. Changes to organisation structures and governance have also served to erode 
medical professional autonomy. Haug (1988) argues that the implications of this are that 
medical autonomy may be dangerous to patients and must therefore be subjected to 
public scrutiny. Haug (1988) concluded there was insufficient evidence to either prove 
or reject her original hypothesis, but invited a further look at the turn of the century. 
4.3.2 Proletarianisation. 
Similarly, based on Marxist analysis, the theory of proletarianisation overlaps to some 
extent with the deprofessionalisation thesis. McKinlay and Arches (1985:161) define 
proletarianisation as, 
' ..... the process by which an occupation is divested of control over certain 
prerogatives relating to the location, content and essentiality of its task activities and 
is thereby subordinated to the broader requirements of advanced capitalism' 
McKinlay and Arches (1985) suggested that control is lost over the criteria for entrance 
to an occupation, the content of training, autonomy in relation to the terms and content 
of work, the objects and tools of labour, the means oflabour and the amount and rate of 
reward for labour. McKinlay and Arches (1985) argued that whilst most occupations 
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have been easily subjected to proletarianisation, the medical profession has been able to 
delay or minimise this process. However due to the bureaucratic consequences of 
capitalist expansion this is no longer the case. 
Rationality is presented as the underpinning requirement for bureaucracy, translated in 
terms of the need for centralisation, economies of scale, medical technological 
advancements and the requirements of efficiency and improved quality of care. 
Bureaucracy is also suggested to be the only way to deliver medical care to large 
numbers of people. McKinlay and Arches (1985) perceived however that the 'real' 
reason for bureaucracy is capitalist accumulation, as a means of controlling educated 
workers to that end. Bureaucracy maintains loyalty and allegiance by rewarding rules 
orientation, predictable and dependable behaviour and the intemalisation of an 
organisation's goals and values. Bureaucratic organisation results directly from the need 
to protect and advance the prerogatives of capitalism by exercising widespread forms of 
social control on three different levels. 
Firstly, social control is exercised by setting organisational goals and the conte:x1 within 
which tasks must be undertaken. Secondly, the behaviour of individuals is controlled by 
hierarchical structures and regulatory norms. Thirdly, the activities of clients are 
constrained by the first two of these forms of control, of which they may be unaware. 
The organisation, in effect, controls the pace and direction of work and engenders 
loyalty and discipline. Standardised evaluation of worker performance promotes 
conformity and control based on individualistic orientation. 
McKinlay and Arches (1985) considered these processes of control in their analysis of 
the position of the medical profession in America Doctors were observed to be working 
less in independent fee-for-service practice and more in large bureaucratic organisations 
as salaried workers. A further factor encouraging the medical profession out of private 
practice was the need to avoid malpractice costs imposed on them by a profit orientated 
health insurance industry. 
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Growth in specialisation, practiced in large bureaucratic settings instead of smaller 
general practice was also observed as a contributory factor. In line with Haug's findings 
(1973; 1975), this was believed to be because of the continual increase in 
medical knowledge making it impossible for a single individual to have sufficient 
expertise in all areas, along with the rising levels of expectations and knowledge of the 
general public. Whilst doctors had until this time been able to maintain their privileged 
position, avoiding proletarianisation, increased bureaucratisation of medical practice 
due to subordination to advanced capitalism was reported to now be eroding the 
privileges of the medical profession. 
McKinlay and Arches (1985) make further related observations. When professionals 
enter a bureaucratic setting they devote themselves to climbing the managerial hierarchy 
and advancing their relative status and control of the organisation in its operational 
field. Thus a select group of professional executives (managers), direct operational 
activities, motivated by organisational priorities (as opposed to professional priorities), 
shaped by the interests of corporate capitalism Secondly, specialisation means that 
doctors are increasingly involved in a highly segmented 'medical care production line'. 
In effect this breaks down medical care into discrete manageable components. The 
doctor becomes an expert in a limited area, which is more generally understandable and 
therefore more vulnerable to codification into bureaucratic rules and procedures capable 
of being computerised and easily grasped by individuals without a formal medical 
training. 
McKinlay and Arches (1985) argued along similar lines to Haug (1973; 1975) that the 
use of technology, and organisation structure, initially erode professional autonomy and 
status, but eventually may go so far as to enable medical professionals to be replaced by 
less qualified, and therefore cheaper personnel. Professionals are thus losing their 
monopoly control over strategic knowledge and are becoming de-skilled, cheapening 
their labour power and diminishing their privileged terms of employment. 
McKinlay and Arches (1985) concluded that the proletarianisation of the medical 
profession may be a slow process and be largely undetected by members due to their 
'false consciousness' of the significance of their daily activities, and their elitist concept 
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of their role. Doctors may not realise that what they are involved in is advancing the 
interests of capitalism Doctors,just like any other workers become 'dupes' ofa system 
which is dominated by a process of capital accumulation and expansion. 
4.4 Restratification Within Professions. 
Based on Weberian analysis, Friedson (1984; 1985; 1986; 1994) poses the theory of 
rest ratification as an alternative explanation of the impact of recent health care policy 
on the autonomy of the medical profession. In 'The Changing Nature of Professional 
Control' (1984), Friedson takes issue with the theories of deprofessionalisation and 
proletarianisation. Friedson (1984) suggests that Haug's arguments (1973; 1975), that 
the professions are losing their prestige and trust is unpersuasive. Friedson (1984) 
argues that in spite of the narrowing knowledge gap between the medical profession and 
the general public, and higher standards of education generally, the medical profession 
continues to possess a monopoly over important segments of formal 
knowledge, which have not diminished. Friedson (1984) further suggests that whilst the 
power of computer technology in storing codified knowledge cannot be overlooked, it is 
members of the professions (not outsiders) who determine what is to be stored and who 
are able to interpret and employ effectively what is retrieved. 
With respect to the proletarianisation thesis, Friedson (1986) argues that employment 
status is not a good direct measure of control or lack of control over work. Apart from 
lawyers and doctors, where an increase in salaried employment could be observed, 
professions had always tended to be in salaried employment anyway. With respect to 
increased bureaucaracy, it is recognised that there have been studies suggesting conflict 
between increased bureaucratic administration and professionalism because 
professionals highly value their autonomy and seek to control their own work and to set 
their own standards rather than accepting direction from bureaucrats. (Hal11968;Scott 
1966). It is noted however, that organisations employing professionals are more likely 
to deviate from the bureaucratic type where employees are tightly controlled by rules 
and procedures. Alternative hybrid structures have emerged, defmed by Goss (1961) as 
'advisory bureaucracies' by Smigel (1964) as 'professional bureaucracy' and by Scott 
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(1965) as 'professional organisations'. The term 'organised anarchy' was coined by 
Cohen and Marsh (1972); and Weick (1976), argued that organisations employing 
professionals should be viewed as loosely coupled systems rather than tightly managed 
bureaucratic units. Similar labels have been assigned to professional structures since 
then, for example Mintzberg's (1983),professional bureaucracy' and Courpasson's 
(2000) concept of 'soft governance. ' 
Friedson (1986) also observed that without careful case-by-case analysis it would be 
wrong to believe that even in bureaucratic organisations, professionals are placed in a 
situation directly analogous to industrial workers, lacking discretion in the performance 
of their work, being closely supervised and having their skills expropriated. 
Professionals are expected to exercise judgement and discretion in their every day tasks, 
and have different supervisory arrangements to other types of workers. It could be 
expected that first line managers would also be qualified professional colleagues. The 
managerial level immediately above the line manager would also be a fellow 
professional, usually for accreditation purposes. In this way, unlike blue collar or 
administrative workers, professionals take orders from superordinate colleagues rather 
than trained managers who may not share the same professional background. Friedson 
(1986) recognised that this does reduce the autonomy of individual 'rank and file' 
professionals, but argues that it does not represent a reduction in the control of 
professional work for the profession as a whole. Other professional workers create 
work, and 'lead' rank and file professional workers. Friedson (1986) argues therefore 
that it is inaccurate to state that professions as corporate bodies have lost control over 
their member's work, even though to some extent individual members may have done. 
Deprofessionalisation and proletarianisation are perceived by Friedson (1986) to be 
inaccurate descriptions of the changing context of professional work. 
Friedson (1986) suggests that whilst there has always been competition within 
professions and stratification of both intellectual power and economic power, the degree 
of formalisation of these relationships is new. One elite group formulates 
standards, another directs and controls, and still others perform the work. Something 
significant has happened to the organisation of the medical profession as a body and to 
the relationships between its members which has serious consequences for the future of 
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the profession. Taking his example of the medical profession, Friedson (1986) suggests 
that despite its internal division by stratification and specialisation, historically it has 
maintained a degree of solidarity (community), enabling it to be accurately described as 
a single profession. This community however, is likely to be threatened by the 
formalisation of professional controls. The profession could be split into distinct groups, 
the practitioners, the researchers and the administrators, each having its own 
professional association representing its own separate interests. 
Friedson (1986) concluded that although the privileged status of rank and file 
professional workers will deteriorate, this will not be so much that they will be 
indistinguishable from other workers. Even though facing more formalised control rank 
and file professionals will continue to have more discretion in their work than other 
types of workers. Individual medical professionals will continue to have a distinct 
occupational identity. 
McKinlay and Stoeckle (1988) and Coburn (1992) criticise Friedson's (1986) theory of 
restratification, and reiterate the validity of the theory of proletarian is at ion. They argue 
that Friedson's (1986) explanation is unable to adequately accommodate 
macrostructural changes. They suggest that professional dominance is a description of 
the situation in the medical profession in the 1960s and not a theory that explains more 
recent events. On the other hand the theory of proletarianisation looks to the future, 
arguing on the basis of what is occurring in the present and what is likely to happen in 
the future. Finally, McKinlay and Stoeckle (1988) indicate that whilst Friedson (1986) 
highlights a lack of evidence to support the decline theories, there was very little 
underpinning empirical data to support his own contributions. Finally, whilst Friedson 
(1986) had argued that decline theories were no more than slogans with little more than 
rhetorical value, McKinlay and Stoeckle (1988) present the reminder that 
proletarianisation is an explanation of a process under development and still continuing 
rather than an end state to be achieved. 
Coburn (1992), compared Friedson's earlier work on professional dominance (1970a; 
1970b), with his later work (1986) and highlighted conceptual confusion between 
'dominance' and 'autonomy.' Coburn (1992) argued that it is more appropriate to view 
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dominance, autonomy and subordination as a continuum of control. Coburn (I 992) 
argued that internal differentiation (restratification) does not maintain 'dominance' 
because medical elites are 'co-opted', working for and developing the goals of the state. 
Whilst they are leaders of the profession, the profession itself becomes 'corporatised' 
through them The profession's knowledge base, nature of work and organisation are 
compromised. 
Since 1997 the New Labour Government's implementation of Primary Care Groups 
(PCGs) then Primary Care trusts (PCTs), and clinical governance framework have 
provided the main focus for studies of challenges to the professional autonomy of GPs 
in the English NHS. These reforms were discussed in chapters two and three of this 
thesis and have been identified as the most recent attempts to extend managerial 
control over the work of the medical profession (Flynn 2002), and therefore to present a 
significant challenge to the professional autonomy and self-regulation of general 
practitioners (GPs). 
The key question addressed by these studies is whether the post 1997 reforms result in a 
professional decline, deprofessionalisation and/or proletarianisation of general practice; 
or a restratification within the profession. The conclusions of these studies vary, but 
there is limited evidence presented of deprofessionalisation, and stronger evidence of 
both proletarianisation and restratification within general practice. 
4.5 Professional Autonomy, Primary Care Groupsffrusts and 
Clinical Governance - The Case of General Practice. 
4.5.1 Salter (2000) identified the underlying political tensions in the relationship 
between medicine, society and the state, and the implications for the future of the 
professional autonomy and self-regulation of the medical profession. Salter (2000) 
argued that until recently the relationship between medicine, society and the state 
formed a stable set offorces based on the mutual exchange of benefits. Society received 
healthcare benefits from the state, the state gained legitimacy from society, and relied 
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on the medical profession to ration heaIthcare resources. By fulfilling its obligation to 
society and the state, medicine received the trust of society and the privilege of self-
regulation within the NHS, from the state. The right to self-regulation is built on trust. 
Recent studies demonstrate that increasingly government heaIthcare policies have 
challenged this. (Harrison and Dowswell2002; Harrison and McDonald 2003; Harrison 
Smith 2003; Sheaff et a12003; 2004; Dent 2005). 
Salter (2000) observed that clinical governance implies that self-regulation is no longer 
a sufficient guarantee of quality. It represents instead, a systematic management-led 
quality assurance framework. Self-regulation remains in name but is in effect rooted 
within a state administration which requires the modernisation of self-regulation, which 
is open and transparent and responsive to changes in clinical practice and service needs, 
and accountable for implementing nationally set standards. 
Salter (2000) examined the opposing underpinning philosophies of clinical governance 
and self-regulation. Clinical governance is a rational bureaucratic regulation through 
rules, procedures, measurement against objective standards, and belief in the 
effectiveness of surveillance by a directive body. (Harrison and Dowswell 2002; 
Harrison and MacDonald 2003 and Harrison and Smith 2003). 
Self-regulation however, is based on trust of independent, self-sustaining professionals, 
motivated by the ownership of professional standards and codes. Salter (2000) 
concluded that if there is to be any way forward, it will be necessary for these separate 
lines of accountability to be integrated in some way. He observed however, that this will 
inevitably offend the basic principles of self-regulation which only accepts 
accountability to ones peers. There would have to be a mutual acceptance of shared 
ownership and responsibility for the quality of the services with greater 
collaboration between medicine and the state. The medical profession would in effect 
have to accept that, 
'medicine's sovereignty is no longer absolute but contingent upon its delivery 
of the state's clinical governance agenda. This would involve the re-working of 
clinical autonomy and peer review to render them contingent upon their 
contribution to the needs of public accountability.' (Salter 2000:880). 
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4.5.2 Harrison and Ahmed (2000) and Harrison and Smith (2003) examined the 
alleged decline in the professional autonomy and dominance of the British medical 
profession over recent decades. Similar to Salter's (2000) work, these accounts also 
focus on medicine's relationship with the state and NHS management. They ask, how 
autonomous is medicine from management and how far does medicine dominate 
management? 
In 2000, this was examined at micro, meso and macro levels of analysis. Professional 
autonomy at micro level includes control over diagnosis and treatment. Restrictions to 
this are through the use of pre-set budgets, the identification of individual GPs with 
untypical treatment patterns, and the implementation of clinical guidelines. Meso level 
analysis is concerned with institutional relationships between the medical profession 
and the state, examples of this include the legal basis of state licensure and self-
regulation, and the arrangements through which medical interests are mediated, 
including joint government / professional committees and official recognition of the 
British Medical Association as the lead professional association. This impacts on the 
local level through the constitution of governing bodies. The macro-level is depicted by 
the biomedical model, the underpinning belief of which is that ill health equals 
individual pathology, and requires medical intervention. 
Harrison and Ahmed (2000) concluded that these have resulted in a new 'scientific 
bureaucratic' medical labour process which runs counter to post-Fordist principles in 
other industries. This model is 'scientific' because prescriptions for treatment are 
increasingly drawn from an externally generated body of research (evidence-based 
medicine), and 'bureaucratic' because it is implemented through bureaucratic rules and 
clinical guidelines. This implies the Fordist principle of ' one best way' which 
significantly challenges the professional autonomy of doctors. In most other industries 
however, there has been a move away from standardised mass production with highly 
routinised work, to flexible production, where workers are closer to the customer and 
are empowered to meet their needs. In healthcare services this would be achieved via 
the professional autonomy of doctors, which has been curtailed by recent policy 
developments. In predicting the outcome of health care policy over the following 
twenty-five years to 2025, control of the medical profession is seen to be a significant 
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test of state power. It is suggested that this may be achieved by a new organisation 
structure, labelled 'neo-bureaucracy', where rules will be enforced through regulatory 
agencies rather than formal hierarchies. Harrison and Smith (2003) however, question 
the technical, political and behavioural adequacy of neo-bureaucracies. Rules cannot 
deal with every situation facing rank and file general practitioners on a day-to-day basis. 
Harrison and Ahmed (2000) also questioned the legitimacy of state rationing of 
heaIthcare through clinical governance as an alternative to the professional autonomy of 
doctors. Clinical governance, including clinical guidelines and national service 
frameworks (NSF) are, 
'a form of 'blackboxing' ... the condensation of a set of political criteria into a 
set of ostensibly technical and scientific rules, whose perceived legitimacy 
suppresses contestation.' (Harrison and Ahmed 2000: 142). 
Harrison and Smith (2003) suggested the development of such rules for determining 
clinical decisions, may be perceived by the public as illegitimate denials of need. 
Previously, professional autonomy would have been the main means of depoliticising 
and legitimising managerial decisions in a demand-led health care service. Harrison and 
Smith (2003) observed that professional discretion may still be required to get work 
done without exposing resource inadequacies. They concluded that the existence of 
performance measures based on rules, results in mistrust between the medical 
profession and management, inflexibility and as a consequence, reduced ability to 
respond to crisis. This often results in increased costs as additional layers of 
bureaucracy are added to deal with the problems. 
Harrison and Ahmed (2000) and Harrison and Smith (2003) concluded that recent 
heaIthcare policies have resulted in a decline in the autonomy and dominance of the 
medical profession. This is clearest at the micro and meso levels of professional 
autonomy. Harrison et al (2000) recognised however, Friedson's (1986) alternative 
theory of restratification, but suggested that whichever perspective is adopted, doctors 
must increasingly adopt a managerialist approach in order to progress within their 
profession, and that clinical decisions must now be externally referenced. 
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4.5.3 North and Peckham (200t) similarly argued that the implementation of clinical 
governance and PCGrrs represents an attempt to extend control over the work of the 
medical profession, significantly challenging its professional autonomy and self-
regulation. Alford's (1975) theory of structural interests in healthcare was used to 
expose underpinning political pressures in primary care. 'Professional monopolisers' 
are exemplified by the medical profession, whose power is reflected in and secured by 
the law and both private and public institutions. The interests of 'professional 
monopolisers' were seen by Alford (1975) to be challenged by 'corporate rationalisers', 
administrators and government healthcare planners whose objective was to extend 
control over the work of 'professional monopolisers'. In 1975 Alford did not believe 
that healthcare reforms of that day would significantly affect the interests of the 
'professional monopolisers'. North and Peckham (2001) argued that since the mid 
1990s however the situation has changed. Fundholding meant that GPs could be made 
accountable for their performance by peers within a managerial rather than a 
professional context. Fundholders were expected to contain their purchasing of hospital 
services, prescribing and practice costs within a fixed fund. In effect this incorporated 
them as 'corporate rationalisers' encouraged by the incentive of being able to reinvest 
underspends in their practices. 
Whereas fundholding was optional, membership ofPCGrrs is mandatory. Budgetary 
arrangements and the PCGrrs other roles in implementing policies means that GP's 
clinical as well as managerial practice will come under the increasing pressure of 
corporate rationalisation. The limiting of professional autonomy is not perceived to be 
a specific goal ofPCGrrs but is likely to occur via attempts to manage resources with 
greater efficiency, and to regulate standards of professional performance. PCGs are seen 
to be the mechanism by which these strategies are implemented. North and Peckham 
(200 1) argued that, 
'PCGrrs are an important locus of struggles between local professional 
monopolisers and corporate rationalisers. ' (2001: 431) 
PCGrrs organise the work ofGPs through the agency of others who become 'corporate 
rationalisers' from within. These are general practitioner Board members who in effect 
'spearhead' the changes. GP Board members seek to represent the interests of the 
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profession, but at the same time are accountable for executing state policy. In the case 
ofPCTs the political balance is seen to change within the role of the general practitioner 
PCT Board member, so that governance, as opposed to representation becomes the 
main function. North and Peckham (2001) suggested that only committed 'corporate 
rationalisers' are likely to be appointed to these roles in the future. North and Peckham 
(2001) further suggested that PCT status is likely to speed up alternative forms ofGP 
employment presenting further challenges to GP autonomy. It was concluded that, 
'PCGrrs are organisational forms that become vehicles for change they are the 
creation of 'corporate rationalisers' at the centre, designed to incorporate 
'professional monopolisers' at local level who will be steered by health 
improvement and clinical governance programmes, constrained by budgets and 
nudged in the direction of greater plurality in decision-making. 
However .... professional monopolisers may concede only what is necessary to 
corporate rationalisers, and neither interest group may relinquish anything of 
substance .... .'. (North and Peckham 2001:437). 
4.5.4 Mahmood (2001) also observed that NHS managers have gradually achieved a 
degree of control over doctors and that the creation ofPCTs is a recent example of this. 
In line with the findings of North and Peckham (2001), Mahmood (2001) observed that 
the status of GPs on PCT Boards is different to what it was on PCG Boards. They are no 
longer in the majority and are therefore less able to influence PCT policy as a result. On 
the one hand it could be argued that GP membership on PCGrr Boards represents a 
restratification within the profession of general practice (Friedman 1986). They retain 
medical power, avoid lay administration and are able to defend the profession's 
interests. Mahmood (2001) recognised that critics have challenged this (Coburn et aI 
1997), maintaining that such restratification provides greater advantage to the state, 
which controls the profession through these individuals. The individual autonomy of 
rank and file GPs is lost not to managers directly but to these elites. Mahmood (20001) 
also observes that GP Board members are not representative of all GP practices. They 
are more likely to be ex-fundholders from affluent areas. Many of these GPs seek to 
become allied with NHS managers to establish a dominant coalition within the PCT and 
to provide a medical viewpoint informing managerial decision-making. 
84 
Janet Hewitt 
2006 
4.5.5 Hamson and Dowswell (2002) conducted a study with forty-nine GPs in 
Northern England, exploring their perceptions of new governance arrangements, 
including GP representatives on PCGrr Boards had impacted on their professional 
autonomy and self-regulation. Harrison and Dowswell (2002) concluded that this does 
represent a form of rest ratification, and whilst there was no direct evidence of the 
deprofessionalisation of general practice, the shift in trust from professional judgement 
to systems of auditable rules, and the increased routinisation of medical work was 
interpreted as a feature of proletarianisation. 
The increased opportunity for the surveillance of medical work was believed to be 
impacting on the behaviour of GPs, causing them to work as if they were constantly 
being scrutinised (Foucault 1977). GPs reported that they felt it necessary to maintain 
careful records of their clinical decisions, providing the possibility for the external 
surveillance of their work and that this implied a reduction in their autonomy. The 
pressure was perceived to come largely from doctors acting in a managerial capacity on 
the PCG Boards. The agenda ofPCGs was believed to be driven by central government. 
This was interpreted by Harrison and Dowswell (2002) as evidence of restratification. 
4.5.6 SheafT et al (2002) explored the strategies that GPs pursue in response to the 
implementation ofPCGrrs in England. Three patterns ofGP behaviour emerged. Some 
GPs tried to maintain an 'enclave' of general practice organised much as before the1997 
'third way' strategies. They informally discouraged GP participation in PCGrrs. The 
impact of new practices like clinical governance was minimised. Some GPs reduced 
their managerial roles and started to concentrate solely on clinical interests. Salaried 
GPs transferred practice management work to professional managers or fellow GPs who 
were interested. A minority ofGPs responded by trying to take the initiative in 
managing the new PCGrr networks. 
SheafT et al (2002) concluded that compared to clinical work, management and 
professional politics were believed to be of minor interest to GPs. In changing 
circumstances, it was not surprising that individuals revised their views about how to 
defend their professional and occupational interests at different speeds. The divergent 
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responses were also taken to imply that restratification of general practice may be 
starting to occur in England. 
4.5.7 Flynn (2002) uses the Faucauldian concept of , govern mentality', Corpasson's 
(2000) model of 'soft bureaucracy' and Lam's (2000) 'machine bureaucracy' to analyse 
clinical governance. The assumptions underlying clinical governance are explored to 
expose their implications for the regulation of the medical profession This is then set in 
a broader contex1 of changes in state intervention in society. 
Flynn (2002) describes Foucault's conceptualisation of , govern mentality' as regulation 
without direct or constricting intervention Individuals and groups are encouraged to 
define problems in similar ways and to accept responsibility for changing things for 
themselves. Flynn (2002) next draws on Johnson's (1995) analysis which argues that 
professionals are important to the state in its exercise of power and its ability to create, 
implement and monitor systems to achieve 'governmentality'. 
'Surveillance becomes institutionalised and routinised in every aspect of 
economic and social life'. Flynn (2002:163). 
Flynn (2002) refers to Osborne's (1993) observations of new methods for governing 
the medical profession, which rather than reducing the power of doctors, attempts to 
align managerial and professional perspectives, so that doctors in effect take part in 
governance. Flynn (2002) concurs with Osborne (1993), that coercive, hierarchical, 
bureaucratic methods of control are meaningless once managers and professionals 
engage in self-assessment and performance management. Clinical governance is an 
example of the medical profession participating in self-surveillance and distancing the 
process from bureaucratic managerial control. 
Flynn (2002) goes on to discuss Courpassan's (2000) concept of 'soft bureaucracy' as 
an organisation with the rigid exterior of a traditional bureaucracy with a 'loosely-
coupled' set of interior practices. Courpassan (2000) argues that organisations 
employing professionals develop systems of self-governance. Standardised performance 
criteria may be adopted but it is the profession itself who initiate these. This is different 
to the management practices applied to non-professionals who may be controlled 
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through hierarchical supervision, standardisation of work procedures and incentives and 
sanctions applied through contracts of employment. Courpassan (2000) argues that to 
gain recognition of their expert effectiveness, professionals are willing to give up some 
of their autonomy. Simultaneously, managers develop strategies to control professionals 
by 'instrumentalising' success and failure, for example by performance appraisal; and 
by 'objectitying' personal responsibility, for example, by linking objectives and tasks 
with specific individuals, so that decisions and potentially errors can be attributed. 
(Courpassan 2000: 153). 
Flynn (2002) observes that this system is 'soft' because performance standardisation 
achieves 'legitimacy' among professionals in decentralised organisations without 
external coercion, and this is highly relevant to analysis of clinical governance, because 
it is a form of governance that brings together internal and external legitimacy. Flynn 
(2002) argues it is also similar to 'governmentality' because it achieves 'action at a 
distance.' (Foucauld 1977) 
Flynn (2002) next introduces Lam's (2000) ideal-type model of ditTerent forms of 
knowledge linked to organisational forms. 'Embrained knowledge' is individual and 
explicit and dependent on conceptual or cognitive skills. This knowledge is linked by 
Lam (2000) to 'professional bureaucracy', where experts acquire skills and knowledge 
through formal education and training and have a high degree of autonomy. 'Encoded 
knowledge' is collective, explicit, codified enabling organisational control, but this does 
not capture tacit knowledge, skills and judgement. This knowledge is related to 
'machine bureaucracies' where there is a clear division oflabour and specialisation, 
close supervision, and continual attempts to codity knowledge to reduce uncertainty. 
There is also a focus on managerially produced rules, monitoring mechanisms and 
performance standards. The use of tacit knowledge is minimised in a machine 
bureaucracy, and errors are eliminated through performance monitoring. The third kind 
of knowledge referred to by Lam (2000) is "embodied knowledge' which is individual, 
tacit, practical and context specific. This is linked to 'operating adhocracy' where there 
is little standardisation of knowledge and work. The emphasis is on problem solving 
and individuals have a lot of discretion in their work. The final kind of knowledge 
defined by Lam (2000) is' embedded knowledge' which is collective, based on shared 
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'norms', routines, and understandings. This is aligned with a 'Japanese-form of 
organisation' which relies heavily on team work, flexibility, strong corporate culture, 
innovation, diffused knowledge through routines and relationships. Lam (2000) 
highlights that this is an ideal-type model and in reality organisations display 
characteristics of several or all of these forms. 
Flynn (2002) argues that Lam's (2000) model is useful for locating clinical governance. 
Medicine combines aspects of , em brained' and 'embodied' knowledge, whilst clinical 
governance represents an attempt to transform medicine into 'encoded knowledge.' 
With the full implementation of clinical governance the control of the medical 
profession is moving away from 'professional bureaucracy' towards 'machine 
bureaucracy.' Flynn (2002) argues that clinical governance also has many of the 
features ofFoucauldian 'governmentality', in addition, the concept of'soft bureaucracy' 
and 'encoded knowledge' are helpful in understanding the changes in organisational 
control taking place in the English NHS. 
Flynn (2002) concluded that in the English NHS the central state is the dominant actor, 
'clinical governance is a means of strengthening state control over quasi-autonomous 
professionals in a decentralised system' (Flynn 2002: 169). In line with Harrison and 
Ahmed (2000), Flynn (2002) suggests that clinical governance is different from 
hierarchical (Fordist) bureaucracy. At the same time it is not a post-Fordist, post-
bureaucratic organisational model of management with high levels of trust in 'devolved 
collaborative networks' (Flynn 2000: 169). Instead, it is, 
, ... a peculiar hybrid', combining different organisational forms, a mixture of 
rationalities and strategies designed to establish and codify explicit clinical standards, 
and to achieve a rigorous methods of performance evaluation through the co-option 
of medical professionals in ways which give some semblance of delegated 
autonomy.'(Flynn 2002: 169) 
Flynn (2002) suggests that both Courpasson's (2000) 'soft bureaucracy' and Lam's 
(2000) 'machine bureaucracy' are evident in clinical governance. Clinical governanace 
is an example of ' govern mentality', where medical professional expertise is essential for 
the management of health risks, and the profession is regulated through its o\\'n self-
surveillance and self-management. The profession is 
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required to accept responsibility for improving quality and accountability for 
performance through clinical governance, which is informed by managerial concepts 
like 'total quality managemenf and 'excellence'; but it differs because it requires 
discretion, entrepreneurship, flexibility, and self-discipline rather than obedience to 
rules and management directives. This is in line with professional autonomy, but control 
of professional performance is measured by managerially generated performance 
indicators. This is a result of the state's need to control expenditure, health risks and to 
ensure consistent continuous improvements in healthcare. Clinical governance therefore 
adopts a bureaucratic form of control, whilst appearing to involve professionals in the 
design and implementation of the system Flynn (2002) suggests that clinical 
governance is to some degree a process to establish 'encoded knowledge' through the 
use of 'soft bureaucracy'. The question of the 'degree' Flynn (2002) suggests, should be 
the subject of future research. 
4.5.8 SheatT et al (2003) also use Courpasson's (1997) theory of 'soft bureaucracy' to 
explore clinical governance and its impact on the relationship between professionals and 
managers within pcarrs. The question is asked, to what extent do general managers 
and professional leaders in English NHS primary care exercise governance in the way 
'soft bureaucracy' describes? 
Sheaff et al (2003) observed that 'soft bureaucracy'has two aspects to it. Firstly, 
'flexible corporatism', where key professionals are given management positions with 
relatively weak managerial power over their colleagues. Secondly, to reduce 
professional resistance to managerial decisions, three legitimations of managerial 
leadership are employed. 'Instrumental legitimation,' stresses that managerial decisions 
promote the organisation's aims, defined in terms of performance indicators accepted by 
all members of the organisation. 'Political legitimation', is where organisational 
members voluntarily hand over power to managers. Finally, 'liberal legitimation' which 
is the basis of 'soft coercion' where external organisational threats, are posed as threats 
to the organisation's survival. 
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Sheaff et aI (2003) observe that whilst Courpasson's (2000) description derives from 
research in building, energy, fmance firms and a police force, recent public policy in 
Europe and North USA has been to similarly construct networks of providers as a 
governance structure for managing services. PCTs are examples of such networks. They 
are small independent medical businesses, lacking the hierarchical governance 
structures found in traditional bureaucracies. The concept of 'soft governance' is used to 
explore clinical governance and its impact on the relationship between professionals and 
managers within these governance structures. It is asked, to what extent do general 
managers and professional leaders in English NHS primary care exercise governance in 
the way 'soft bureaucracy' describes. 
Leadership in the PCGffs was found to emerge largely from GPs who had been active 
in fundholding or medical audit, informally endorsed as leaders by other GPs. Around 
this 'core' ofleaders were found to be two 'periphery groups'. The 'inner core' 
comprised solely GPs, locality groups and former fundholding networks. These were 
now being used for clinical governance purposes. The 'outer periphery' comprised 
other health care professionals according to task. Sheaff et al (2003) suggest that 
PCG/Ts had few means of exercising power and exacting obedience through 
hierarchical supervision, coercion, or punishing of uncooperative GPs, because most 
were self-employed. 
Elements of 'flexible corporatism' were found in the PCGffs although this was usually 
'watered down' Evidence-based medicine itself was seen to be an impersonal defmition 
of acceptable clinical practice. It is observed that, considering GPs usual sensitivity to 
threats to their clinical freedom they preferred the more prescriptive coronary heart 
disease NSF than the less prescriptive mental health one, and had done more to 
implement it. GPs were unreceptive to anything they perceived as 'managerial norms' 
for managerial control. The same applied to 'managerial tools.' Various existing audits 
and educational activities had been re-labelled clinical governance, or included as part 
of practice or individual development plans. All of these activities were led by GPs. 
Managers were in a weak position to apply any management norms or tools. PCOffs at 
the time of this research had not developed local indicators of individual clinician 
performance, but were starting to. OPs reported documenting their clinical decisions 
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more thoroughly. GP clinical governance leads were visiting the practices to discuss 
progress towards implementing clinical governance and using these opportunities to 
'utter quiet words of warning' where necessary. Competition between GPs was not 
evident, although some seemed wary of others. The only rewards and sanctions 
mentioned were peer pressure and comparison with colleagues. 
SheatT et al (2003) suggested that all three forms of legitimation described by 
Courpassan were evident. Clinical governance activities were legitimated in 
instrumental ways. Clinical governance leads represented necessary tasks in technical, 
problem-solving terms, encouraging GPs to adopt self-imposed targets or to volunteer 
for special projects. Clinical governance leads represented consistent deviance from 
evidence-based guidelines as clinically and scientifically unacceptable. Local clinical 
governance policies reflected national policy initiatives, but this was explained as 
national priorities coinciding with local needs. Sheaff et al (2003) observed, that 
although clinical governance activity was legitimated in these instrumental terms, 
instrumental justification referred to the technical health effects of good clinical 
practice, not its contribution to NHS management objectives. 
SheatT et al (2003) also reported that respondents accepted a variant ofCourpassan's 
'political legitimation' of clinical governance activity because they feared the threat of 
NHS management policing their work, introducing a form of scepticism and passivity. 
Sheaff et aI (2003) concluded that a form of 'soft coercion' was occurring. GP clinical 
governance leads represented national policy as something that could be imposed if it 
was not adopted voluntarily, even though in reality clinical governance policies merely 
represent guidance, the regulatory status of this being unclear. The 'tacit' threat was of 
managerial inteference in medical decision-making, reduced professional discretion, 
more paperwork and tighter fmancial controls. To support this, GP clinical governance 
leads reported referring to national policies relating to quality, in particular the 
formation of NICE and CHI (now CHAI), and the media and other reports offailures of 
medical self-regulation. Local clinical governance policies 
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were also represented by clinical governance leads as a protection from the external 
threat of 'heavy-handed' government and NHS management initiatives. Sheaff et al 
(2003) suggest that this legitimated one GP intervening in the practice of another, at 
both the clinical level and at practice level, in terms of how it was organised, even 
though GP practices are small independent businesses. Under this 'soft coercion' many 
(but not all) GPs were willing to share some of their decision making with GPs in other 
practices and the PCGrr leads. This 'politiacl legitimation' of professional colleagues 
as leaders was reported to be still weak. 
Sheaff et al (2003) noted, that both medical and managerial informants represented 
clinical governance activities and networks as self-managed by GPs and not therefore an 
exercise of managerial control. It was also emphasised that clinical governance was not 
to be imposed on GPs. Clinical governance leads reported that they had found it 
necessary to make performance comparisons none threatening, that self-criticism was 
encouraged rather than external criticism, success stories were well publicised whilst 
problem areas remained highly confidential. Education and training was the means used 
to influence clinical practice because this was perceived by GPs to be non-threatening. 
GPs had been willing to legitimate leadership and give up some power to medics, but 
not to NHS managers. It is reported that GP clinical governance leads believed their 
task was to construct the 'trust' of other GPs. This is understood by Sheaff et al (2003) 
as an example oflegitimating clinical governance activities in 'political' terms. 
Sheaff et al (2003) concluded that whilst centralised policy making leadership does 
exist in PCGrrs, there are few other features constituting them as bureaucracies. GP 
Board members had little hierarchical authority or other means of coercion of rank-and-
file GPs. Individual GPs were unwilling to transfer decision-making authority to NHS 
managers. However, by exposing individual GP practice to the 'gaze' of collective 
professional leaders, this helped to establish technically legitimated rules of professional 
practice which regulate the work of rank-and-file GPs. Thus the focus ofself-regulation 
has moved away from individual GPs to GP leaders on PCGrr Boards. There is 
therefore evidence of restratification in general practice, but this is complex and multi 
faceted. Sheaff et al (2003) found no evidence of deprofessionalisation of GPs. PCGrrs 
were found to a degree to substitute for a traditional bureaucracy as a governance 
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structure through which managers and professional leaders can exercise soft leadership 
over professional general practitioners. 
With respect to the value of the concept of soft bureaucracy as an analytical tool, Sheaff 
et al (2003:421) argued that it identifies that managers do not influence doctors directly, 
but through local professional leaders who have a 'boundary role' of communicating 
managerial priorities and conserving a degree of autonomy for the profession. The 
influence of these leaders is exercised through a, 
'combination of knowledge management, collective self-organisation and the 
innuendo of political threats rather than overt financial, administrative or regulatory 
controls.' (2003:421) 
The focus of self-regulation has shifted away from the individual doctor to medical 
leadership. Sheaff et aI (2003) suggested that such restratification should be understood 
as a differentiation of roles between intermediaries and fellow 
professionals rather than difference of occupational group or employment status, as if 
doctor and manager were mutually exclusive categories. Sheaff et al went on to point 
out the similarities and differences between Friedson's (1986) and Courpassan's (2000) 
ideas. Both describe bureaucracies structured in a hybrid way to take account of a 
professional workforce, and both perceive a move away from informal methods of 
control within professions to more formal controls. Both understand control to be 
exercised by a supervisory group from within the profession itself and a consequence of 
intensified market competition Both agree that one consequence is the reduction of 
individual power and autonomy. Friedson however, maintains that these changes do not 
necessarily reduce the power of the profession as a whole, whilst Courpassan sees the 
construction of new (although still limited) forms of managerial domination. Whilst 
Friedson (1986) divides professional elites into a knowledge elite, and a supervisory 
elite, Courpassan views knowledge mangement and supervision as two aspects of the 
professional leaders role, rather than a difference in status. 
4.5.9 SheafT et al (2004), drawing on Foucauldian theory, examined the effect clinical 
governance policies have on self-regulation, in particular the 'governmentality' and 
discipline of English general practice. The question is asked, what forms of professional 
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discipline are emerging as PCOffs start to implement clinical governance policies? It 
was concluded that medical networks still influence OPs more than NHS managers do. 
The profession still exercises self-regulation to avoid managerial control. Professional 
leaders still mediate between fellow GPs demands and those ofheaIth care policy. OPs 
maintain decision-making power in relation to clinical governance, local healthcare 
needs and strategies to deliver these. The technical quality of GPs work is still 
determined by GPs reviewing fellow professionals work via some form of peer review 
or evidence-based medicine. At the local level, a new form of GP self-regulation is 
evolving which is different from earlier forms. Constant surveillance of GPs clinical 
practice is replacing the 'occasional glance' ofthe local Medical Audit Advisory 
Groups, Local Medical Councils, and the Royal College of General Practitioners, 
'Permissive exception management is gradually yielding to routinised, more 
comprehensive and directive technologies of power focused on mainstream clinical 
practices and the largest care groups' (Sheaffet al2004:100). 
Professional discipline is more collective with professional autonomy and self-
regulation redefined in more collegial terms. 
'A medical discourse is shifting the emphasis from individual autonomy to 
corporacy.' (Sheaff et al 2004: 100). 
This is leading to greater transparency in GPs clinical practice to local medical leaders 
'gaze' and to that ofNHS managers. It is gradually becoming more difficult for rank-
and-file OPs to block changes in clinical practice. This collective control is being 
exercised through semi-forrnallocal networks. There is an emerging group of 
professional leaders who mediate between professionals and managers as in the case 
of hospitals . It is noted that whilst GPs remain influential they are no longer able, in 
isolation, to determine what questions may be asked about their work. PCGrrs are 
increasingly monitoring the work of GPs and the criteria used increasingly originating 
from national bodies subject to the influence of government policy. It is finally 
concluded that as in the case of hospitals , where medical leaders have for some time 
been strengthening professional discipline in order to avoid further managerial 
trespassing upon medical self-regulation, and where some doctors as a result lost power, 
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but the profession as a whole became stronger, a similar process appears to be occurring 
in general practice. A form of professional restratification is occurring. 
4.5.10 Armstrong (2002) explored the way in which GPs make prescribing decisions 
in the context of evidence-based medicine. Evidence-based medicine is used to 
exemplify stratification theory, with rank and file GPs implementing the results of 
clinical research conducted by medical elites. Armstrong (2002) found that evidence-
based medicine enabled general practitioners to resist some of the challenges to 
professional autonomy, since applying scientifically proven treatments provides less 
justification of external constraints. Armstrong (2002) reported that the prescribing 
practice of GPs maintains an individualistic approach to the varying needs of patients 
and to the idiosyncratic prescribing experiences ofGPs. Armstrong (2002) concluded 
there was tension between the concepts of professional autonomy of individuals and the 
concept of rest ratification, but there was no conclusive evidence of rest ratification 
occurring in general practice. 
4.5.11 Dopson et al (2003) examined the origins and impact of evidence-based 
medicine and the mixed reactions of clinicians to its implementation. Dopson et al 
(2003) suggest that the interest of policy makers in evidence-based medicine and the 
resulting clinical guidelines are interpreted by some clinicians as a cost cutting 
mechanism whilst at the same time maintaining standards of care, and as a potential 
vehicle for the rationing of health care. Dopson et al (2003) further suggest that NHS 
managers may perceive evidence-based medicine as a means of increasing control of the 
doctor's work. Evidence-based medicine seeks to create a culture in which practitioners 
automatically think in an 'evidence-based' way and this shapes their behaviour and 
clinical decision making. The medical profession has both accepted evidence-based 
medicine and has also resisted it. 
Dopson et al (2003) highlight the significant influence of the medical profession on 
evidence-based medicine in its early stages, but recognise that support for this did not 
mean it was being applied in every day practice. This is referred to as the 
'implementation gap'. The 'implementation gap' is explained partly in terms of the 
power of the medical profession, although the professional leadership of the 
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implementation of evidence-based medicine is perceived to have helped to limit medical 
resistance. Doctors have been able to undermine evidence-based medicine either to 
bring about change perceived to improve the patient experience when the evidence for 
this is not strong, or to reject unwanted change on the basis of evidence being still under 
trial or weak. 
The 'implementation gap' is explained in terms of the perceived threat to medical 
professional autonomy posed by evidence-based medicine, which may be viewed as 
reducing or eliminating a clinicians right to make medical decisions without challenge. 
Acceptance or other wise of evidence-based medicine and the resulting clinical 
guidelines depends to some extent on whether a doctor sees these as an authoritative 
and credible assistance to improve hislher practice, or as a form of imposed managerial 
control. 
Dopson et aI (2003) conclude that heaIthcare continues to be complex requiring medical 
expertise in both the construction and application of clinical guidelines. Haug's (1973; 
1975) theory of deprofessionalisation is not therefore an adequate explanation of the 
impact of evidence-based medicine on the autonomy of the medical profession. 
Friedson 's (1986; 1989) restratification theory is accepted as a more plausible 
alternative. Overall, the medical profession retains the power to determine its own 
practice and to avoid managerial control, achieved by the emergence of a supervisory 
hierarchy within the profession. Evidence-based medicine and the resulting clinical 
guidelines are viewed as, 
•.... a classic example of stratification, in which some doctors with expert status, sift 
the evidence and provide guidance for other doctors to put into practice.' (Dopson et 
al 2003:323) 
4.5.12 A study conducted by Locock et aI (2004), was part of a Department of HeaIth 
funded evaluation of the implementation and impact ofPCGffs in England. The aim of 
the study was to determine the experiences of GPs in PCGffs and to explore the e~1ent 
to which GPs manage or are managed by these structures. Stratification theory 
(Fried son 1986; 1989) was used to examine whether PCTs will strengthen medical 
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control over resource allocation, whilst avoiding management control of clinical 
decision making. The study also explored whether GPs not involved in decision-making 
at PCG/T level feel a loss of control over decisions and their own clinical practice. 
The conclusions drawn were that at that time there was inconclusive evidence of 
PCGlTs strengthening collective medical control over resource allocation and the ability 
to fend off managerial control over decision making. There was however, clear evidence 
that there had been no significant impact from PCGrrs or other government policies on 
individual professional autonomy of general practitioners. 
The results of the study suggested that some GPs were optimistic about PCTs, others 
were less positive describing strategies for resisting Wlacceptable interference. Key 
concerns were the level of paperwork. meetings and the generally increased workload. 
With respect to clinical guidelines and protocols, some felt these were beneficial others 
disliked the prescriptive nature of these. Some felt clinical freedom was at risk, but this 
was more an anticipated concern for the future. With respect to the impact ofPCTs on 
the quality of care locally less than half of the participants felt there was potential or 
actual improvement in quality. With respect to the impact of the PCGff policies on their 
own individual clinical decisions, responses ranged from rejection of 
any constraint imposed to the welcoming of greater standardisation. Many GPs said that 
they felt constrained but would do whatever was in the best interest of patients 
regardless of guidelines. Some GPs had no problem with the principle of guidelines but 
wanted to reserve the right to make decisions that differed from the guidelines in 
individual cases where necessary. 
Many GPs reported strategies being used to persuade them to abide by PCGrr policies, 
including the use of fmancial incentives, which were believed to be an effective 
mechanism given the independent contractor status of GPs. There were no examples of 
financial penalties for non-compliance although there were fears of this reported for the 
future. Some GPs mentioned peer pressure and local audit. GPs who were not PCG 
Board representatives reported minimal involvement in decision-making structures. 
Many believed good clinical decisions were being over-ridden because of financial 
considerations. Many GPs saw primary care as relatively powerless even though the 
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Boards were trying to ensure policies and decisions were supportive of clinical practice. 
Confidence of rank and file GPs in the GPs who represented them on the Boards was 
high. There was a lack of understanding of what motivated these individuals however. 
The reasons suggested were political ambition, the desire to exercise power and make 
themselves a name, visionaries with a will to be innovative to improve patient care, 
those bored with or not good at direct patient contact, alternative sources of job 
satisfaction, workaholics, those feeling that somebody has to do the job so it might as 
well be them Many GPs felt there was no tension between GPs involved at Board level 
and rank and file colleagues. Where tensions were reported these tended to be because 
policy decisions were felt to threaten professional autonomy or the quality of care, or 
because, colleagues were believed to be 'selling out' to corporate managerial interests. 
4.5.12 Dent (2005) considers the introduction in 2001 of an overarching Council for 
the Regulation of HeaIth Care professionals and other post 1997 reforms on the 
professional autonomy and self-regulation of the medical profession and on the nursing 
profession. Dent (2005) suggests these have resulted in a shift from 'tolerant 
professional autonomy' to a 'responsible professional autonomy'. This has resulted in a 
de-emphasis of individual clinical experience and professional judgement, in favour of 
evidence-based medicine and 'Prescribed Pathways of Care'. Dent (2005), similar to 
other authors also comments on the attempts of the government to integrate medicine 
into management. Dent (2005) argues that these reforms represent a shift from previous 
models of making autonomous professionals accountable, to one of subordinating the 
medical profession to state management systems of surveillance. Concurring with 
Harrison and Macdonald (2003), Dent argues that this has resulted in 'scientific 
bureaucratic' medicine which has diminished the tacit element of medical practice. 
'Integrated Care Pathways, clinical guidelines and protocols are introduced to be 
obeyed rather than as navigational aids, informing rather than directing clinical 
practice' (Dent 2005:6) 
Similar to SheafT et al (2003; 2004), Dent (2005) regards these as examples of 'soft 
bureaucracy' ensuring that central governmentally defmed targets are achieved. 
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Dent (2005) observes a potentially expanded role for the nursing profession resulting 
from the post 1997 reforms. The medical profession is still however perceived to retain 
its dominant influence within the healthcare professions. It is observed however, that 
both the medical profession and nursing (and other health care professionals) have been 
placed under the control of the Commission for the regulation of Health Care 
Professionals. Whilst nurses and some other health care professionals perceive this to 
provide them with grater professional status and recognition, doctors interpret this as the 
means by which their professional self-regulation is subordinated to the Privy Council 
and/or Parliament. For the medical profession this represents, 
' .. a shift away from professional self-regulation to a more tightly defmed suzerainty vis-
a-vis govemment. ; (Dent 2005:9). 
Dent (2005) concludes that the medical profession will be unlikely to accept its own 
undermining by government regulation and nurses encroachment on their traditional 
areas of work. Elite elements within the medical profession will however, accept and 
champion the reforms representing a restratification within the medical profession. 
(Friedson 1886; 1989) 
4.6 Conclusion. 
This chapter has reviewed the nature and development of the professions as a distinct 
occupational group from functional and processual perspectives. It has argued that the 
key defining characteristics of a profession are its professional autonomy and self-
regulation. This has many dimensions to it, but in essence, it is the ability to determine 
the nature and content of work and the right to self-regulation without reference to 
others. The dominance of the professions is based on its unique access to and regulation 
ofa body of knowledge valued by the state and society. Professional autonomy 
empowers the negotiation of other privileges including institutional influence, the 
ability to achieve premium fmancial rewards and entry to exclusive markets, and the 
opportunity to influence policy and its implementation. 
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This chapter has explored challenges to professional autonomy. Neo-Marxist analysts 
interpret reductions in professional autonomy in terms of two overlapping concepts of 
deprofessionalisation (Haug 1973; 1975) and proletarianisation (McKinlay and Arches 
1985; McKinlay and Stoeckle 1988). Deprofessionalisation explains the erosion of 
professional legitimacy and knowledge monopolies resulting from the improved levels 
of general education and a less deferential society. Medical mistakes are open to greater 
scrutiny. Doctors are in effect, technicians producing medicine for the consumer 
according to standard protocols. This implies that non-medical professionals could do 
the job, the doctor's monopoly of knowledge may be easily eroded and managers can 
monitor professional performance. Proletarianisation suggests that in advanced 
capitalist societies professional work is 'bureaucratised' and 'corporatised" reducing its 
status to that of any other type of worker in a capitalist system Professionals work to 
achieve organisation goals rather than to serve clients. 
Regulation and inspection reduce their freedom to practice. Whilst they continue to 
receive high rewards, surplus value is still extracted from their labour. 
Neo-Weberian analysts prefer explanations which focus on changes within the 
profession. Restratification implies a decline in collegiality, with elite groups emerging 
within a profession and limiting the autonomy of 'rank-and-file' practitioners. The 
power and dominance of the profession as a whole is maintained. Medicine has become 
more hierarchical. It has simultaneously responded to and shielded itself from 
managerial control by ensuring that professionals themselves take on significant 
managerial positions. Professions acquire power which was previously the sole domain 
of managers, but the distribution of this varies within the profession. A previously 
homogenous group is divided into those with and those without a wider organisational 
stake. (Friedson 1984; 1986). 
Chapters two and three of this thesis examined New Public Management techniques 
applied in the English NHS. Since 1997 the New Labour Government has implemented 
Primary Care Groups, which have since evolved into Primary Care Trusts, and a 
framework of clinical governance. These have been described as the latest phase of 
managerial ism in the English NHS (Flynn 2002). Recent studies in the primary care 
sector have focused on the impact of these reforms on the relationship between the 
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medical profession and the state, and on the professional autonomy and self regulation 
of general practitioners (Salter 2000; Harrison et aI 2000; Harrison and Dowswell 2002; 
Harrison and Smith 2003; North and Peckham 2001; SheatT et al2002; 2003; 2004; 
Flynn 2002). The key question addressed in these studies is whether restratification is 
occurring in general practice, as it is already believed to have occurred in the case of 
hospital consultants (Hackett 1999; Sheaff et aI 2004). These studies present limited 
evidence of deprofessionalisation, and more significant evidence of both 
proletarianisation and restratification (Salter 2000; Harrison et aI 2000; Harrison and 
Dowswell 2002; Harrison and Smith 2003; North and Peckham 2001; Mahmood 2001; 
Flynn 2002; Sheaff et aI 2002; 2003; 2004). Other studies indicate that the evidence is 
inconclusive (Armstrong 2002; and Laycock et al2004). 
The debate about whether restratification is occurring in general practice in the English 
NHS as a result of post 1997 reforms is ongoing. The purpose of this study is to 
contribute to this debate. The aim of the study is to compare managerial and 
professional perspectives of the impact of clinical governance on the professional 
autonomy and self-regulation of general practitioners in a primary care trust in the 
Northwest of England. The study is differentiated from existing studies reviewed in this 
chapter in that its main focus is clinical governance rather than PCGlTs as new 
organisational forms. The definition of clinical governance in my study is broader than 
in existing studies which have largely focused on the implementation of National 
Service Frameworks (Sheaff et al2000; 2003; 2004) and evidence-based medicine 
(Dopson et al2003; Armstrong 2002). At the time of collecting data for my study the 
new General Medical services contract was being negotiated and most of the 
participants referred to this in their responses, providing additional insight into 
managerial and professional perceptions of the impact of the new contract on the 
implementation of clinical governance in general practice. Whilst most of the existing 
studies use qualitative research methods, there are no in-depth single site case studies of 
this nature, comparing managerial and professional perspectives. The aim of my study 
is to add to the existing body of knowledge by focusing on the impact of the whole 
process of clinical governance on the professional autonomy and self-regulation ofGPs 
and to employ a single site exploratory case study methodology to paint a rich and 
detailed picture of the 'human-side' of the Utopian PCT and the associated general 
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practices. The next chapter presents the research methodology, research design and data 
collection methods employed in my study. 
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Metllodo[ogy. 
Chapter Five 
'We can, and I think must, look upon human life as chiefly a vast interpretative 
process in which people, singly and collectively, guide themselves by defining the 
objects, events, and situations which they encounter ••• ••• ••• Any scheme designed to 
analyse human group life in its general character has to fit this process of 
interpretation' (Blumer 1956:686). 
5.1 Introduction. 
The aim of this study is to examine the impact of clinical governance on the 
professional autonomy and self-regulation of general practitioners (GPs) in a Primary 
Care Trust (PCT) in the Northwest of England from the perspectives of Primary Care 
Trust directors and managers, and medical healthcare professionals working in general 
practice. 
The objectil'es of this research are: 
• To explore clinical governance in the context of general practice and to identify 
the requirements for and the barriers to its implementation 
• To examine the role ofGP Medical Representatives on the Primary Care Trust 
(PCT) Board and Professional Executive Committee (PEC) in the 
implementation of clinical governance in general practice. 
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• To analyse the impact of clinical governance on the professional autonomy and 
self-regulation of GPs to determine whether this is contributing to the 
deprofessionalisation, proletarianisation or restratification of general practice. 
This chapter outlines and justifies the research methodology and data collection 
methods employed in my study in the contex1 of the research questions, aim and 
objectives. The chapter is presented in five sections. The first section is the 
introduction. The second section locates the research in the 'qualitative research 
paradigm' and justifies this choice in the context of the research aim and objectives. The 
third section provides details of the research design, which is a single-site exploratory 
case study employing semi-structured interviews, focus groups, non-participant 
observation and documentary analysis. The fourth section considers the trustworthiness 
of the data The fmal section discusses issues relating to organisational access and 
research ethics. 
5.2 Justification for the Paradigm and Methodology. 
A significant contribution to the understanding of epistemological and ontological 
issues in social and organisational research was made by Burrell and Morgan (1985) 
who produced a matrix of four paradigms representing mutually exclusive approaches 
to the research process (Bryman and Bell 2003). The matrix is displayed at Figure 1 
overleaf. 
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SUBJECTIVE 
THE SOCIOLOGY OF RADICAL CHANGE 
'Radical 'Radical 
humanist' structuralist' 
'Interpretive' 'Functionalist' 
THE SOCIOLOGY OF REGULATION 
Figure 1: Source:-BurreU G. lind 
Morgan G. (1985:22) 
Sociological Paradigms and 
Organisal;onalAnalys;s 
OBJECTIVE 
Johnson and Duberley (2000) observe that the two axes of the matrix are based on 
different assumptions about the nature of social science and the nature of society. All 
social science theory makes assumptions along these dimensions and is located 
somewhere in the matrix according to those assumptions. The horizontal axis makes 
assumptions about the nature of the social world and the methods used to research it. 
Choices are made about ontology, epistemology, human nature and methodology. By 
accepting one set of alternatives the opposite ones are excluded. The vertical axis of the 
framework represents assumptions about the nature of society and at one extreme 
represents 'the sociology of regulation' and at the other, 'the sociology of radical 
change.' The two dimensions produce four paradigms which are labelled 'radical 
humanism', 'radical structuralism', 'the interpretive paradigm' and 'the functionalist 
paradigm' Burrell and Morgan (1985) argue that whilst the paradigms share some 
characteristics they are sufficiently differentiated to be treated as four distinct and 
separate approaches. This produces paradigm incommensurability, because the 
paradigms represent commitment to opposing beliefs about the world and how to 
research it. Jackson and Carter (1991) argued that this incommensurability is important 
because it protects the diversity of scientific thought. 
105 
Janet Hewitt 
2006 
Reed (1985:205) suggests however that the boundaries between the paradigms are not 
so distinct and 'clear cut.' Isolating research into incommensurable paradigms of this 
nature reduces the 
'potential for creative theoretical development.' 
Willmott (1993:23) argues that the subjective/objective dualism leads to a polarisation 
of methodological approaches. Paradigms should rather, 
'arise through critical reflection on the limitations of competing approaches'. 
The approach to research methodology (the philosophical underpinning of research 
techniques) has implications for the research methods (the investigative techniques) 
employed. Bryman and Bell (2003) suggest that there are two different approaches. The 
'epistemological version' which, like the Burrell and Morgan (1985) model outlined 
above, views research methods as embedded in the research paradigm Quantitative and 
qualitative research from this perspective would be based on incompatible 
epistemological and ontological principles. The 'technical version' on the other hand, 
focuses on the strengths of data collection and data analysis techniques 
associated with quantitative and qualitative research, and acknowledges therefore the 
possibility of mixing these methods whilst at the same time recognising that these are 
associated with different epistemological and ontological assumptions. This opens up 
the possibility of combining qualitative and quantitative research methods. 
Symon and Cassell (1998) observe that for some researchers the most important factor 
is selecting the most appropriate technique for the research questions to be addressed. 
This perspective allows for research techniques to be used within a number of different 
paradigms. Researchers provide their own interpretations of research methods 
influenced by their own ontology and epistemology. 
In line with the observations ofBryman and Bell (2003), Creswell (2002) observes that 
two paradigms are widely discussed in the research methods literature, the qualitative 
and the quantitative paradigms. Qualitative research is defined as, 
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, an inquiry process of understanding a social or human problem based on 
building a complex, holistic picture, formed with words, reporting detailed 
views of informants and conducted in a natural setting.' (Creswell 2002: 1 & 2) 
Quantitative research is defined as, 
'an inquil)' into a social or human problem, based on testing a theol)' composed 
of variables, measured with numbers, and analysed with statistical procedures, in 
order to determine whether predictive generalisations of a theol)' hold true.' 
(Creswell 2002:2) 
Denzin and Lincoln (1994:4) compare these approaches, stating, 
'Qualitative researchers stress the socially constructed nature of 
reality ........ They seek answers to questions that stress how social experience is 
created and given meaning. In contrast quantitative studies emphasise the 
measurement and analysis of causal relationships between variables, not 
processes. ' 
Writers such as Firestone (1987); and Guba and Lincoln (1988) contrast the 
assumptions of theses paradigms. Firestone (1987) reports that there are five sets of 
assumptions underpinning both paradigms which at the extreme positions may be 
viewed as diametrically opposed. These assumptions are ontological, epistemological, 
axiological, rhetorical and methodological. 
Ontological assumptions relate to the nature of reality. Is the 'reality' to be investigated 
external to the individual, or the outcome of individual consciousness? 
In qualitative studies 'reality' is subjective as seen by the participants in a study. In 
quantitative research 'reality' is objective and viewed as separate from the researcher. 
Epistemological assumptions relate to the nature of knowledge and therefore the 
relationship of the researcher to the subject of the research. Can knowledge be acquired, 
or is it something that has to be personally experienced? The researcher interacts with 
the researched in the case of the qualitative paradigm, and is independent from it in the 
case of the quantitative approach. 
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Axiological assumptions relate to the role of values in a study. The qualitative 
researcher recognises that the study is 'value-laden', and identifies and reports his/her 
values and biases along with the value nature of information gathered. On the other 
hand, the quantitative researcher believes his /her values are isolated from the study. 
Firestone (1987) refers to rhetorical assumptions or the language of research and 
suggests that qualitative language is more informal, whilst quantitative language is 
impersonal and formal. 
Firestone (1987) argues that from these four sets of assumptions the fifth has emerged, 
the research methodology. This embraces the other four and refers to the entire process 
of the research. Quantitative methodologies include for example, experiments and 
surveys including cross-sectional and longitudinal studies using questionnaires or 
structured interviews for data collection. The intent is to generalise from a sample to a 
population (Babbie 1990). Qualitative methods and traditions are many and varied and 
include for example, interviewing, participant observation and the diary method 
(Easterby-Smith et a12002; non-participant observation, text analysis and discourse 
analysis (Silverman 2001); and conversation analysis (Have 1999). Ethnography, 
phenomenology, grounded theory and case study methodology are also traditions 
associated with the qualitative paradigm (Creswell 1998). 
Qualitative methodology uses 'inductive' logic where issues emerge from the 
informants in a study rather than being identified in advance by the researcher. Creswell 
(2002) argues that this provides, 
'rich, context-bound' information which leads to 'patterns or theories' helping 
to explain a situation or phenomenon' (2002:7). 
Quantitative research on the other hand uses 'deductive' logic, where theories and 
hypotheses are tested for cause and effect. Creswell (2002) observes that concepts, 
variables and hypotheses are chosen before the study begins and remain fixed 
throughout. 
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Quantitative research has a long history flowing from the natural sciences and is 
varyingly referred to as traditional, positivist, experimental or empiricist research 
established by writers such as Compte, Durkheim, Newton and Locke (Smith 1983). 
The qualitative paradigm is termed the constructivist, naturalistic or interpretive 
approach. (Lincoln and Guba 1985~ Smith 1983). Smith (1983) argues that the 
qualitative paradigm began as a countermovement to the positivistic paradigm in the 
late nineteenth century through writers such as Weber and Kant. 
Brewerton and Millward (2001) similarly observe that within the social sciences some 
have challenged the positivist paradigm as inappropriate for the investigation of social 
phenomenon on the basis that in this context reality is constructed and cannot be 
explained in terms of universal laws; rather it is relevant to search for meanings and 
interpretations. In the case of research into the professions for example, Everett Hughes 
(1963), quoted in Macdonald (1995:6) reported that he had, 
' .... passed from the false question, is this occupation a profession? to, what are 
the circumstances in which people in an occupation attempt to tum it into a 
profession and themselves into professional people?' 
This spawned research which as outlined in chapter four of my thesis continues to this 
day, which emphasises the ability of professionals to influence and shape the 
organisations and environments in which they operate, and seeks to identify how 
individuals perceive their social and organisational worlds. (Friedson 1970a; 1970b~ 
1984; 1986; Larson 1977). 
Collis and Hussey (2003) highlight the key criticisms of the positivist paradigm, firstly, 
that it is impossible to treat people as being separate from their social contexts, they 
cannot be understood without examining the perceptions they have of their own 
activities. Secondly, the highly structured research designs of the positivist approach are 
perceived to impose constraints on research results and may ignore more relevant and 
interesting findings. Thirdly, it is not realistic to believe that researchers can be 
objective and independent. They are a part of what they observe, and they cannot do 
anything other than bring their own interests and values to the research. Finally, it is 
argued that to try to capture complex phenomena in a single measure is misleading. 
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Saunders et al (2003) highlight that researchers selecting the qualitative paradigm, 
perceive the social world to be complex and unique, a function of a particular set of 
circumstances and individuals. It is observed however that this may raise the question of 
the 'generalisability' of the results of such research. This is a complex issue, but 
Saunders et al (2003) argue that in qualitative research generalisability is not perceived 
to be important. The social world is changing all the time, and every set of 
circumstances is unique. Ifthis is accepted then there is no need for research results to 
be generalisable. On the other hand, it is necessary to explore subjective meanings 
motivating individual action. People interact with their environments and make sense of 
this through their interpretation of events and the meaning that they extract from these. 
It is the role of the researcher therefore to try to understand the subjective reality of 
participants in a study to make sense of motives actions and intentions. 
Collis and Hussey (2003) observe that the positivist paradigm requires research findings 
to be credible. To be credible findings must be 'reliable' and 'valid'. For positivists, 
research findings if they are to be reliable, must obtain the same results should the 
research be repeated. However under the qualitative paradigm, the criterion of reliability 
is not given so much status, and is differently interpreted. The question becomes, would 
similar observations and interpretations be made on different occasions or by different 
researchers? 
Validity is the extent to which the research findings accurately represent what is really 
happening in a situation. Collis and Hussey (2003) point out that because the positivist 
paradigm focuses on the precision of measurement and the ability to repeat an 
experiment reliably, there is a danger that validity will be low. The measures used may 
not reflect the phenomena the researcher claims to be researching. On the other hand, 
the very aim of the qualitative paradigm is to identify the essence of the phenomena 
under investigation, and to extract data which is rich in meaning and explanation, as a 
result, validity tends to be higher. 
Creswell (2002) suggests that the purpose ofthe research and the nature of its central 
inquiry, along with the researchers 'worldview', education, experience and 
psychological attributes will influence the researcher's research philosophy and design. 
I believe 'reality' to be largely socially constructed, and subjective. For this reason I am 
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interested in discovering manager's and GP's individual perceptions of clinical 
governance and the requirements for and barriers to its effective implementation in 
general practice. I also want to explore manager's and GP's perceptions of the role of 
GP medical advisers in the implementation of clinical governance and its impact on the 
professional autonomy of GPs. Do managers, GPs and other healthcare professionals in 
general practice perceive clinical governance to reduce the professional autonomy of 
GPs or is it merely 'changing hands' within the profession? 
5.3 The Research Design. 
I have chosen to use a case study methodology for my research. The unit of analysis is a 
Primary Care Trust (PCn. The data collection methods used are in-depth, semi-
structured interviews, focus groups, non-participant observation at the Clinical 
Governance and Risk Management Committee and the General Practice Sub-group at 
the PCT, and the analysis of PCT documentation relating to the implementation of 
clinical governance. 
5.3.1 An Exploratory Study. 
This research takes the form of a single site exploratory case study. Exploratory studies 
are, according to Robson (2002:59) 
'a valuable means of rmding out, what is happening; to seek new insights; to ask 
questions and to assess phenomena in a new light. ' 
The aim of my research is to explore the concept of clinical governance in the context of 
general practice, and to discover manager's, GP's and other healthcare professional's 
(working in general practice) perceptions of clinical governance on the professional 
autonomy and self-regulation of GPs. I did not set out to specifically test existing 
theories, but I was guided by a set of propositions which stemmed from reading the 
literature on the professions. Could it be that the professional autonomy of GPs in the 
Utopian area is declining as a result of the implementation of clinical governance in 
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general practice? (Mckinlay and Arches 1985; Mckinlay and Stoeckle 1988) Has the 
professional autonomy traditionally experienced by all GPs in Utopia been redistributed 
to elite groups emerging within the profession? (Friedson 1984; 1986) 
5.3.2 A Case Study. 
Robson (2002: 178) defines a case study as, 
'a strategy for doing research which involves an empirical investigation of a 
particular contemporary phenomenon within its real life contex1 using multiple 
sources of evidence.' 
Yin (2002) identifies the characteristics of case study research. The researcher seeks to 
understand phenomena within a particular context and uses multiple methods for 
collecting data which may be both quantitative and qualitative. Yin (2002) also 
highlights that it is valid to use case study methodology working within either the 
quantitative or qualitative paradigms. 
Yin (1991a and 1991 b) identifies three different kinds of case studies exploratory, 
descriptive and explanatory. Scapens (1990) adds two other types, illustrative and 
experimental. Exploratory case studies seek to assess phenomena in a new context. 
Descriptive case studies attempt to describe current practice. Explanatory case studies 
use existing theory to understand and explain phenomena or events. Illustrative case 
studies attempt to illustrate new and innovative practices, and experimental case 
studies examine the difficulties in implementing new procedures or techniques and seek 
to evaluate the benefits obtained. 
I have chosen to use an exploratory case study approach for my research study. Yin 
(2002) suggests that case studies are appropriate research strategies when research 
questions ask 'how' and 'why' as well as 'what' questions in relation to a contemporary 
set of events, over which the researcher has little or no control. My research focuses on 
the perceptions of managers and GPs of the 'nature' of clinical governance in the 
'context' of general practice and 'how' this impacts on the professional autonomy of 
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GPs. I am seeking to work within the qualitative paradigm According to Robson's 
(2002) definition ofa case study, and Yin's (l991a; 1991b; 2002) explanations of when 
it is appropriate to use case study methodology, this is a suitable research strategy to 
achieve the aim and objectives of my research study. 
I recognise however, that in focusing on individual meaning other qualitative research 
strategies could have been adopted In particular an ethnographic approach would have 
been a valid approach to adopt. Saunders et al (2003) observe that ethnography seeks to 
interpret the social world the research participants inhabit and the way in which they 
interpret it. The research method that dominates ethnography is identified by Gill and 
Johnson (2002: 113) as participant observation, where the researcher, 
'attempts to participate fully in the lives and activities of subjects, and thus 
becomes a member of their group, organisation and community'. 
To use this approach would require me to work with all three groups of participants in 
their organisational settings, firstly at the PCT and then in individual practices. This 
would have been too time-consuming a process and impossible to achieve along side a 
full time teaching job and within the parameters of a part time PhD. Also, the very 
nature of general practice which respects the confidentiality of patients would have been 
prohibitive. I would not have been allowed to observe GPs during consultations to fully 
understand how GPs perceive clinical governance to impact on their work. 
5.3.3 The Parameters of the study - The' unit of analysis' 
The unit of analysis in my study is Utopian Primary Care Trust (Pcn. The number of 
participants in the study is fifty. This includes thirteen PCT directors/managers, nine 
professional representatives at the PCT, twelve 'rank and file' GPs (Thirty four 
participants). In addition eight practice managers participated in two focus groups, and 
eight practice nurses participated in two further focus groups. The field work took place 
in three phases. The managerial participants and the professional representatives at the 
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peT were interviewed first over a 12 month period, February 2003 to February 2004. 
The GPs in the field were interviewed next. During this phase it became apparent that 
practice managers and practice nurses could add interesting insights to the study. At the 
same time, I was conscious of time moving on and was anxious not to get 'side tracked' 
into related issues of interest to practice managers and nurses, but 
not of direct relevance to the study. I decided therefore that the final phase of the 
fieldwork would be to hold focus groups for these participants. The interviews with 
GPs and the focus groups took place over an eight month period, from March 2004 to 
November 2004. 
Bryman (1989) observes that some of the classic studies in organisational research have 
derived from the detailed investigation of one or two organisations. (Blau 1955; 
Gouldner 1954; Roy 1954; 1960 and Selznick 1949). These studies all took 'an 
organisation' or 'a department' as constituting 'the case'. Bryman (1989) states 
however, that people, events and activities can also be viewed as the 'unit of analysis' in 
case studies. Bryman observes that case studies can involve more than one 'site' usually 
to try to improve the generalis ability of research results, the absence of which is a well 
documented criticism of single-site case studies. Bryman (1989) argues that when large 
numbers of 'sites' are involved in a study, the distinctiveness of the case study approach 
is questionable. In my study the aim is not to generalise from the case study to the wider 
population, but to take a 'snapshot' at a particular time of the situation in a particular 
location (Saunders et aI2003). This enables me to complete the research process within 
the financial and time constraints of my part time PhD. The outcome of this exploratory 
case study however, does provide the basis for the study to be repeated in further sites in 
the future if a researcher perceives the new situation to be sufficiently similar to the 
circumstances of this case to make the parameters of the study transferable (Lincoln and 
Guba 1985). It is pertinent at this point however, to reiterate a point made earlier in this 
chapter, that the social world is changing all of the time and every set of circumstances 
is unique. There is no need therefore for results of a study to be generalisable. Instead, 
what is important is to try to understand the subjective reality of the participants in a 
study in whatever circumstances are present at the time (Saunders et al 2003). 
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Bryman (2004) observes that often in qualitative research the numbers of participants 
and how they are selected is not transparent. Saunders et al (2003) suggest that the 
sampling methods most often associated with qualitative research are classified as non-
probability sampling. Participants tend not to be chosen at random but deliberately 
because of the contributions they make to achieving research objectives. The sampling 
methods most often used are defined as quota sampling (although this is also used for 
surveys in the quantitative paradigm), purposive sampling, snowball sampling, self-
selection sampling and convenience sampling. 
Purposive sampling is most often associated with case studies, and enables the 
researcher to use judgement, selecting a sample that is perceived to best meet the 
research objectives. Snowball sampling enables the researcher to identifY other suitable 
or significant participants through other participants during the process of the study. 
Self-selection sampling occurs when individuals are invited to participate and choose to 
accept or decline the invitation. Convenience sampling is used when participants are 
selected because they are easy to obtain, for example, stopping people in the street and 
asking for their participation. 
In my study the PCT managerial participants were selected using the purposive 
sampling method including every PCT director and manager involved with clinical 
governance in the context of general practice. These individuals were key informants 
and are identified by job title in the study. They include, the PCT Chief Executive 
Officer who is statutorily accountable for clinical governance at the PCT as well as in 
associated independent contractor organisations. The Director of Clinical Services who 
is the clinical governance 'lead co-ordinator' at director level and her Deputy Director 
of Clinical Governance and Professional Development. The Director of Primary Care 
who is responsible for the implementation of clinical governance in general practice and 
other independent contractor organisations. Other directors with functional 
responsibilities for clinical governance included in the study are the Director of 
Modernisation, the Director of Human Resources, and the Directors of Finance 
(Acting). The lay Chair of the PCT Board and a Non-executive Directors were included 
not only because of their roles but also because of their previous extensive experience of 
working with general practitioners. 
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Other managers with responsibilities for clinical governance included in the study are 
the Clinical Governance Facilitation Manager who leads a team responsible for 
supporting independent contractors in the implementation of clinical governance; the 
Risk Manager; the Corporate Affairs Manager responsible for the employment of GPs 
who have opted for direct employment with the PCT (two only at the time of data 
collection), and the Head of Health Improvement responsible for the development and 
implementation of key performance indicators at the PCT. There are a total of thirteen 
director and manager participants in all. 
The professional representative participants were selected using a mix of purposive 
sampling and snowball sampling techniques. The professional participants included the 
GP Chair of the Professional Executive Committee, and three GP representatives two of 
whom are also clinical governance 'leads' at the PCT. In the course of these interviews 
I was informed that the two practice nurse representatives, the two pharmaceutical 
advisers and one of the allied health professional representatives also had extensive 
knowledge of working in or with general practice. I decided to interview these 
individuals also. There are a total of nine PCT professional representative participants in 
all. 
The second phase of my fieldwork involved interviewing a sample of twelve 'rank-and-
file' GPs working in the Utopian area and associated with the Utopian PCT. There are 
70 GPs in the Utopian area, two are directly employed by the PCT and the remainder 
work in 30 independent practices, thirteen of which are 'single handed' practices. 
I had been 'wamed' by the managers participating in the first phase of my study at the 
PCT, that the GPs in the field are very busy individuals and might be unwilling to 
participate in my study. This naturally alarmed me, so I decided to write to all of the 
practice managers explaining my study and initially inviting all GPs to participate. One 
of the GPs employed by the PCT agreed to participate. I heard nothing from the practice 
managers! I started to make follow-up telephone calls to the practice managers and 
eventually made appointments with seven GPs at different practices. Several of these 
were subsequently cancelled and then re-arranged. 
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The Clinical Governance Facilitation Manager, whom I had befriended at an early stage 
in my study, contacted me and invited me to a Protected Education Time (PETS) event, 
where GPs were going to meet to discuss the fmancial implications of the new GMS 
contract. This was a great opportunity to make personal contact with GPs who had 
already agreed to meet me, but also many who had not. By the end of the session 
another four GPs had agreed to allow me to interview them This made up my non-
probability sample of 12 GPs. Two of these were 'single handed' practitioners. 
In an ideal world I would have liked to have used purposive sampling so that I could 
have selected GPs who would have added interesting insights because of their varying 
experiences, perhaps because of being 'single-handed' GPs, or because of the size of 
their partnership, or perhaps because of previous fundholding experience. The reality is 
however, that given the circumstances described above I used a mixture of self-selection 
sampling and snowball sampling. The same methods were also used to identify practice 
nurse and practice manager participants for the focus groups. 
Creswell (2002) observes that qualitative research is an emergent process using 
inductive logic. Issues emerge from the informants in a study rather than being 
identified in advance by the researcher. In my study, this proved to be the case, 
participants identified further individuals whose expertise was significant to the study. 
For example, the GP professional representatives highlighted the significance of the 
insights that could be added by the practice nurse, pharmaceutical and allied health 
professional representatives, leading me to invite these individuals to participate in the 
study. Similarly GPs in the field, identified the significance of the potential input from 
practice nurses and practice managers in the field, hence the focus groups were 
arranged. There is a danger however, that the study is never ending. I found this aspect 
of the process challenging, where to 'draw the line' under the fieldwork. 
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5.3.4 Data Collection Methods. 
Yin (2002) observes that researchers using case study methodology employ a range of 
data collection methods. In this study I used semi-structured interviews, focus groups, 
non-participant observation at the peT Clinical Governance and Risk Management 
Committee and the sub group of that committee for general practice, and documentary 
analysis of PCT documentation relating to the implementation of clinical governance. 
Semi-structured Interviews. 
Bryman (2004) suggests that interviewing is widely used in qualitative research and 
often takes the form of unstructured or semi-structured interviews. In unstructured 
interviews the interviewer may ask only one question, or possibly use a set of prompts 
as a memory aid. The participants respond freely with the interviewer following up key 
points. In the case of semi-structured interviews the researcher has a list of topics or 
questions to be followed. At the same time the interviewee has a lot of opportunity to 
reply freely, introducing other related issues. Questions may not follow on exactly as 
indicated in the interview schedule, and the interviewer may ask supplementary 
questions or omit questions from the schedule as deemed appropriate during the 
interview. 
I used semi-structured interviews in this research study. After biographical details had 
been obtained, the interview schedules for all participants, both managerial and 
professional followed the same three themes which were derived from my research 
objectives and were influenced by my earlier literature review. These were, 'the nature 
of clinical governance in general practice', 'implementing clinical governance in 
general practice', and 'the impact of clinical governance on the work and role of GPs in 
practice, and the role of GP medical advisers in the implementation of clinical 
governance. ' I identified a set of generic questions to use as prompts within these 
themes, but these were varied and focused according to the role ofthe participants. In 
the case of the professional representatives and GPs in the field, these individuals were 
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asked the same questions, but when other related issues were identified by the 
participants, I probed further, encouraging the participants to express themselves 
freely in relation to these areas. Examples of the interview schedules used are at a 
Appendix 1. Each interview lasted approximately sixty to ninety minutes. 
The recording or otherwise of interviews is debated in research methods literature. 
Patton (1990) strongly recommends this, whilst, for example, Lincoln and Guba (I 985) 
suggest that recording interviews is intrusive and prone to technical failure with 
potentially disastrous consequences for the research study. I did however record the 
interviews with participants in my study using a Samsung Digital Voice Pen (SVR-
S 133). I found this unobtrusive recorder to be very effective. I think sometimes 
individuals forgot they were being recorded because of the absence of microphones and 
wires. After each interview I 'uploaded' the recording onto audible files on my laptop 
computer. From here I was able to transcribe the interviews into word documents which 
I filed on hard disk and floppy disk. I also printed off hard copies and kept these in A4 
ring-binder files for later analysis. 
Semi-structured interviews are criticised in relation to their 'reliability' and the related 
issue of bias. Easterby-Smith et al (2002) and Healey and Rawlinson (1994) point to the 
lack of standardisation in these interviews. Would other researchers identify similar 
information? These authors also observe that both interviewers and interviewees can 
introduce bias into the interview process. It is also possible for an interviewer to 
introduce bias in the way the responses are interpreted. I do not believe it is possible for 
a researcher to be entirely objective and independent from the participants in a study. I 
accept that during the interviews I conducted I may have impacted in some way on the 
interviewees. Throughout the research process however, I attempted to genuinely and 
honestly interpret and represent the views of my participants as carefully as possible. I 
tried not to ask leading questions or to express a personal viewpoint during the 
interviews, whilst at the same time demonstrating a keen interest in what the 
participants had to say, and keeping as natural an atmosphere as possible. Where I was 
unclear as to meaning, I asked the participants for further clarification. At the end of 
each theme within the interviews I summarised the key points that I believed had been 
119 
Janet Hewitt 
2006 
expressed to enable the participant to correct any misunderstanding that may have 
occurred during the interview. After each interview was transcribed, the participant was 
provided with a copy of the transcript of the interview to check for accuracy. 
Marshall and Rossman (1999) and Saunders et al (2003) note that within the qualitative 
paradigm the view is that it is not necessary to replicate the findings from semi-
structured interviews, since they reflect the situation only at the time the data was 
collected, in a situation which is subject to perpetual change. I would present this 
argument in the case of my study where the circumstances explored are complex and 
dynamic. The advantage of using semi-structured interviews was that the flexibility of 
these allowed me to explore this complexity and build a detailed 'snapshot' of the case. 
Focus Groups. 
Bryrnan and Bell (2003) differentiate focus groups from group interviews. Focus groups 
explore a specific topic in depth, whereas group interviews span more widely. In focus 
groups, the researcher is interested in how the participants discuss the issue as a member 
of a group, rather than simply as individuals. 
As outlined above I had not initially planned to include practice nurses and practice 
managers in my study. During the course of the interviews with the GP professional 
representatives at the peT I had been encouraged to interview the practice nurse and 
allied health professional representatives who had extensive experience of the issues in 
the study because of their work with general practitioners. These individuals, as well as 
GPs in the field had also encouraged me to include 'rank and file' practice nurses and 
practice managers from individual practices in the study. 
I was concerned about timescales in relation to my study, and admit that this was partly 
my reasoning for holding focus groups. I was however also interested in how these 
individuals would relate to each other in a focus group as they discussed their own 
involvement in their practices in relation to the implementation of clinical governance, 
and the impact clinical governance was having on the role and day to day work of GPs. 
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The very diverse nature of general practice and the way these individuals were given 
widely varying responsibility for implementing clinical governance in the practices 
became very clear in the process of all of the focus groups. 
There were four focus groups in all, held in an interview room at the PCT. The focus 
groups comprised two groups of practice nurses each with four members, and two 
groups of practice managers each with four members. I used the same themes to 
structure the focus groups as had been used for the semi-structured interviews, but did 
not identify specific questions. Instead I asked participants to share their experiences 
relating to the implementation of clinical governance in their individual practices. I 
found it necessary to provide more structure to the focus groups to prevent the 
participants from straying from the main point than had been necessary in the individual 
interviews. The focus groups were recorded and transcribed in the same way as the 
interviews. They were of course more time consuming and difficult to transcribe. 
Saunders et al (2003) highlight the problem of inhibiting contributions and issues of 
trust and image management that may arise from gathering people together in groups. 
As noted above, these individuals did self-select as participants, but I was careful not to 
include individuals from practices that were in close proximity to each other in the same 
group. Although the participants did know each other from PCT meetings and in some 
cases had attended common Protected Education Time (PETS) sessions, they were not 
close associates. 
Observation at PCT Committees. 
Patton (1990) suggests that observation provides knowledge of the context in which 
events occur and can enable the researcher to identify things which the participants 
themselves are unaware of Bryman and Bell (2003: 178) defme non-participant 
observation as, 
'a situation in which the researcher observes but does not participate in what is 
going on in the social setting in which he or she seeks to observe the behaviour 
of members of the group, organisation, community.' 
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Non-participant observation is further divided between structured observation and 
unstructured observation. Structured observation is where the researcher formulates and 
applies rules for the observation and recording of the behaviour of participants. 
Unstructured observation does not require the use offormal rules and observation 
schedules for recording behaviour. The aim is to develop a narrative account of 
participant's behaviour in as much detail as possible. 
Over the same twenty months during which the interviews and focus groups took place, 
I also attended as a non-participant observer, the quarterly Clinical Governance and 
Risk Management Committee at the PCT and the follow up sub group meeting for 
general practice. I was not however allowed to record these meetings or to take notes, 
but I was provided with the agenda and minutes of the meetings. I kept notes of my 
observations which I tried to write immediately after each of the meetings recording my 
perceptions of the issues and interactions between the committee members. I was 
particularly interested in the interactions between the GP medical advisers and PCT 
managers in relation to the implementation of clinical governance in general practice. 
Brewerton and Millward (2001) discuss problems and issues associated with participant 
and non-participant observation They suggest that this process requires high levels of 
skill, time and experience. In the case of unstructured non-participant observation, it is 
concluded that there are concerns of validity and reliability because there is scope for 
many alternative interpretations. There is no way of determining that my interpretations 
of the events in the Clinical Governance and Risk Management Committee (CGRMC) 
and its general practice subgroup are accurate. The Assistant Director of Clinical 
Governance and Professional Development and the Risk Manager are key members of 
the CGRMC. After every meeting I attended I met with these individuals to discuss, and 
I suppose I could say, 'confirm' my thoughts about what had occurred in relation to the 
roles the GP Medical Advisers had played in the meetings. I went through the same 
process after the general practice sub group, with the Clinical Governance Facilitation 
Manager who is Chair of this group. I tried to record my observations immediately after 
these meetings whilst they were still clear in my mind. 
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Bryman and Bell (2003) also observe the problem of participants changing their 
behaviour due to being observed. I was introduced to the members of the CGRMC on 
the first occasion I attended, as a lecturer from the local University undertaking a 
research project about clinical governance. After several attendances and as I started to 
get to know members of the committee through their participation as interviewees in my 
study my presence seemed to be accepted. I do not believe that my presence 
changed the behaviour of the members of the CGRMC, in the heat of the debates in 
those meetings my presence was almost entirely overlooked! 
Documentary Analysis. 
Yin (2002: 81) states that documentary information is likely to be relevant to every case 
study topic. Its most important role is to corroborate and supplement evidence gathered 
from other sources. It is observed that, 
' ... if the documentary evidence is contradictory rather than corroboratory, the 
case study investigator has specific reason to inquire further into the topic.' 
It is in the context of confirming the data collected using the methods outlined above 
that documents pertaining to the implementation of clinical governance in general 
practice have been used. I never intended to lUldertake qualitative content analysis, 
semiotics or hermeneutics as a means of interpreting documentary evidence. 
Department of Health documentation and NBS Executive Guidance were referred to in 
my literature review, and used as a key to understanding the concept of clinical 
governance and its surrounding issues. Later in the study NHS guidelines relating to the 
implementation of the new General Medical Services (GMS) contract were also 
examined. Other PCT documentation referred to include the Local Delivery Plan (LDP); 
documentation from the Local Implementation Teams (LIT) for the implementation of 
National Service frameworks (NSFs); the Clinical Governance and Risk Management 
Development Plan; the PCT Medicines Management Plan; the PCT Communication 
Strategy; the Agendas and Minutes of the Clinical Governance and Risk Management 
Committee (CGRMC) meetings and its sub group relating to general practice. In 
addition, I had sight of some of the summaries ofNSFs that were circulated to GPs as 
123 
Janet Hewitt 
2006 
examples of points made by the pharmaceutical advisers to the peT; and blank outlines 
of the self-assessment questionnaire and action plans used by the Clinical Governance 
Facilitation Team with general practices to determine their baseline position for clinical 
governance. 
Yin (2002) observes that the strengths of using documents in a research study are that 
they can be repeatedly reviewed and they are exact in that they contain details of contact 
names and events. The weaknesses are identified as difficulty in retrieving documents 
or accessing them, and that they might reflect the unknown bias of the authors. I found 
the documents I used a useful source of contact names in the research process; a very 
useful source of background information about implementing clinical governance in the 
Utopian area, and as suggested by Yin (2002), a useful way of validating the data 
collected from other sources. I did not have difficulty accessing the documents that are 
in the public domain. Over time as the various participants got to know and trust me and 
to understand more fully the nature of my research, they started to include me on 
circulation lists and to advise me of documents they thought might be useful. As 
participants referred to documents in their interviews, I asked for copies which were 
nearly always provided. 
5.3.5 Data Analysis. 
Tesch (1990) suggests that working within the qualitative research paradigm there are 
various styles of data analysis, and no one 'right way' of undertaking the process. Data 
analysis requires the researcher to be comfortable with developing categories and 
making comparisons and contrasts. The researcher also needs to be 'open minded' to 
alternative explanations of their findings. (Creswell 2002). 
Tesch (1990) refers to processes of 'de-contextualisation' and 'recontextualisation', 
where large quantities of information are reduced to 'patterns' and 'themes' and then 
reinterpreted using some framework and built into a larger consolidated picture. 
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Creswell (2002:154) observes that, 
, whilst flexible rules govern how one goes about sorting through interview 
transcriptions, observational notes, documents and visual materials ...... .it is 
clear that one forms categories of information and attaches codes to these 
categories. These categories and codes form the basis for the emerging story to 
be told by the qualitative researcher. ' 
Analysing the inten'iew and focus group transcripts 
I began by reading through all of the interview transcripts, and in some cases listening 
again to the recordings of these to get a sense of the whole picture. I sorted the 
transcripts into two categories, 'managerial', including PCT directors and managers and 
the practice managers; and 'professional', including the OP Chair of the PCT 
Professional Executive Committee, the GP medical advisers to the PCT, other 
professional advisers to the PCT, OPs in the field and practice nurses in the field. The 
interview transcripts within these two categories were then numbered. Within each 
separate transcript every paragraph was assigned a letter of the alphabet, A-Z, then A 1-
Zl, A2-Z2 and so on. This was to facilitate quoting from the transcripts when reporting 
the results of the study. 
As the literature review had informed the construction of my research questions from 
which I had derived my research aim and objectives, I similarly used the literature 
review to construct a framework of key concepts relating to clinical governance, and the 
theories of deprofessionalisation, proletarianisation and restratification This framework 
can be found at Appendix 2. I did not set out to 'test' theory in this study but was 
guided by a set of propositions stemming from the literature on the professions, the 
initial framework for analysis of the data allowed for these to be considered. 
Starting with the 'managerial' category of transcripts I examined these for the concepts 
in my framework of analysis and coded the transcripts in relation to these. Sometimes, 
the participant's comments related to more than one of the concepts these were assigned 
additional codes. I made notes in the margins of the transcripts as ideas occurred to me. 
I constructed key points to be made in relation to each of the concepts in the framework 
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of analysis. These were then organised under headings and sub-headings derived from 
the three themes and related questions in the original interview schedules. As additional 
points emerged from the data these were assigned new codes and included under 
relevant headings. In this way the data analysis began with a framework of key concepts 
derived from the literature review, but there was sufficient flexibility in the process to 
enable further related concepts to 'emerge' from the data 
Analysing the observation notes. 
The purpose of the observations of the Clinical Governance and Risk Management 
Committee meetings and the general practice sub-group meetings was to observe the 
interactions of the GP medical advisers and PCT directors and managers. To what 
extent did these individuals behave as professional representatives ofGPs in the field in 
the managerial decision making of the committee, and to what extent did they advise the 
peT managers about the best way of achieving GP compliance with peT policies, 
procedures and initiatives? In analysing the notes from these observations, I identified 
the issue involved, and categorised the behaviour ofGP advisers into 'professional 
representative' and 'management adviser/change agent'. 
Analysing documents. 
In line with Yin's (2002) observations, I used NHS and peT documentation as a source 
of corroboratory evidence to support the results of the interviews, focus groups and non-
participant observations. The documentation was also a useful source of background 
information because it contained detail of structures, systems and procedures in relation 
to the implementation of clinical governance. As I accessed each document I read 
through it, making notes of key points and issues. These were a useful source of 
additional background information to have during the interviewing process. This 
information enabled me to more fully understand the comments made by participants 
and enabled me to probe any contradictions between the documentation and the 
comments made during the interviews. Of course I did not receive all of the 
documentation at the start ofthe study, and so my background knowledge and 
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understanding increased as the study progressed, and I was increasingly able to benefit 
from the use of the documentation in this context. 
5.3.6 Reporting the results. 
After the analysis of the data was completed the results were reported initially in two 
documents, one presenting the 'managerial' perspective and the other reporting the 
'professional' perspective in relation to the aim and objectives of the research study 
(these documents are available on request). The overall aim of the study however, is to 
explore the concept of clinical governance in the context of general practice and to 
examine the impact of clinical governance on the professional autonomy and self-
regulation ofGPs in the PCT forming 'the case', from the perspectives of both 
managers and professionals. The initial two documents presenting managerial and 
professional perspectives were therefore amalgamated into a single comparative report 
of the results of my study which is presented in chapter six of this thesis. The headings 
and subheadings developed during the analysis of the data described above form the 
structure of this chapter. All key points made are evidenced with reference to quotations 
from the interview transcripts. These are referenced with the key informant's job title, 
(GP participants in the field are assigned a number), the number of the interview, the 
page number and paragraph letter from the original interview transcript. This chapter is 
then used as the basis of my discussion presented in chapter seven, where the fmdings 
ofrny research are located in the context of the existing literature in the field of inquiry 
previously outlined in my literature review in chapter four. The discussion chapter also 
draws on the contextual material presented in chapters two and three of my thesis. 
5.4 The Trustworthiness of the Data. 
Creswell (2002) observe that qualitative researchers have no single position in 
addressing validity and reliability in qualitative studies. Lincoln and Guba (1985) 
suggest however that there are four useful criteria to evaluate the results of a qualitative 
study, 'credibility', 'transferability', 'dependability' and 'confirmability'. The key issue 
is, 
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'How can an inquirer persuade hislher audience that the findings of an inquiry 
are worth paying attention to?' (Lincoln and Guba 1985:290) 
Credibility demonstrates accurate presentation of the views of the participants. The 
researcher's interpretations should be supported by the research data. There should be 
logical 'internal consistency' so that the conclusions ofa study correspond with each 
other. There should also be 'external consistency' so that the research participants can 
recognise the results presented in a research study. (Gummeson 2000). Lincoln and 
Guba (1985) suggest that credibility can be achieved by the researcher immersing 
him/herselfin the study over a prolonged period of time to gain depth of understanding. 
Credibility can also be enhanced by triangulation, using different sources of 
information, different data collection methods and by gaining participant validation of 
the research fmdings. 
The parameters of a PhD dictate to some degree the time available for undertaking a 
research study. I was involved with the participants of my study, collecting data over a 
twenty month period during which time I believe I became a well known figure at the 
PCT. This was less the case in the second phase of my data collection when I mostly 
only visited individual practices once to undertake an interview. Throughout this time 
period I was building up a detailed picture of the issues relating to the implementation 
of clinical governance in general practice in the Utopian area, and of the impact on the 
work and professional autonomy of GPs. 
As already outlined, data was coJIected from different sources and using different data 
collection methods, and I made every attempt to ensure that the data I collected and the 
way in which I interpreted it genuinely represents the views of the research participants. 
Lincoln and Guba's (1985) 'transferability' refers to whether the research fmdings can 
be applied to another situation which is sufficiently similar. I have already declared that 
my study is not designed to be 'generalis able' to other settings, nor is this necessarily a 
requirement of qualitative research studies of this nature (Saunders et al 2003). Instead 
it is an attempt to explore what is occurring at a particular time in a particular situation, 
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'the case'. As observed by Lincoln and Guba (1985) it is for the reader to decide 
whether or not the fmdings of my study are applicable to another situation. 
'Dependability' (Lincoln and Guba 1985) is concerned with the research process. Has it 
been conducted systematically and is it rigorous and well documented? 'Dependability' 
in qualitative research has some parallels with 'reliability' in a quantitative study. The 
research design of this thesis as outlined in this chapter adheres to the established 
procedures for case study research strategy (Yin 2002) and the selected data collection 
methods, set within the qualitative research paradigm The results are triangulated by 
using different sources of data, different data collection methods and by involving to the 
degree possible the research participants in confirming the results of the study. In 
addition comparisons are made with other related literature in the field of inquiry in the 
discussion of the results. Throughout the research I have tried to keep accurate records. I 
have both electronic and 'hard' files of my research instruments, transcripts, and 
observation notes. I have all of the peT documentation used in the study filed, and have 
audible files of my interviews and focus groups on hard disk and on back up CD. 
'Confirmability' (Lincoln and Guba (1985), refers to whether the findings from the 
research flow from the data collected. It relates also to the way in which the researcher 
is interpreting the data As outlined earlier in this chapter, I used a 'hybrid' approach to 
this process, deriving a framework for analysing the data from the literature review, but 
also allowing new themes to emerge from the data itself The results flowing from my 
analysis are broadly in line with other similar studies as outlined in the discussion in 
chapter seven of the thesis and add further insights into the area of the inquiry as 
explained in the conclusion to my study presented in chapter eight. 
4.5 Access and Ethical Considerations. 
Bryman and Bell (2003) observe that ethical issues are directly related to the integrity of 
a piece of work, and are concerned with the treatment of research participants. Diener 
and Crandall (1978) suggest that there are four overlapping areas to be considered by 
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researchers, potential harm to participants, whether there is 'informed consent', invasion 
of privacy and possible deception. 
Harm to participants relates to potential physical harm, harm to development or self-
esteem, harm to career prospects or future employment, and 'inducing subjects to 
perform reprehensible acts' (Diener and Crandwell (1978: 19). Bryman and Bell (2003) 
suggest that lack of informed consent relates mostly to situations where the true identity 
of the researcher is unknown to the participants, so that they are not given the 
opportunity to refuse to participate in the study. This is related also to invasion of 
privacy. Bryman and Bell (2003:544) observe that, 
'to the degree that informed consent is given on the basis of detailed 
understanding of what the research participants involvement is likely to entail, 
he or she, in a sense, acknowledges that the right to privacy has been 
surrendered for that limited domain'. 
Finally, 'deception' (Lincoln and Guba 1985) is deemed to have occurred when 
researchers represent their research as something different to what it is. 
In my study the process of gaining access to the PCT is closely related to ethical issues. 
I made the initial contact with my research site through an MBA student whose 
dissertation I had supervised. I was introduced to two directors in order to explain the 
purpose of my proposed research and to outline the access requirements of the study. 
Access was granted 'in principle' by these individuals, but I had to make a formal 
submission of a research proposal to the PCT Research Ethics Committee and gain its 
consent before access could be fmally granted. The paperwork for this process was very 
complicated although the times cales involved were quite short because the committee 
was due to meet within a few weeks of my initial interview with the PCT directors. I 
was required to complete a lengthy form with many personal details requested to judge 
my suitability and qualifications to undertake the research proposed. I also had to 
submit the aim, objectives and research questions for the study along with a summary of 
the research design The complication was that I had to gain the consent of all proposed 
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participants before the committee would grant access. This posed few problems in 
relation to the directors and managers of the PCT, but presented a difficulty in the case 
of the independent contractor participants, the GPs. I knew that it would be time 
consuming and difficult to negotiate with GPs for their participation so far in advance of 
the time I wanted to interview them After much discussion with members of the 
Research Ethics Committee it was agreed that the PCT would simply give me a letter of 
introduction, confirming my identity and stating that I had been granted access by the 
PCT Research Ethics Committee. I could then produce this when I was ready to involve 
the independent contractors. They would then have to make their own decisions about 
whether or not to participate in the study. 
I was granted access initially for one year; this was eventually extended by a further 
year. I was asked to produce a management report communicating my key findings in 
relation to the research objectives at the end of the study. 
In relation to potential 'harm to participants' there is one area of concern with my study. 
This relates to the anonymity of some of the participants. In the case of the 
GPs, practice managers and practice nurses there are no issues because these individuals 
are not identifiable in my study. In the case of the PCT Chief Executive Officer, 
directors and managers and to a lesser extent the professional advisers these are not 
identified as individuals, but they are identified by job title. It has been necessary to do 
this to present a sufficiently detailed authoritative account of the subject of the research 
from the managerial perspective. In the context of their specific roles these individuals 
have been key informants in the study. The identity of the PCT is disguised which goes 
some way to ease the problem of anonymity for these individuals. To minimise any 
potential harm to managerial participants in this study there will be limited access to 
this study for a period of time following completion of the project. 
In the context of 'informed consent and issues of privacy' (Lincoln and Guba 1985), as 
previously identified, I had to gain the consent of the managerial participants in advance 
of access being granted by the PCT Research Ethics Committee. In the case of the 
independent contractor participants and members of their practice staff, I had to present 
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a letter of introduction from the Research Ethics Committee, identifying me and 
explaining the purpose of my research when making contact to negotiate access to their 
organisations. 
5.6 Conclusion. 
In this chapter I have differentiated between the quantitative and qualitative paradigms 
whilst recognising an ongoing debate about the validity of this distinction. I have 
located my research in the qualitative paradigmjustifying this choice in the context of 
the aim and objectives of the research and my own personal ontological and 
epistemological preferences. I have identified the research design which is a single-site 
exploratory case study. I have outlined the data collection methods which are semi-
structured interviews, focus groups, non-participant observation and documentary 
analysis. I have discussed the trustworthiness of the data and explained how I have 
analysed and reported the results of my study. Finally, I have outlined the procedures I 
followed to gain access to Utopia peT and issues relating to research ethics. The next 
chapter presents the results ofmy study. Chapters six to eight are presented in Volume 2 
of this thesis. 
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